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About This Book
This volume presents a wide-ranging analysis of the emergence and
worldwide diffusion of social policies. Social policy diffusion is analyzed
in varying fields—affecting all aspects of life—namely, old age and
survivor pensions, labor and labor markets, health and long-term care,
education and training, and family and gender policy. Based on policy
field-specific theoretical approaches, the authors of this volume investi-
gate how the global diffusion of social policy occurs through different
network dimensions. In this perspective, networks of global trade, colo-
nial history, similarity in culture, and spatial proximity are regarded as
“pipe structures,” or structural backbones, of the diffusion process. It is
the first volume that explicitly follows this macro-quantitative perspec-
tive on network diffusion of different social policies on a global scale and
over a long historical period, beginning in 1880. Each study applies the
same method of network-diffusion event history analysis and predicts
the diffusion process for the same set of networks in order to make these
processes comparable. Moreover, diffusion of each policy is highlighted
by its spatial–temporal patterns in global maps. This volume therefore
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Networks of Global Social Policy
Diffusion: The Effects of Culture,
Economy, Colonial Legacies,
and Geographic Proximity
Ivo Mossig, Michael Windzio, Fabian Besche-Truthe,
and Helen Seitzer
Introduction1
The global diffusion of social policy is an emerging field in political
science and comparative macro-sociology. Detailed, qualitative studies
can precisely highlight the mechanisms of diffusion at work, e.g.,
learning, emulation, competition, or coercion (Gilardi 2016; Obinger
et al. 2013). Even though this approach can reveal these mechanisms,
it is limited to the respective cases under investigation. At a higher
level of abstraction, researchers can apply statistical models for diffusion
research on a comprehensive set of countries and over a long historical
1This chapter is a product of the research conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
“Global Dynamics of Social Policy” at the University of Bremen. The center is funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—project
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period. On the one hand, such studies usually abstract from the country-
specific “micro” mechanisms; on the other hand, they provide a “macro”
perspective on the diffusion process in the overall population of countries
around the globe. The empirical studies collected in this volume follow
the second approach.
Our research was conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
1342 (CRC 1342) at the University of Bremen, which is funded by the
German Research Foundation (DFG). The members of the CRC 1342
collected an unprecedented amount of historical data on welfare policies
around the globe to allow for macro-quantitative analyzes of global diffu-
sion in different subfields of social policy covering almost all countries in
the world. This book is a collaborative effort of the quantitative projects
in the CRC 1342 that analyze the diffusion of welfare policies.
We regard diffusion as a process driven by multiplex ties between
countries in global social networks. In social network research, multi-
plexity means that subjects have network ties in various dimensions. In
our view, global trade, colonial history, similarity in culture, and spatial
proximity link countries to each other. In an epidemic, nowadays an
unfortunately well-known type of diffusion, the share of infected subjects
in the population depends on single events of disease-adoption at the
micro-level; these events, in turn, result from some kind of interaction
between subjects. Hence, networks are the “pipe structure,” or the struc-
tural backbone, of the diffusion process. We will analyze diffusion in
several subfields of social policy, investigating the question of which
network dimensions drive the process. For instance, the introduction of
certain labor regulations might depend more on economic ties, in partic-
ular, global trade, whereas cultural similarity between countries could
M. Windzio · F. Besche-Truthe · H. Seitzer






1 Networks of Global Social Policy Diffusion … 3
be more important for family or education policy. This volume aims
at testing the different network structures against one another in their
relevance for the diffusion process in different subfields of social policy.
These policy fields are old age and survivor pensions, labor and labor
markets, health and long-term care, education and training , and family and
gender policy.
The present chapter introduces a network diffusion model for the
analysis of social policy diffusion. We will give a detailed overview of the
networks used in the following contributions. By applying an identical
methodology to different fields of social policy, studies in this volume
contribute to comparative research on the diffusion of social policy.
Four different networks will be analyzed as explanatory variables in
this volume. The first is the network of geographical distance or prox-
imity , which is represented by the distances between the capitals of the
countries included in the sample. This network is based on the assump-
tion that diffusion processes are subject to “slowing” effects of distance
(Staudacher 2005; Berry 1972). However, geographical distances do not
represent actual network contacts but merely promote the formation,
frequency, and intensity of contacts. For this reason, we will secondly
analyze the effect of the global trade network. We assume that beneficial
economic exchange in global markets is a crucial condition for domestic
economic growth (Krugman et al. 2018), but global economic transac-
tions might be less costly if labor or educational standards are similar.
Thirdly, we will analyze the network representing “cultural spheres”
(Windzio and Martens 2021), which we assume to be of particular
importance in the subfields of family and education policy. The fourth
network represents ties of colonial legacies between states and captures
long-term, asymmetric interdependencies. In this framework, the spatial
distance network, or more precisely the spatial proximity network, serves
as a reference point for determining whether the contacts in the three
other network types exceed the breaking effect of distances and are there-
fore more relevant to the diffusion of social policy (Simmons and Elkins
2004).
The aim of this chapter is to present in detail the methodology of the
network diffusion model used in the following chapters and the networks
of geographical distances, global trade, cultural spheres, and colonial
4 I. Mossig et al.
legacies. We will give a brief overview of the current state of research
and argue that the respective networks might be relevant in explaining
diffusion processes in social policy. Subsequently, we will describe the
construction of the networks, network parameters, and visualizations.
Accounting for the change of network contacts over time, we apply longi-
tudinal exponential random graph models (ERGMs) (Harris 2014) to
analyze relevant variables influencing the probability of network ties.
The Network Diffusion Model in Event
History Analysis
Processes of social diffusion often follow a logistic growth curve. Logistic
growth processes are common in epidemiology, where they describe the
spread of infectious diseases (Shen 2020). If the mechanism of diffusion
is contagion via contact among subjects, the probability of meeting an
“infected” subject is very low at the beginning of an epidemic, but the
likelihood increases as the share of those who have already contracted the
disease rises.
Yet subjects show considerable variance in social behavior as well as
in their likelihood to contract the disease. Depending on the disease,
some subjects turn out to be immune, have very few network ties, or are
even isolated. Moreover, if other subjects recover from the disease and are
immune afterward, the increase in the probability of becoming infected
at a particular moment decreases if most subjects to whom potentially
infected persons have contacted are now immune (left-hand side of
Fig. 1.1). This applies not only to the spread of diseases (Shen 2020); we
can also describe the diffusion of innovation in this way and, accordingly,
the diffusion of different social policies as well. Even though the logistic
growth curve is a crucial characteristic of diffusion processes (Rogers
2003), the underlying structure is a network. Networks were not system-
atically included in diffusion analysis until the mid-1990s, when Thomas
Valente developed the network diffusion model (Valente 1995). At the
micro-level, events of contraction drive the diffusion process, which
means that subjects change their state from uninfected to infected, for
example, or to have adopted an innovation—in our case, a policy. Each
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Fig. 1.1 Logistic density and cumulative logistic density function
single micro-level event contributes to the time-dependent aggregation
of these events to the macro-level, where we then describe the diffusion
process as a characteristic of the overall population, for example, by the
cumulative logistic growth function (right-hand side of Fig. 1.1).
At the starting point of an epidemic, all subjects are at risk of adopting
the disease. Due to the waiting time until the moment of contraction,
the underlying micro-level data are called episodes, with the starting
point being the first occurrence of an infection in the population and
the endpoint being either the contraction of the disease, the end of
the epidemic, or simply the end of the window of observation. Conse-
quently, we will apply event history models to analyze micro-level events
of policy adoption in order to reconstruct the diffusion process at the
population level. In these models, the dependent variable is the hazard
rate (in our case the rate of adoption of the respective social policy). It
is defined as the probability P , that the event at time T , occurs within
a particular interval between t and t + t , given that the event has not
yet occurred at t , that is, T is greater than or equal to t .
r(t) = P(t ≤ T < t + t |T ≥ t) = P(t ≤ T < t + t)
P(T ≥ t)
In a discrete-time situation, we can estimate event history regression
models by using binary outcome models (Singer and Willett 2003) such
as logit, probit, or complementary log–log models. In this volume, we
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will use logit models, where the hazard rate r (t ) is predicted by j time-
dummies α that indicate e.g., 25-year time intervals, to estimate the
effects of our four networks of trade, colonial history, cultural spheres,
and spatial proximity, and some control variables β’x.
r(t) = 1
1 + exp( −(α1t1 + ... + α j t j + β1trade + β2colony + β3culture + β4 proximty + β ′x) )
Contagion at time t depends on exposure to subjects already infected at
t−1. Valente (1995, 43) defines exposure as the share of infected subjects
j in the (time-varying) egocentered network of subject i. The term x ij
defines a tie in the egocentered network of subject j, and aj are those
alters already infected at t . The formula below shows that exposure is a




j =i xi j • a j )t
(
∑
j =i xi j )t
Figure 1.2 gives an example of how exposure is calculated and repre-
sented in time-dependent episode data. The table on the right-hand side
of Fig. 1.2 represents the underlying data structure, which is comprised
of two subjects i and j. It shows the dependent variable “d” that
denotes whether the innovation was adopted at a particular time point
“t,” the network exposure (“expo.”), and one binary control variable.
For this exemplary representation, we chose a dummy variable, which
indicates that subject i belongs to the WEIRD “cultural sphere” of
western, educated, industrialized, resourceful and democratic countries as
one control variable (Henrich 2020; Seitzer et al. 2021) (see below). We
will describe this category in more detail later on. To the left of Fig. 1.2,
we see the graphical representation of network exposure in the respec-
tive episodes. Observation i is exposed to 2/6 of its alters who already
adopted a social policy at t1, to 3/6 at t2, 4/6 at t3, and 5/6 at t4. Since
subject i adopts the social policy at t4 + 1, when 5/6 in its network are
adopters, i ’s threshold is 5/6. In contrast, subject j adopted the social
policy at t2 + 1 at a threshold of 3/6.
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Fig. 1.2 Network exposure and the hazard rate
In the column “expo.” in the table to the right of Fig. 1.2, there is
a particular value of exposure for each year in which the two countries
i and j were at risk of adopting (which means that they had not yet
adopted, or T ≥ t ). The event of adoption occurs as a result of a given
exposure in the moment before adoption, so the respective exposure is
lagged by one year. At the bottom of Fig. 1.2, hazard ratios are shown
for the binary explanatory variable WEIRD. Country i is WEIRD and
has 1 event out of 4 time periods at risk and thus a hazard rate of 0.25.
Period t1 has been dropped because of the lagged exposure, i.e., there
is no data on subjects that adopted at t ≤ 1. Country j (non-WEIRD)
has 1 event out of 2 time periods at risk and thus a hazard rate of 0.5,
so the hazard ratio is (1/4)/(1/2) = 0.5. Computing hazard ratios and
standard errors for continuous variables, such as exposure, is much more
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difficult and requires the application of maximum likelihood estimation,
particularly if the model includes further covariates.
The Methodology Used in This Volume
Throughout this volume, we use discrete-time logistic hazard models. The
dependent variable is the absorbing destination state of having adopted
a social policy (= 1). Similar to Fig. 1.2, once a country has adopted the
social policy in question, it drops out of the risk set. Since j adopts at t2
+ 1, there are no data entries for the subsequent time points. Conversely,
more entries are given for i because the adoption comes later in t4 + 1.
Countries that adopted a policy prior to 1880 dropped out of the risk set,
and if they did not adopt until 2010, they are right-censored . In hazard
models, the consequence of left-censoring is usually that the beginning
of the episode is unknown, so we cannot properly compute time-at-risk.
Those countries are not considered in the risk set, i.e., in the underlying
sample on which hazard ratios are estimated. However, they contribute
to the estimation of the network exposure of countries that have not yet
adopted. Right-censoring, on the other hand, means that those countries
remain in the risk set throughout the entire time frame.
To test whether the diffusion of social policy occurs along particular
network contacts, four different networks build the underlying structure
through which we assume diffusion to occur. As mentioned before, these
are geographic proximity, trade relations, cultural similarity, and colo-
nial legacies. Exposure to countries that already adopted a social policy
is calculated separately for every network. Hence, while the exposure
of a country i can be very high in the global trade network, it can be
zero in the colonial legacies network simply because the country has not
had any colonial relationship. Furthermore, the exposure in the respec-
tive network is weighted by tie strength, e.g., exposure to a country
that had already adopted the social policy is higher in a geographically
close country than in one that is further away. Lastly, exposure is esti-
mated either undirected (for the networks of geographic distance, global
trade, and cultural spheres) or directed (for the network of colonial lega-
cies). For the latter, this means that if the colonial power adopted a
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social policy, exposure for its (past) colonial entities increases. However,
this does not hold the other way around. For undirected networks,
exposure would take the same value regardless of direction. Generally,
(unweighted) exposure is included in the logistic hazard models as a
numeric variable ranging from 0, where no alter has adopted the social
policy, to 1, where all alters have adopted the social policy. On a similar
note, the geographical proximity network is time constant, meaning the
tie strength does not change over the duration of analysis, while cultural
spheres, trade, and colonial legacies are time-variant to account for the
declining influence of colonial powers after decolonization, changing
economic partnerships, and evolving cultural characteristics.
We take the four networks as the underlying structures for the diffu-
sion process. As we will see later in the chapter, all networks constitute
different avenues or “pipes” through which communication and infor-
mation about social policies can travel. Taken together, these networks
emphasize different specificities of countries’ interdependencies. By
including different networks, we assume to catch as many instances of
network diffusion as possible through the different mechanisms.
However, social policy diffusion can also depend on domestic factors
such as a country’s level of economic development or financial capa-
bility. The same is true for civil freedom in the political regime (Lindert
2004). Thus, we introduce Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
(Inklaar et al. 2018) and a democratization index as baseline control vari-
ables. The former was linearly interpolated for the whole time frame by
taking the minimum value for every income group based on all obser-
vations before 1800 and filling in any missing values according to the
minimum of the respective income group of the corresponding country
by assuming a logistic growth function. Provided there were no data
available, these were the values to start the interpolation into future
years. This yields a continuous measure of economic development from
1880 to 2010 for almost all countries in our dataset. For the level of
democratization, we use the basic Varieties of Democracy Regime Score
(Lührmann et al. 2018), which in the raw data ranges from 0 to 9
and was linearly interpolated for any missing data points. This method
introduces some noise to the data, as it fills missing data points with non-
natural numbers (decimals). However, filling missing data either with
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the number observed before or thereafter would make the measurement
error even greater. We suspect the benefits of the interpolation to be
greater than its disadvantages and certainly greater than having to discard
observations.
Additionally, the diffusion process in question might show time
dependency resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, we control
for time dependency by using a piecewise constant step function, based
on a baseline of, e.g., 25 years steps, starting in 1880 until 2010. Never-
theless, as different as the social policy fields are in this volume, authors
might very well find a way of defining time effects that better fit their
theories and hypotheses. One last variable that needs introduction is
trade existed . This variable stems from and directly refers to the global
trade network. Because of the historicity of the data, we are often unable
to accurately describe national units that were not established in the
respective historical period. This problem is especially apparent in the
network of global trade based upon the Correlates of War (COW) Inter-
national Trade Dataset (Barbieri and Keshk 2016). Since their collection
efforts were for the purpose of measuring trade between states, any states
considered to be non-existent at a particular moment according to the
COW definition are not included in times of non-existence. Because
our data covers the network across all 164 countries from 1880 until
2010, empty dyads in the trade network do not necessarily mean that
no trade happened. It might just mean that the country did not exist
as an independent trading partner and therefore trade with this country
was impossible. States that did exist but did not officially trade are coded
with a value of zero. To control for the possible distortion of the two
different meanings of zero ties, we include a dummy variable in all esti-
mations which signifies whether a country, according to the trade data,
existed (= 1) or did not exist (= 0).
Lastly, we face a problem with statistically non-independent observa-
tions. During the time frame under investigation, there are historical time
periods in which several countries did not exist because they were part of
a larger unit. An ideal-type example of this are countries of the former
Yugoslavia. For example, if Slovenia and Croatia both adopted a social
policy when they were part of the former Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia was
the overarching unit that actually adopted the policy, thus resulting in
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the introduction of a policy when the country units Slovenia and Croatia
were non-independent observations. This is due to the way we arrange
the dataset for the diffusion analysis: the set of nodes in the network
is constant over time, which implies that Slovenia and Croatia existed
before, during, and after Yugoslavia existed. Our approach to address
this problem is to regard Slovenia and Croatia as “spatial patches,”
remaining well aware of the fact that many countries actually changed
their borders throughout history. From this perspective, Slovenia and
Croatia were spatial patches at risk of adopting a social policy before,
during, and after Yugoslavia existed. Yugoslavia will not be regarded as
a subject in our sample, but Slovenia and Croatia and all other coun-
tries formerly belonging to Yugoslavia are indeed distinct units. These
subjects are not, however, statistically independent from one another!
This does not pose a problem for the calculation of exposure through the
networks but it does cause a violation of the assumption of independence
of error terms in the maximum likelihood estimation. In the logistic
diffusion model, we address this statistical non-independence by using
cluster-robust standard errors (Zeileis et al. 2020). Our procedure has
the following advantage: it accounts for the statistical non-independence
of observations when they are part of an overarching cluster (spatial
patch) by using the corrected standard errors, but it does not impose
any standard error correction in the hazard model for country-years not
belonging to the respective cluster or to any other cluster.
The analyses in all chapters of this book follow the same rationale:
First, the exposure to already “infected” countries is calculated for each
network, as discussed above. This statistic, i.e., the weighted share of ego’s
network contacts who had already adopted the policy in question at t−1,
is then handed over to a time-discrete hazard model. In this model, the
adoption rate is regressed on exposure, controlling for GDP per capita,
the democracy index, and additional policy field-specific factors. The
resulting robust standard errors correct any statistical non-independence,
potentially affecting standard errors. In most chapters, we present the
coefficients as hazard ratios, representing influence of the predictors on
the risk of policy adoption. The results therefore allow us to determine
which of our networks represent a “pipe structure” for the contagion of
social policies, for example, through exposure to countries that already
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adopted the respective policy. We can determine whether factors such as
cultural similarity or trade, for example, have a stronger effect on the
adoption of a policy, as they represent the better “diffusion channel.” To
give an example: if we enhance a diffusion model based on the cultural
spheres network with the trade network and the effect of the former
thereby loses significance afterward, then the trade network is not just a
mediator of the effect of trade on diffusion but also the more appropriate
explanatory variable.
Networks of Social Policy Diffusion
In the following, we discuss the networks we use to explain diffusion
processes in different fields of social policy. As mentioned before, coun-
tries are tied to each other in networks of geographical proximity, global
trade, cultural spheres, and colonial legacies. These network dimen-
sions are the basis of our comparative analysis of diffusion based on the
network diffusion event history model discussed in the previous section.
At first sight, our four networks seem to correspond with the mech-
anisms discussed in the diffusion literature (Obinger et al. 2013;
Starke and Tosun 2019; Gilardi 2016). Networks of colonial legacies
could correspond with coercion, global trade networks with competition,
cultural spheres networks with learning and geographical proximity with
imitation. On second thought, however, such an assignment between
network dimensions and diffusion mechanisms does not capture the
complex reality of policy diffusion. For instance, global trade networks
can also indicate cooperation and division of labor, so that the mecha-
nism at the dyadic or country level would be surely different. Moreover,
whether a policy adoption in a particular country results from learning or
imitation is hard to decide from a global, macro-quantitative perspective.
It is thus important to put the power of the network diffusion approach
into perspective. Network diffusion analysis based on multiplex networks
can reveal the relative importance of the respective “pipe structure” for
the diffusion process under investigation. But neither does it provide
information on agency and decision-making nor does it guarantee that
the networks considered in the analysis actually are the most important
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structures. Possibly, other network dimensions, international organiza-
tions, or even personal networks between experts and policymakers are
more important, e.g., for learning. Our approach is thus a first starting
point in the global analysis of network diffusion of social policies.
Network of Geographic Distances
There is little doubt that geographical distance influences diffusion
processes. The closer the objects of investigation are located to each other,
the more likely they come into contact and the more likely the content of
the diffusion process—e.g., disease, innovation, or a social policy—will
be contracted or adopted. A simple and illustrative example is the spread
of a virus transmitted via personal contacts (Cliff 1979), or, alternatively,
the negative effect of geographical distance in migration (Windzio 2018)
as predicted by the gravity model (Dodd 1950). The “neighborhood
effect” is a simplified version of spatial distance, whereby a location in
the immediate neighborhood increased the risk of adoption.
The strength of neighborhood effects can be derived from the diffu-
sion rate, which in turn depends on the properties of the diffusing infor-
mation. The adoption rate usually declines with increasing complexity
of knowledge or increasing capital intensity (Staudacher 2005). Rumors
about prominent personalities spread rather quickly, while complex
scientific findings, for example, show a much slower diffusion. In addi-
tion to the speed of diffusion, the spatial area in which diffusion takes
place is a crucial factor. If geographical distances were the only explana-
tory factor, the speed of diffusion would allow conclusions about the
topology of the area and the distribution of subjects within this area.
The diffusion rate is usually not constant across time and space, rather
there are preferred routes—for example, through particularly intensive
contacts—which increase the propagation velocity along certain diffu-
sion channels and thus have a significant influence on the propagation
area (Grabher 2006).
In previous research on policy diffusion (Obinger et al. 2013),
geographical distances were used as weighting matrices in spatial regres-
sion models to capture dependencies in the form of “spatial lags” (e.g.,
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Franzese and Hays 2007; Schmitt and Obinger 2013). A simple form of
a spatial weighting matrix is the neighborhood matrix. If two countries
have a shared border, the respective cell of the neighborhood matrix has
a value of 1, and otherwise 0 (Windzio et al. 2019). The neighborhood
matrix thus implies the assumption that only countries with a common
border can influence each other (Obinger et al. 2013). Not least because
of the criticism of this very narrow assumption, the distances between
capital cities were used instead of, or rather in addition to, the neighbor-
hood matrix to define “spatial lags” in the weighting matrices (Schmitt
2019; Simmons and Elkins 2004).
As a justification of the relevance of geographical proximity, it is
often argued that the intensity of communication between countries can
increase due to their proximity. This argument implies the assumption
that the exchange of information between neighboring or geographi-
cally close countries is substantially higher. Even unintended forms of
information exchange occur more easily and thus more frequently. In
addition, policy examples from neighboring or nearby countries are often
regarded as a blueprint for a country’s own national policies, so that a
high degree of mutual influence is assumed due to geographical prox-
imity (Schmitt and Obinger 2013). However, a clear assignment of
geographical proximity to one of the mechanisms from the diffusion
literature—(i) learning, (ii) competition, (iii) imitation, or (iv) coercion
(Obinger et al. 2013; Starke and Tosun 2019)—is difficult. Magetti and
Gilardi (2016) conclude that “Geography is often an important compo-
nent of diffusion, but it cannot be linked straightforwardly to any of
the […] mechanisms. Therefore, it is a catch-all indicator that usually
discriminates between them. It is best used in combination with other
indicators” (Magetti and Gilardi 2016, 93).
Similarly, Simmons and Elkins (2004) note that geographical distance
does not provide a satisfactory explanation for policy diffusion per se.
In line with their view, Beck et al. (2006) point out in a contribu-
tion with the significant title “Space is more than Geography” that,
on the one hand, taking geographical distances into account in spatial
econometrics is a methodological enrichment, but that other measures
for determining interconnectedness between states would produce more
fruitful results. Similarly, Boschma (2005) argues that proximity not
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only encompasses physical–geographical proximity, but that cognitive,
organizational, social, and institutional forms of proximity exist as well.
Accordingly, neighboring countries are more likely to display similar
social structures and traditions. These similarities serve as one expla-
nation for the high correlation between culture and spatial proximity.
This argument fits well with our idea that cultural proximity can also be
an important dimension. Ties in the network of “cultural spheres” (see
below), which is correlated with spatial proximity, can be a much more
meaningful condition of diffusion. Whereas spatial proximity between
capitals is measured almost accurately, however, the network of cultural
spheres is a combination of various complex characteristics and there-
fore more prone to measurement error. According to this brief overview,
we argue that the network of geographical distances serves as a reference
point to measure the relevance of the contact networks of global trade,
cultural spheres, and colonial connections.
The calculation of distances between capitals is described in detail in
Eiser et al. (2020). The corresponding dataset is available in the Global
Welfare State Information System WeSIS (www.wesis.org). To ensure
that an increasing geographical distance indicates a decrease in the inten-
sity of contact, we calculated the inverse of distance. The value for the
contact between two countries i and j due to geographical proximity is
therefore:
xi j = 1/ capital distance
Even though there are occasional shifts of the capital in some countries,
for pragmatic reasons the distances are based on the capital cities in 2020.
Therefore, the geographical distances are a time-invariant network.
Global Trade Networks
In international comparative social policy research, trade networks are
a central indicator for mapping economic globalization processes. Both
in the first wave of globalization from 1890 to World War I (WWI),
and especially during the second wave of globalization from World War
II (WWII) to the mid-1980s, the density of trade networks increased
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rapidly, and trade was the central engine of economic globalization
(Mossig and Lischka 2022). In social policy research, the share of trade
([imports + exports]/GDP) was traditionally interpreted as an indicator
of economic openness (Busemeyer 2009). Cameron (1978) was one of
the first to show an empirical association between the expansion of the
public sector and the integration into world trade for 18 Western indus-
trialized countries. According to his argument, open economies with a
high share of trade in GDP are particularly dependent on external events,
such as price developments on the world market. In order to counteract
these external dependencies, these open economies try to extend their
influence within the domestic economic sectors. Smaller economies in
particular have comparatively high trade shares as a percentage of GDP
due to the smaller domestic market and a high degree of specialization
in their own industrial structure. Accordingly, the economic openness of
smaller economies, such as the Scandinavian countries or the Nether-
lands, partially explains the disproportionate expansion of the welfare
state. In the literature, such side effects of economic globalization are
discussed in the context of the compensation thesis (Rieger and Leibfried
2003; Starke and Tosun 2019).
Since the 1980s the importance of trade networks on world market
integration declined. States have now become increasingly involved in
global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). This competi-
tion takes place with regard to the range of low-cost location conditions
offered, for example, in terms of social security contributions or taxes
(Mossig and Lischka 2022; Düpont et al. 2022). In order to survive this
competition, policymakers considered a dismantling of the welfare state
by lowering social standards and social contributions as necessary (Swank
2010), which was referred to as a “race to the bottom” (Kvist 2004) in
the literature.
Openness or inclusion as measured by trade shares in a country’s
GDP or foreign direct investments (FDI stocks or flows) is a highly
aggregated indicator. It disregards the varying importance of different
trading partners, i.e., it does not differentiate between trading partners
that are important and unimportant to ego. In addition, indirect connec-
tions via third trading partners are neglected. However, the structure of
the network and the position of the individual states in this network
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largely determine the scope of action and also influence the vulnerability
and sensitivity of interstate relations (Glückler and Doreian 2016; Maoz
2011). The significance of economic globalization and the relevance of
intensifying trade linkages for the diffusion of social policy is based on
the assumption that important trading partners influence a country’s
policies more strongly than subordinate trading partners do. As a result
of the globalization process, countries are becoming more closely aligned
with one another, although this does not necessarily mean that social
policy has to converge (Jahn 2016).
The trade networks were defined as follows: The trade data are
collected from the Correlates of War Project (Barbieri and Keshk 2016).
According to the following regulations, the edge weights were deter-
mined for each year. The volume of trade between each of the two
countries comprises the total trade in goods in one year and is there-
fore undirected. The original trade flows were converted into US$ using
the average exchange rate from 2011 to avoid an inflation-related densifi-
cation of the networks. Due to the extremely different trade volumes, we
logarithmically transformed the trade values. The edge weight of trade
interdependence between two countries i, j is therefore:
xi j =
{
log(trade) if trade> 0
0 if trade= 0
If a dyad shared any trade volume in any respective year, the log of this
volume was used, otherwise the edge was set to 0 as the dyad did not
share any trade in the respective year. Further decisions regarding the
construction of trading networks concern former countries that have
split up over time, e.g., Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Serbia-
Montenegro. In such countries, the trade volume of the shared years was
divided according to the GDP proportion of these countries after these
countries separated from each other. In the case of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) this refers to the period from 1922 to 1991,
in the case of the Baltic States 1941–1991, and in the case of the former
Yugoslavia the period from 1918 to 1992. “Small” states that once existed
but are not represented in the selected country sample for this anthology
were deleted (e.g., Yemen People’s Republic, Republic of Vietnam, Korea
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from 1880 to 1905, Kosovo, Zanzibar). Furthermore, because there are
some missing values, we include a dummy variable in the later analysis
which depicts whether a country “existed” based on the COW defini-
tion, as explained in detail above. The network representation in Fig. 1.3
is a quadrilateral Simmelian backbone (Nocaj et al. 2015) (Fig. 1.3).
The network visualization only shows to a limited extent how inten-
sively individual countries are involved in global trade. But weighted
degree centrality can be used as a measure of network integration. In
2010, China was the country with the highest trade integration (degree
centrality of 1.92). The value 1.92 indicates that China was involved
in 1.92% of bilateral trade worldwide, followed by the USA (1.80),
Fig. 1.3 The network of global trade in 2010
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CHN, USA, DEU, FRA, ITA, NLD, JPN, IND, GBR, KOR,




MYS, CHE, SWE, IDN, ZAF, SGP, AUS, AUT, ARE, POL,
SAU, UKR, DNK, FIN, ARG, CZE, EGY, PRT, NOR, GRC,




HUN, VNM, MAR, ISR, NZL, IRN, CHL, NGA, BGR, DZA,
COL, SVK, SVN, PHL, BLR, LBN, BGD, QAT, TUN, KAZ,
PER, KWT, HRV, VEN, LTU, SYR, OMN, KEN, CIV, ECU,




IRQ, AZE, EST, CYP, GTM, DOM, YEM, TZA, CMR, SEN,
AGO, TTO, SDN, PAN, GEO, PRY, CUB, MUS, MKD,
HND, UGA, UZB, MOZ, SLV, ZMB, BEN, ETH, TKM,
COG, MDA, ARM, ALB, AFG, GAB, KHM, BIH, ZWE,
JAM, GIN, BOL, COD, TGO, MRT, PRK, NIC, LBR, MMR,
MDG, TJK, NAM, BFA, MWI, MLI, GNQ, HTI, KGZ,
PNG, DJI, MNE, SWZ, NER, MNG, GUY, SLE, NPL, RWA,
GMB, TCD, LAO, SUR, BWA, FJI, SOM, BDI, CAF, GNB,
SLB, COM, LSO, BTN
No 2010 trade data reported for CPV, SRB, SSD, and TLS
Germany (1.69), and France (1.57). The following Table 1.1 divides the
country sample into quartiles. 17 countries (10.4% out of 164 countries)
with the highest centrality rating account for 25% of the cumulative
degree centrality. In contrast, the last quartile is occupied by 81 countries
with the lowest centrality values in global trade. Bhutan, for example,
which ranks last, only accounts for 0.05% of global trade. Lesotho
(0.08), the Comoros (0.09), and the Solomon Islands (0.10) also had
a very low-degree centrality in 2010.
The Network of “Cultural Spheres”
During the last decades, culture became an increasingly important
concept in economics and the social sciences (Rose 2019; Emirbayer
and Goodwin 1994). Despite its importance, however, culture is quite
a controversial concept. Culture exists at different levels (Basáñez 2016);
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it can be very local, or it can encompass wider regions of the world—
the term can be used to refer to the character of business organizations
or of neighborhoods, cities, and nation-states (Anderson-Levitt 2007).
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” emphasized the role of cultural
conflicts after the end of the Cold War but attracted sharp criticism
for his approach because it also challenged optimistic views on cultural
diversity. He derived his typology of world cultures from the most
important world religions but did not appropriately account for the
cultural diversity within these religions and regions. Finally, he focused
on “fault lines” between cultures, where he supposed conflicts to be
most likely to occur (Huntington 1993). Given this criticism, scien-
tific investigations should think more carefully about how to classify
cultures rather than simply abstaining from analyzing this important
driving force of global politics and political and social change of nation-
states. We thus use the concept of “cultural spheres,” which distinguishes
cultures in the world but allows fuzzy boundaries, a considerable degree
of overlap, and change in cluster membership over time (Windzio and
Martens 2021). Our typology of cultural spheres results from a combi-
nation of time-varying indicators. By regarding cultures as spheres with
fuzzy boundaries, changing membership, and considerable overlap, we
avoid an essentialist concept of culture. We coded our cultural indi-
cators as binary variables and created a valued two-mode network in
which countries are linked to one another by sharing one or several
cultural characteristics, e.g., the highest quartile of the index of polit-
ical liberties or the same language group. We used the following cultural
characteristics to build the two-mode network of cultural spheres: a
country’s dominant religion, gender relations, civil liberties, rule of law,
government ideology (nationalist, socialist or communist, restorative or
conservative, separatist or autonomist, religious), dominant language
group, hegemonic language (English, Spanish, Arabic), Huntington’s
civilizations (African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, Lone
States, Orthodox, Sinic, Western), and both long and short-term colonial
influence (Besche-Truthe et al. 2020). The more of these characteristics
two countries share, the higher their cultural proximity. In our network
diffusion models, we thus include exposure as a weighted term, which
means that exposure increases with the growing share of adopters in
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the network but also with the increasing tie-strength to these adopters.
The cultural spheres network is time varying. For example, proportions
of dominant religious or ethnic groups as well as dominant language
changed over time.
To gain a better overview of the network and the resulting cultural
spheres, we clustered the network with a Louvain clustering algorithm.
According to the time-variant nature of the network, the result suggests
a five-cluster solution in 1880 but a three-cluster solution in 2010. This
supports the idea that there has been an increasing isomorphism in insti-
tutional structures around the globe (Meyer et al. 1997). Figure 1.4
Fig. 1.4 Network of cultural spheres in 2010
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shows the result of a Louvain clustering procedure which results in a
three-cluster solution for the year 2010. Blue vertices represent a cluster
of mostly WEIRD (see above) and economically developed countries,
the second cluster (green) mainly consists of non-dominantly Muslim
African, Asian, and South American countries, and the third cluster
(orange) is dominated by Muslim countries. A closer inspection of
these clusters shows that there is some overlap between cultural spheres
and world regions, but this correspondence is far from being perfect
(Fig. 1.4).
Network of Colonial Legacies
Researching the history of social policy adoption means to acknowl-
edge specific historical interdependencies. A thorough and encompassing
diffusion study must consider early social policy diffusion “under the
conditions of colonialism” and “under conditions of continuing post-
colonial ties” (Kuhlmann et al. 2020, 81). Influences of these depen-
dencies can be as diverse as the mechanisms of diffusion. On the
one hand, we can assume a coercive mechanism in that the empire
just implemented policies in colonies without deliberation. The process
of social policies diffusing from the empire to dependent entities is
described as “imperial diffusion” (Kuhlmann et al. 2020). After the colo-
nial dominion ended, however, a different diffusion mechanism might
have been at work. For example, we know from diffusion research that
perceived similarity can foster orientation toward some specific “role
model” countries; Australia might look to Britain and Guinea to France
for appropriate policy solutions (Dobbin et al. 2007, 453). Further-
more, possible policy solutions can be easier to implement because of
path dependencies, such as institutional structures implemented during
colonial rule that were modeled according to the role model. However,
adverse effects can also be existent, as the institutionalization of policies
in colonies differed in light of different characteristics and the strength
of indigenous traditions (Craig 1981, 192).
Moreover, after colonization ends, the forged linkages between nation-
states can facilitate diffusion in several ways. Specialized actors enter into
1 Networks of Global Social Policy Diffusion … 23
transnational contact, especially in cases where nation-states are actively
searching for role models for their institutions or for the transforma-
tion of their welfare systems. Once, a colonial link has been forged, the
influence does not recede immediately after independence. Indeed, past
studies show a strong correlation between colonial past on the one hand
and enhanced contact and influence between the two countries on the
other, such as through migration (Windzio 2018) or development aid
(Shields and Menashy 2017), for example.
To include both colonial dependencies and postcolonial influences, we
established a network of colonial legacies which is time-variant, directed,
and weighted. This means that much like social network surveys, colo-
nized countries “nominate” their colonizers. In the years of colonial
dominion, the weight of the tie is 1. After colonization ended, an expo-
nential decay parameter is estimated, representing the eroding influence
of the former colonial link. The exponential function has been chosen
because the values tend to get quite small, i.e., the influence via a link
of colonial legacy is diminishing. For example, the values of ties are 0.97
one year after colonization, 0.77 ten years after colonization, and 0.08
one hundred years after colonization. The decay parameter was calculated
with the following function:
exp(−(No. years since colony ends/40))
In our view, the influence of a colonial power does not simply disappear
immediately after the colony becomes officially independent. According
to our assumption, the influence of the colonial power declines much
more gradually over time after official independence is achieved. There
are different variants to compute exposure due to the colonial legacy
based on this function. We apply the function to the standardized expo-
sure as computed by the netdiffuseR package (Vega Yon and Valente
2021), which restricts the range of exposure between zero and one.
Accordingly, the theoretical assumption is that colonial legacy is very
strong and the strength of the colonial power’s influence remains almost
constant after independence. In contrast, if we do not standardize
the exposure, the influence of former colonial powers still exist, but
compared to the standardized computation of exposure, the power
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declines after colonization. To date, there is no commonly accepted stan-
dard by which the influence of former colonial ties on the subsequent
history of a country can be modeled. There are even more alternative
approaches that are conceivable, e.g., that the network of colonial ties
is simply cross-sectional, but this would be a strange assumption for the
historical periods before colonization. Another approach would be to test
the influence in a time-constant way after colonization ended, whereas
the tie in the colonization network is zero before colonization. The
“right” way to capture the effect of colonial legacies might also depend
on the particular social policy under investigation. Finally, since we are
interested in comparing the effects of different networks on the diffusion
of social policy, we should keep in mind the strong correlation of expo-
sure across different networks. Hence, researchers should also interpret
their results against the background of considerable multicollinearity.
The raw data is based on the Colonial Dates Dataset (COLDAT) by
Bastian Becker (2019) in combination with the Centre d’Etudes Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) (Head and Mayer 2014)
and our own data collection using Wikipedia. In line with CEPII, our
definition of colonial links is that a colonial relationship should involve
long-term, civilian administration that includes significant settlement.
We assume, for instance, that the territory of what is now known as
Armenia was “colonized” by the Persian Empire before 1828 and by
the Ottoman Empire before 1920, as well as simultaneously by Russia
between 1813 and 1918. After that time, we assume Armenia to be a
“colony” of Russia until the dissolution of the USSR in 1990. Although
these relations do not depict “classic” (exploitative) colonial relations, we
find merit in a more encompassing approach. The long rule of an empire
leaves marks on the society and the political system at large. We still
see some former USSR states that actively search for contact to Russia
and openly base their (authoritarian) policies on Russian examples, e.g.,
Belarus. Furthermore, by using the aforementioned decay parameter we
do assume a decreasing influence of former rule by empires. Nevertheless,
the colonial network poses a methodological problem when, for instance,
a social policy was adopted for the entirety of the USSR. Due to the
simultaneous adoption of policy, the exposure of former USSR states is
calculated as 0 at the time of policy adoption. That, however, would
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assume an incorrect threshold and therefore distort the regression esti-
mation. Hence, in contrast to Fig. 1.2, exposure was calculated without
a one-year lag in the colonial network, i.e., exposure at t is calculated as
the ratio of alters that adopted precisely at t and not t−1 (Fig. 1.5).
Correlations of Our Networks
Social networks are the structural backbone of the diffusion process. We
are interested in whether the multiplex network in the dimensions of
geographic proximity, colonial heritage, global trade, and cultural prox-
imity do actually relate to different influence channels, or whether they
tend to be rather redundant. If the correlation between ties in a network
or, more precisely, the value of different edges in the dyads are strongly
correlated, these networks tend to be redundant. As Table 1.2 indi-
cates, this is definitely not the case. Here we see a correlation matrix
of the weighted edges and find only minor correlations overall. We find
the highest correlation between networks of cultural spheres and (log)
trade (r = 0.242). As a result, these four networks are far from being
redundant.
However, the correlation of these networks is not the same as the
correlation of exposure to alters that have already adopted the informa-
tion. At the beginning of a pandemic, for example, when exposure is
generally low, it does not matter whether these networks are correlated
or not. Exposure will be low anyway. Minor differences in network struc-
ture can correspond to strong differences in exposure if, for example, the
ego-network of country i has just one more tie to an adopter in the




(exp. decay) Log (trade)
Cultural
prox
Geogr. proximity 1.000 – – –
Colonial tie
(exp. decay)
0.007 1.000 – –
Log(trade) 0.036 −0.007 1.000 –
Cultural prox 0.071 −0.019 0.242 1.000
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(exp. decay) Log (trade)
Geogr.
proximity
Cultural prox 1.000 – – –
Colonial ties
(exp. decay)
0.142 1.000 – –
Log(trade) 0.728 0.038 1.000 –
Geogr. proximity 0.919 0.050 0.741 1.000
(weighted) trade network than in the cultural spheres network but the
additional tie in the trade network has a particularly high weight in the
computation of exposure. Similarly important are situations when most
alters are already infected and exposure is generally high. Exposure can be
1 (maximum normalized exposure) in a network dimension where ego is
tied to 12 alters, but it can also be 1 in another network dimension where
ego is tied only to 2 alters. Table 1.3 shows the correlations of (weighted)
exposure to alters that adopted compulsory education. Indeed, corre-
lations are considerably higher. Exposure in the network of geographic
proximity is strongly correlated with the network of cultural proximity
(0.919) and also with exposure in the trade network (0.741). Moreover,
trade and cultural proximity are highly correlated as well (0.728).
Structural Features and Interdependencies
of Our Networks
How can we further characterize these networks? Networks of positive
ties often show transitive hierarchies, as epitomized by the adage “friends
of my friends are my friends.” If node i names node j as a friend, and if
j is befriended with node k, i tends to close the triad and establish a tie
to k because i regards friends of j as his or her friends as well. However,
not all networks show this pattern. A visual inspection of the colonial
ties network in Fig. 1.5 suggests that the overall share of transitive triads
of all triads is comparatively low, but the structure is dominated by so-
called “in-stars.” We use Exponential Random Graph Models ERGMs
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(Harris 2014) in order to explain the basic determinants of the respec-
tive networks in a multivariate regression. We recoded the weighted edges
into binary values by setting the lowest quintile of geographic distance
to 1 (else = 0). We did the same with values of ≥ 3 of log(trade )
and values > 3 of weighted cultural proximity. These thresholds iden-
tify rather strong ties in the respective network. The motivation of this
model is to maximize the likelihood of actually observing the empirical
network x out of the huge set of networks X that the respective set of
nodes (in our case countries) could form. The outcome of interest is the
probability P of observing the empirical network x out of the huge set
X. The odds of all possible networks are represented by κ(θ), and due to
κ(θ), P is indeed a probability in the equation below, expressed in a way
that resembles a multinomial logit model.
P(X = x) = exp{θ
′z(x)}
κ(θ)




The likelihood is maximized by inserting coefficients θ for the network
characteristics z(x), e.g., transitive closure, homophily, or any other kind
of explanatory variable. Because of the statistical non-independence in
networks, it is almost impossible to get reliable results by using maximum
likelihood methods, the estimation is based on Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulations. Given the specified regression equation, the
algorithm generates a huge set of networks by inserting θ coefficients
drawn from a random distribution and adapts these coefficients until
the equation generates networks similar to the empirical network with
respect to the underlying characteristics z(x). The resulting coefficients θ
of a converged model can be interpreted as changes in the log odds of a
tie in the respective network due to a one-unit change in the explanatory
variable z(x).
The first column in Table 1.4 shows determinants of ties in the trade
network, the second column in the network of cultural spheres , and
the third column in the network of colonial histories. We estimated a
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Table 1.4 Determinants of ties in networks of countries 1880–2010 (t = 8),
temporal exponential random graph models, N = 164
Effects on network ties
Trade Culture Colony
Edges −2.2137* −1.6452* −5.9938*
Structural factors
Gwesp.fixed.0.693 1.0127* 1.0263* –
Gwdsp.fixed.0.693 −0.1569* −0.2130* –
2-in-stars – – 0.1207*
Dyadic factors
Edgecov(spatial prox.) 0.1488* 0.0956 0.5812*
Edgecov(cultural prox.) 0.9971* – –
Edgecov(colonial tie) 0.9816 −0.3214* –
Edgecov(trade tie) – 0.8275* 0.8158*
Political-economic factors
Same regime −0.9179* 0.129 −0.0440
Absdiff(GDP/1000 USD) −0.0182* −0.0055 −0.0078
Indegree(GDP/1000 USD) – – 0.0147
Outdegree(GDP/1000 USD) – – −0.0385*
Degree(GDP/1000 USD) 0.0332* – –
Memory term (tie stability) 2.1166* 1.5484* –
*Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval, p < = 0.001
Source WeSIS database, own computation
temporal ERGM for the period from 1890 to 2010 in 20-year intervals
and eight measurement occasions using bootstrapping methods (Leifeld
et al. 2016). The term “edges” is the intercept of the regression model
and represents the log odds of the network density, given that all covari-
ates are constrained to zero. The positive significant effect of gwesp
(geometrically edgewise shared partners) indicates that transitive closure
much more likely occurs in the empirical network than in a corre-
sponding random network. In contrast, gwdsp (geometrically dyadwise
shared partners) shows a significantly negative effect and points to the
lower probability of open triads (Harris 2014). Aside from these network
structural effects, ties in the trade network depend on spatial proximity
(0.1488*) and cultural spheres (0.9971*) but not significantly on colo-
nial legacies. They occur less often if two countries have the same level
of democratization (same regime) and the higher the absolute difference
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in GDP per capita between ego and alter is. Unsurprisingly, global trade
is an issue of economically well-performing countries since high levels
of GDP increase the degree (0.0332*). We also estimated the memory-
term of “tie stability” (Leifeld et al. 2016), which indicates the stability
of ties and non-ties, and thereby accounts for how strongly the state of
the network at t depends on its previous state at t−1 (Table 1.4).
Column 2 in Table 1.4 shows the effects on the log odds of ties
in the network of cultural spheres . Again, we find the pattern of high
transitivity (gwesp) and a negative tendency toward open triads (gwdsp).
Having a tie in the network of colonial legacies has a negative effect
on cultural similarity (−0.3214*), which means that countries colonized
other countries that were culturally rather different. Contrariwise, a tie in
the network of global trade increases the log odds of a tie in the cultural
spheres network—which we also do not interpret in a strict causal sense
because the direction of the influence could also be reversed (0.8275*).
Our model does not indicate that political regime type in terms of
levels of democratization and economic development corresponds with
culture: if two countries have the same level of democratization, the
log odds of a tie in the cultural spheres network is only insignificantly
increased. The absolute difference in GDP is insignificant as well. Again,
the memory-term indicates a significant effect of the lagged network.
Finally, we analyze the network of colonial legacies, which has quite
a specific topology as shown in Fig. 1.5. This network is rather special
since there are few “hubs” with many ingoing ties, and there is a clear
distinction between node sets of senders and receivers. We find a positive
effect of 2-in-stars. This means that two ingoing ties occur significantly
more often than expected by chance, which is obvious from the visual
representation in Fig. 1.6. In addition, there are positive effects of spatial
proximity and ties in the trade network. While there is no effect of same
regime, effects of GPD per capita are negative on outdegree. Accordingly,
richer countries name other countries as colonizers less often: overall,
richer counties have a considerably lower risk of being colonized.
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Overview of the Volume
Social policy fields investigated in this volume are old age and survivor
pensions, labor and labor markets, health and long-term care, educa-
tion and training, and family and gender policy. In Chapter 2, Breznau
and Lanver analyze the introduction of work injury insurance, which
often marks the beginning of an emerging welfare state. According to
the results, spatial proximity and levels of democratization are the major
determinants of adoption, but ties in the trade network also have a
positive effect. Emerging education states are analyzed by Seitzer, Besche-
Truthe, and Windzio in Chapter 3. They show that cultural proximity
has a strong effect on the adoption of compulsory education, but this
effect vanishes after controlling for spatial proximity. Similarly, in Besche-
Truthe’s study (Chapter 4) the effect of a tie in the network of cultural
proximity becomes insignificant upon the adoption of adult basic educa-
tion policies after controlling for spatial proximity, GDP per capita, and
level of democratization. Moreover, although the introduction of health-
care systems, as analyzed in Chapter 5 by Polte, Haunss, Schmid , De
Carvalho, and Rothgang , mainly occurred in economically prosperous
countries before WWII, the effect of GDP decreases in subsequent
periods. In addition, the effect of spatial proximity decreases over time,
whereas the effect of trade networks seems to increase. Another impor-
tant policy in aging societies is long-term care, analyzed by Fischer, Polte,
and Sternkopf in Chapter 6. Aside from geographic proximity, there
seems to be no horizontal diffusion via networks. Rather, the introduc-
tion of long-term care systems depends on problem pressure (population
75+), political empowerment of women, GDP per capita, and levels of
democratization.
In their study on the introduction of paid maternity leave, family
allowances, and the adoption of workplace childcare regulations, Böger,
Son, and Tonelli (Chapter 7) show that while paid maternity leave was
an important issue on the agenda of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO), family allowances tend to depend more on domestic factors.
In contrast, there seem to be effects of colonial legacies, particularly
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in former French colonies, with regard to workplace childcare regula-
tions. The ILO is in the focus of Hahs study on the ratification of the
C111 Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Employment and Occupation
(Chapter 8). Ties in the network of colonial legacies and spatial prox-
imity seem to drive the diffusion process, but the former effect is strongly
confounded with a country’s legal origin.
Interestingly, exposure to other countries due to similarity in culture
has a negative effect on the adoption of antidiscrimination legislation
supporting the LGBTQ+ community, whereas there are positive expo-
sure effects in the network of global trade (see the study of Seitzer in
Chapter 9).
Chapter 10 by Schmitt and Obinger critically reviews the results and
the research design applied in this volume. They appreciate the macro-
quantitative approach to social policy diffusion, but also recognize its
limitations. Analyzing network diffusion highlights the global interde-
pendence, but does not tell us much about the precise mechanism at
work in a respective country dyad or subnetwork. These mechanisms also
depend on country-specific factors and sometimes on idiosyncratic situ-
ations that we cannot generalize to other interdependent constellations.
Future research on policy diffusion should thus systematically consider
mixed-methods designs and apply a combination of macro-quantitative
data and in-depth case study analyzes.
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The Global Diffusion of Work-Injury
Insurance: The Role of Spatial Networks
and Nation Building
Nate Breznau and Felix Lanver
Introduction1
Work-injury laws, also historically known as workmen’s compensation
and accident insurance , are among the oldest welfare state laws and
often marked by scholars as the beginning of the welfare state (Abbott
and DeViney 1992; Flora and Alber 2009). They extended the basic
principles of responsibility for damages done to persons or property
1This chapter is a product of the research conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
“Global Dynamics of Social Policy” at the University of Bremen. The center is funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—project
number 374666841—SFB 1342.
N. Breznau (B) · F. Lanver




© The Author(s) 2022
M. Windzio et al. (eds.), Networks and Geographies of Global
Social Policy Diffusion, Global Dynamics of Social Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83403-6_2
39
40 N. Breznau and F. Lanver
found in civil and common law traditions. Their implementation coin-
cided with new, dangerous forms of employment in factories, mech-
anized extraction, and construction that came with industrialization.
The workers, families, and communities affected by these new industrial
risks demanded protection, putting pressure on policymakers (Wilensky
1975; Kangas 2010).
Usually, the first work-injury law introduced in a state was employer
liability . Although these laws often standardized compensation levels and
explicitly covered work-related damages, they did little to reduce worker
subversions and revolts. They mostly did not insure against risk because
the burden of proof of harm fell on the worker and compensations were
small and limited in duration (Flora and Alber 2009). More advanced
and effective laws involved the creation of social insurance. These placed
all employees into an insurance scheme, with automatic entitlements
to compensation unless otherwise proven by the employer or insur-
ance agency in court. Social insurance offered financial predictability,
less workplace violence, and protection of both employers and employees
from legal battles (Tripp 1976; Berkowitz and Berkowitz 1984; Pavalko
1989).
Employer liability laws tended to pave the way for social insurance
laws. However, history suggests no standardized trajectory (Haggard and
Kaufman 2008). Types of work-injury laws are only weakly correlated
with industrialization and democratization, leaving functional theories
limited in their capacity to explain cross-country patterns of welfare
state development (Alber 1982). For example, Britain was the earliest
industrializing society and quite democratic, but a latecomer to social
insurance in 1934. Germany was less industrialized and less demo-
cratic, but a pioneer in 1884. Meanwhile, France was similarly developed
as Germany and slightly more democratic, but only introduced social
insurance 10 years later in 1894 (Breznau and Lanver 2020).
Factors of political economy are likely responsible for such variation.
Work-injury social insurance, and the general implementation of social
insurance across policy domains, is an important strategy in political rule.
Social protection laws shift the burden of individual risk to the collective
level, meaning that workers and rulers become bound together with a
common welfare interest. The extent of these provisions often depends
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on the success of left/labor parties and special interests. In general, this
strategy is an adaptation of military conscription. Dating back to the
Greeks and Romans, ruling powers used the promise of veteran bene-
fits to motivate and compensate soldiers engaged in potentially deadly
work to defend the territory and its people (Ierley 1984). Soldier provi-
sions often included forms of health care, pensions, survivor benefits,
and compensation for injuries obtained on duty. The utility of welfare
provisions for expanding and defending a nation’s borders simultaneously
aided in developing and expanding allegiance of soldiers to that nation.
This process can be transferred to workers and their support of their orga-




The idea of a nation-state and democratic rule of law was quite new in
the late 1800s when states first started making national work-injury poli-
cies. It was precisely the expansion of rights by a state that led to workers
having new forms of power to exert in the state (voting, the right to
organize). At the same time, the architects and policymakers developing
nation-states were able to build their own bases of power by offering
these rights (Marshall 1950), and with these rights came institutional
developments like social insurance and the stable bureaucratic structures
to implement it that strengthened the worker-state relationship. The
allegiance of workers in all their forms was crucial to nation-building
because they represented the largest segments of society demographi-
cally and were increasingly exposed to resistance tactics that threatened
the state through urban concentration and the spread of Communist
doctrine.
Theories of power resources and institutions argue that politics and
the ability of special interests to organize and exert power influenced
the timing and scope of work-injury laws. As argued by Korpi (1983),
the agents of the working class—especially unions, socialist movements,
and “left”-parties—competed with employer organizations and special
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interest groups for influence in development of social, economic, and
political institutions via the state. The mobilization of the working class,
motivated in particular by the spread of new socialist ideas, imposed
pressure on the old and new power elites, forcing them to take strategic
action. It is thus a combination of power resources and ruling strategies
which fostered the stabilizing role of social insurance in nation state-
building. The Communist movements were just one example of the
threat of revolution that lurked among populations in early European
state-building after the French Revolution (Breznau 2020).
In Bismarckian Germany, for example, the introduction of social
insurance went hand-in-hand with the Sozialistengesetze , which were
various laws prohibiting a range of socialist, social-democratic, and
communist associations. These laws were dismantled in 1890 due to
the continued success of the socialist party and its allies; however, by
this point Germany had introduced the world’s first national, and rela-
tively comprehensive work-injury social insurance scheme. Arguably, this
contributed to the failure of a socialist revolution despite strong socialist
organization, because the state became strong through public legitimacy,
not only the use of force. In a similar vein, Béland and Koreh (2019)
suggest that in both Canada and Israel social insurance policies played
a prominent role in state-building, despite extremely different historical
and institutional trajectories. Just as with taxes, the authors stress the
importance of revenue raising in contributory schemes, emphasizing the
possibility to use those programs to expand state fiscal capacities and
legitimacy. As states legislate in more areas and control or regulate more
forms of insurance, the state itself becomes indispensable to the economy
and social welfare.
Whether giving or regulating or simply reacting to worker revolts,
state-building was certainly not a linear, “friendly” process, but one
of contradictions and conflict. Nation-building entails attempts to vest
the highest level of power and authority into nation-state governance,
a power to which all other power resource groups (parties, unions,
employer organizations, etc.) are subjugated. From a Gramscian perspec-
tive, this would be construction of a hegemonic state through both
coercion (strong laws against revolutionary organizations) and consent
(providing citizenship, new rights, and social insurance).
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State leaders and policymakers did not operate in isolation. They
constantly engaged in policy learning from other states as they competed
not only for strengthening local, regional, and global power and stability.
This was facilitated by international organizations, political treaties, and
trade. Liu and Leisering (2017) argue that the adoption of Bismarckian
systems was the product of international norm-setting by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO). For example, Japan directly imported
German civil law and later Bismarckian social insurance principles in its
(strong) state development, and the latter was specifically intended to
head off labor problems witnessed across Europe (Gordon 1985). The
Communist party was certainly an international organization by the late
1800s and had great influence on worker movements even before the
ILO and in countries across the globe from the USA to Japan.
It is therefore our main contention that work-injury and especially
social insurance were particularly important in the process of nation-
building. Given that work-injury protection in the form of social insur-
ance tended to preclude or coincide with other forms of social security
(pensions and unemployment protection, for example), it should be a
key event in the construction of successful nations. As it requires legiti-
macy and a clear nation-state within which to enact the policy, it should
come in the early stages of nation-state development. Therefore, we
hypothesize that social insurance is more likely in the years immediately
after nation state formation.
At the same time, employer liability policies were often enacted to
placate rather than empower workers. They paid lip service to worker
movements and calls from elites or humanistic organizations to help
the lot of the suffering workers. In many cases they were simply laws
to achieve recognition and clout internationally, as with appearing ‘in
line’ with the powerful ILO; workmen’s compensation being among the
earliest conventions (C012 1921 and C017 1925). Given that employer
liability laws did not specifically link workers with the state in a soli-
daristic way because they left the burden of proof (thus risk) on the
workers, we expect that enactment of employer liability laws is not more
likely in the years immediately after nation state formation.
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We incorporate our unique hypotheses within the larger theoretical
perspective motivating the collective research in this book. Namely, we
are also investigating the development of social policy as a process of
globalization, so we test our hypotheses while simultaneously attempting
to account for diffusion and historical trajectories. Diffusion processes
related to colonialism, trade, migration, and culture are often theorized
and tested in the development of social spending or the introduction
of welfare state laws (Collier and Messick 1975; Schmitt 2015; Egger
et al. 2017); but we are aware of no study that simultaneously accounts
for both density of adoption among network ties and event history
trajectories to estimate the likelihood of adopting work-injury insurance.
Data andMethods
All data and replication materials are available in our Project Repository.2
We use the Global Work-Injury Policy Dataset (GWIP v1.0) (Breznau
and Lanver 2020) to measure the year of introduction for our depen-
dent variables first law and first social insurance . We recode the latter
to the year when all formal blue-collar workers were de jure covered.
Some countries introduced a first social insurance law that covered only
certain segments and we do not count this. To be consistent with our
nation-building theory, the law should apply to the industrial, blue-collar
workforce whose allegiance is arguably necessary for national success,
and certainly strong development in a global capitalist economy. Full
information on all covariates is available for 151 countries from 1880 to
2010.
Our primary test variable is the year that a country became an inde-
pendent state and the four years following. We also include the year
prior to state formation to account for any measurement error associ-
ated with chopping time data into yearly points; although in only two
cases, a law appeared the year before state formation. We would argue
this is not coincidental but a part of the state formation which starts
2 https://github.com/nbreznau/work_inj_diff.
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many months or years prior to a formal declaration of independence. To
identify state formation, we take the institution of a state government
that had autonomous or semi-autonomous (usually under the purview
of a monarch) domain over policymaking most often established via a
constitution and covering consistent borders or people as our criteria.
For example, Germany in 1871 and Japan in 1890.
Our other independent variables in the analysis account for modern-
ization and political regime by measuring Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita in ten thousand 2010$US and the degree of democra-
tization using the regime scale from the Varieties of Democracy project.
The latter is a continuous measure from most authoritarian to most
democratic. Next, we incorporate four network variables measuring
colonialism, culture, trade, and spatial proximity. These variables are
described in detail in Chapter 1. Briefly, culture refers to similari-
ties in time-varying indicators of political liberties, rule of law, gender
roles, dominant religion, language group, government ideology, and
Huntington’s classification of civilizations. Trade refers to dyadic trade
densities provided from the Correlates of War data and spatial prox-
imity refers to capital distances. As network variables, they measure both
dyadic network linkages and the rate of diffusion among closer ties.
Thus, their effects are weighted, a process also described in more detail
in Chapter 1. See also the methods of Valente (1995).
We tested two network diffusion effects of colonialism, one normal-
ized where the effect of colonialism is constant after colonialism ends
and one where former colonies are still treated as part of the colonial
network after independence. This matters little empirically, as in both
cases the point estimates are close to zero and/or show huge confidence
intervals (Models 4 and 5 in both Appendix Tables). Consistent with
modernization arguments, we tested the robustness of our findings using
percent of the labor force in agriculture for a restricted 83 country sample
using the Banks CNTS data, but it was not any more informative than
our GDP variable and thus not reported here (see Project Repository for
these results).
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Results
We start with a descriptive portrayal of the event of nation-state forma-
tion in Fig. 2.1. Each row of the figure on the y-axis is a single country
plotted across the years 1880–2010. We centered the year measure so
that year of state formation is zero. Thus, the black vertical line is when
each state became independent. The dark grey segments represent time
periods in each nation’s history where there was no work-injury coverage.
The brown segments indicate a country has employer liability, and the
green segments indicate a work-injury social insurance scheme.
Figure 2.1 shows that social insurance is something ubiquitously
introduced after nation-state formation. This means that establishing a
Fig. 2.1 Nation-state formation as a “treatment” effect for the introduction of
work-injury law
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constitution, declaring independence, or various other events that estab-
lished a politically self-ruling state entity are changes in state status
that occur prior to social insurance introduction. Of 150 countries that
enacted any law, 133 (89%) introduced social insurance. Of the coun-
tries that introduced social insurance by 2010, 25 (19%) introduced it
during state formation. Moreover, many countries that have not intro-
duced social insurance are much younger (indicated by the missing
segments in the lower right of Fig. 2.1). Whether this is a causal relation-
ship, we cannot conclude; however, the fact that many states establish
social insurance at the moment of statehood or within the first 4 years
thereafter suggests that social insurance is often part of state and nation-
building, given of course that many other factors are at play, and nation
building is a process that is continual rather than discrete. Further
evidence comes from our regression models whose main coefficients are
displayed in Fig. 2.2 (full results found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in the
Appendix).
In Fig. 2.2, the blue lines refer to Model 2 and the red lines to
Model 3 (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in Appendix), these models are identical
except for the inclusion of network exposure by spatial proximity. More-
over, Models 2 and 3 are otherwise identical for the dependent variables
first law (left panel, Models “A” in Table 2.1) and first social insurance
Fig. 2.2 Discrete-time hazard diffusion models of work-injury law in 150
countries, 1880–2010, Log-Odds
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(right panel, Models “B”). The results reveal that spatial proximity, state-
founded, and democratization all exhibit positive statistical associations
with the yearly likelihood of adopting a first law. The effects are consid-
ered important because they reflect a plausible statistical range that is
significantly greater than zero with a 95% confidence interval (CI) after
robust clustering standard errors by country. The “OR ~” labels added
to the plot for the significant coefficients are exponentiated coefficients,
“odds ratios,” representing the increase in likelihood of adoption in any
given year with a one-point increase in that variable, all else equal.
The spatial proximity variable is weighted by both the distance
between the states and the percentage of members adopting a first law,
thus it is difficult to interpret. However, we can say that the difference
between having few other states nearby adopting and most states nearby
adopting is a 31-fold increase in the likelihood of adoption in a given
year. The CI is very wide, so this is not a highly reliable value and might
range from just a few times more likely to 50 times more likely.
The state-founded variable suggests a 2.2-fold increase in likelihood
of adopting a first law, and the democratization variable has a 1.2-fold
increase. However, we have to keep in mind that odds ratios are always
relative to the actual baseline likelihood of adoption in a given year. This
is difficult to pinpoint because of the time period dummies necessary in
this type of model. In Table 2.1 we see that an average likelihood of adop-
tion in any given period of a first law (Model 3A) is 0.003 or roughly
0.3% all else equal. The state-founded variable represents a (2.2*0.3%
=) 0.66% likelihood of adoption. The window of five years of state
formation is our test variable, thus the likelihood of adopting at some
point in the entire five-year period is 3.3%.3 The democratization vari-
able is measured on a scale from 0 to 9, so we can say that when a state
goes from a score of 2 (or “rather authoritarian”) to a score of 7 (“rather
democratic”) the odds actually increase by (5*1.2 =) sixfold leading to a
likelihood of (6*0.3% =) 1.8%; a perceptibly large increase.
3 Cumulative probability over X years calculated as 1 −(
100 − [percent likelihood in year ]∧X/100∧X).
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The results are slightly different for adoption of a first social insur-
ance law. Here, network exposure to trading partners matters as well
as the other significant effects for any first law. We can say that the
state-founded variable is even more influential. Taking again a rough
average of 0.3% baseline likelihood (Model 3B) a country is (3.6*5
=) 18-fold more likely to adopt during state formation, which is an
overall likelihood of (0.3*18 =) 5.4%, a considerably sized likelihood
in a five-year-period.
Note that our selection of Models 3A and 3B was supported by a
better fit to the data than Models 1 or 2 or any robustness checks in
both dependent variables’ cases.
Discussion
A political economy perspective on institutions suggests that democratic
regimes are more likely to enact universal policies because the citizens
are relatively equal, at least in comparison to authoritarian regimes where
certain groups are often targeted to maintain power (Grünewald 2021).
The measure is fraught with uncertainty, however, as who qualified as
a voting citizen changed dramatically over time. Women were excluded
early in democratic development and often racial/ethnic/religious groups
as well. Moreover, workers were not citizens in early democracies and the
franchise extended only slowly from high-status landowners or nobility
to petty bourgeoisie to the working masses who were also at first mostly
working in informal or subsistence labor.
What is ostensibly striking is the lack of association of GDP with
likelihood of adoption. We are careful here because democracy could be
seen as a process of modernization, or at least as a form of institutional
isomorphism along a modernizing trajectory. Therefore, we do not inter-
pret the GDP coefficient as evidence against the modernization thesis.
It is more likely an artifact of event history modeling in many coun-
tries. The ranking of countries in 1900 is roughly the same in 2000 in
terms of GDP, and this means that most countries follow more or less a
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yearly, linear trajectory in GDP growth. Therefore, GDP tracks time in
the hazard model and fails to introduce unique explanatory variance. To
demonstrate why modernization probably matters despite the insignifi-
cant GDP coefficient, we divide our countries into a mean split between
“high” and “low” GDP in 1900. Then we plot the cumulative hazard
rates of adoption in Fig. 2.3 by group. The darker blue hazard lines show
that those with higher GDP in 1900 are more likely to adopt sooner than
those with lower GDP in 1900. This is evidence of the role of GDP,
but we could of course divide the sample into more and less democra-
tized and possibly “Western and non-Western cultural spheres” and plot
a similar hazard rate trajectory. As these are all interrelated (Breznau et al.
2011, footnote 5), we do not argue for a direct effect of GDP per se but
are careful not to rule out development and modernization as playing an
important role, also indicated by a large effect of democratization in our
models.
What is not so often explored in the social security and welfare state
development literature is the concept of spatial proximity. The classic
study by Collier and Messick (1975) and work by Castles and colleagues
(Castles and Mitchell 1992) suggests that there are families of nations
when it comes to social policy adoption timing. Thus, the early adopters
were European, then came the British influence sphere (New World
Fig. 2.3 Cumulative hazard rates of adoption by low versus high GDP in 1900
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and Japan), and then Latin America and so forth. Our study reveals
more about the mechanisms behind this process than the previous works
because it includes multivariate event history modeling with network
diffusion effects. This gives a direct statistical link of dyadic ties and
network weighting as a model of the theoretical reality of social exchange
and transmission of ideas through the convenience of spatial contact.
In a way, our study opens a new area for researchers to attempt to
disentangle trade—what is passed through actions related to economic
exchange—from the transmission of ideas based on both convenience
and political networks. We assume that ideas passing through interna-
tional organizations such as the ILO, religious and charity organizations,
the Communist party, and university exchanges are endogenous to our
measure of trade partnerships. States that trade more with each other also
have exchanges in these other areas. This is often facilitated by shared
culture, language, or geopolitical agendas. As our reproducible code and
data are freely available, we look forward to researchers expanding on our
ideas and models. Nonetheless, the trade effect is striking, and we are not
aware of a strong theory of policy diffusion based on trade in the welfare
state literature.
Conclusion
Using an event history time-series model of 150 countries from 1880 to
2010 with the inclusion of network diffusion variables, we show that
state formation is an important statistical predictor of the introduc-
tion of a first work-injury law in a given nation’s history. It is an even
more important predictor of a first social insurance law, increasing the
likelihood of adoption during the five-year early state formation phase
by 18-fold. This points to the important role of social insurance in
state-building. Of course, stronger states with more wealth or geopolit-
ical power were more likely to adopt social insurance, especially earlier
in their histories, as with the colonial empires of Western Europe and
later the Russian Communist Party ‘empire’ constructed via the Soviet
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Union where countries adopted social insurance as part of the system of
socialism. Both western and eastern Europe saw social insurance arrive
after the start of industrialization, but the former did it without workers
overthrowing their governments. In both cases, workers attaining social
protections, in addition to expanded rights in the transition out of
serfdom, represented a means of constructing a nation in addition to
a state (western Europe) or a nation in opposition to the existing state
(Russian and Communist revolutions). The cohesiveness of the nation,
or what many refer to as solidarity, was built on this enfranchisement and
protection of workers, who in exchange offered more efficient or effective
labor to improve the state.
We argue that state formation and strengthening are compatible
with power resource theories. Once established, the state is vying for
complete control over the individuals and organizations within it. More-
over, without a productive workforce that has a sense of national unity,
the state is less likely to be as economically competitive or as defen-
sible against outside invasions. We expect a similar mechanism is at
play between states and industrial workers as with states strategically
using social provisions to improve the number of soldiers and their
willingness to fight for the nation. Thus, the introduction of a social
insurance scheme that covers all formal industrial workers is a monu-
mental state achievement and institutionalizes the state in a way not
present beforehand. Essentially, the welfare of the state and worker
become coterminous, where each has an interest in the other via social
insurance.
There are limitations to this study; in particular, the timing of nation-
state formation is difficult to measure. Germany became an independent
state in 1871 but before this there was a German people that arguably
constituted a nation, albeit within various forms of empire. After that,
the geopolitical form of Germany changed during and after the World
Wars, and then again with reunification. This is nothing particularly
unique to Germany. Poland had shifting borders throughout the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries as did China and countries that once
comprised the Soviet Union. Austria is another challenging measurement
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case because it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but also oper-
ated as a semi-autonomous state introducing social insurance for miners
in 1854 independently of the empire. Therefore, we should proceed with
caution in interpreting results, as state formation is not a discrete event
in many cases but an ongoing contested process. Finally, even though we
found no clear association, colonialism may play a role in work-injury
policy because the effect is confounded by culture and spatial proximity,
which many former colonies have in common to some extent.
We did not expect an effect of state formation on the introduction of
a first work-injury law, as these were largely not social insurance laws but
employer liability laws that were ineffectual at staving work-related risks.
The effect of state formation on social insurance for blue-collar workers
was much larger than on first work-injury laws statistically speaking, but
it is not as clear cut as we expected. It is possible that employer liability
had a symbolic role in appeasing workers in the very short term and was
thus a step in the nation-state construction process, if only as a gesture.
As we measured introduction of policies, we do not capture further
developments of the state whereby policies are expanded in benefits and
coverage and create even more solidarity, i.e. nation building. Given the
new global data now available for investigating such phenomena, we see
great potential for further investigation of this and other classic research
on the welfare state that has been characterized by a focus on the Global
North.
Appendix
See Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
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(1880–1902) 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(1903–1928) 0.007* 0.007* 0.006* 0.007* 0.007*
(1929–1954) 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.003* 0.003*
(1955–1979) 0.002* 0.002* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*




























GDP per capita 0.986 0.979 0.997 1.000 1.000
Democratization 1.280* 1.251* 1.252* 1.229* 1.229*
Model statistics
Countries 150 150 150 150 150
Observations 7766 7766 7766 7766 7766
Log likelihood −650.477 −647.807 −643.481 −643.114 −643.114
AIC 1318.955 1315.614 1308.962 1310.227 1310.227
*Indicates coefficient is statistically different from zero with a 99% CI. Standard
errors adjusted using Huber-White method
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(1880–1902) 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*
(1903–1928) 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(1929–1954) 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.004* 0.004*
(1955–1979) 0.002* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002* 0.002*



























GDP per capita 0.911 0.925 0.909 0.906 0.906
Democratization 1.170* 1.146* 1.155* 1.138* 1.138*
Model statistics
Countries 150 150 150 150 150
Observations 12,162 12,162 12,162 12,162 12,162
Log likelihood −649.725 −639.206 −636.391 −635.429 −635.429
AIC 1317.450 1298.413 1294.781 1294.858 1294.858
*Indicates coefficient is statistically different from zero with a 99% CI. Standard
errors adjusted using Huber-White method
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Introduction1
Compulsory education is a standard most countries nowadays adhere to.
Welfare-states are considered responsible for providing universal access
1This chapter is a product of the research conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
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to education (World Conference on Education for All 1990). Educa-
tion has always played a crucial role in society—it prepares students
to contribute to the labor market and society, ensures social order, and
permits social mobility at the same time: “Education is prestigious, is
thought functional for all sorts of goods, and is seen as both individually
and collectively beneficial” (Strang and Meyer 1993, 502). Social status is
heavily influenced by education, increasing the demand for institutions
of mass education, as it promises social mobility and life-chances other-
wise unattainable. In addition, well-organized rational bureaucracies
require appropriately qualified employees and citizen (Weymann 2014).
In short, education closely corresponds with modernization. However,
there are different pathways into modernity (Eisenstadt 1986), which
also depend on different cultures and religions. A crucial aspect of educa-
tion is the transmission of norms and values from one generation to the
next. With this, it ensures not only the continuation of traditions but
also influences and shapes the persistence of local and national cultures
(Morin 2016; Boyer 2018). As a consequence, the content and shape
of state-organized education is tied to local culture and practices. At the
same time, it is also a result of transnational processes and developments.
In this chapter, we elaborate upon the question: what determinants have
shaped the global diffusion of compulsory education policies?
Education started to become increasingly important with the rising
significance of the individual (Ramirez 1989) and with globalization
trends (Griffiths and Imre 2013). This leads us to the assumption that
state-regulated education may not only vary in content between cultures
but also have varying degrees of significance for societies, resulting in
varying time points of compulsory education introduction. Our hypoth-
esis, therefore, is that culture influenced the introduction of compul-
sory education around the globe. Despite cultural differences, however,
modern education systems are remarkably similar. Most schools have
two- or three-tier systems (primary, secondary, and tertiary), class struc-
tures divided by age-group and front-facing instructions, not to mention
the focus on mathematics, reading, sciences, history, and physical and
arts education, just to name a few (Anderson-Levitt 2003). Yet, the actual
content of these curricula might differ between cultures. The long-term
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trend towards isomorphism continues despite remarkable global differ-
ences between cultures (Henrich 2020). This perspective, but especially
the inclusion of shared cultural traits as a pathway of diffusion, has been
ignored in research on the development of social policy for far too long.
State-organized education is the outcome of religious, economic, and
political mechanisms that drive a rationalized society and state, secu-
larizing the organizational and institutional rules of the individual’s
membership in these units (Weber 1972; Weymann 2014). Education
allows nation states to shift the focus to the individual, which is now
responsible to take its role in differentiated units of a complex society.
It provides the cognitive basis for a (post-)industrialized state’s rational
administration. Secularization and Western rationalization originated
from a particular cultural development in the Occident (Weber 1972),
whereas other areas in the world followed different cultural pathways into
modernity (Eisenstadt 1986), which might also affect the establishment
of educational institutions such as compulsory education.
However, one has to keep in mind that culture is not the only influ-
ential factor on the introduction of social policies such as education.
Diffusion research has shown that the transformation and, especially,
diffusion of policies are highly dependent on countries’ opportunities
for interaction. Therefore, taking a network perspective to study the
introduction of compulsory education should not come as a surprise.
The diffusion of compulsory education is, in our perspective, depen-
dent on the ties and networks between countries. Therefore, in this
chapter, we implement a network diffusion approach by including the
exposure to countries that have already adopted compulsory education.
The connections in the distinct networks determine the exposure and
are, in some cases, volatile over time but also changing in tie strength.
We construct the ties between countries through connections of trade,
colonial legacies, or spatial proximity.
Furthermore, we include a network of shared cultural characteris-
tics between countries to test the influence of culture on the diffusion
of education policy. According to our approach, countries are more
closely tied to each other when they share more cultural characteris-
tics. How to define “culture,” how culture influences individual behavior,
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and how cultures differ around the world, are important but contro-
versial issues in the social sciences (Anderson-Levitt 2012). In our view,
“culture” essentially signifies a shared understanding of reality, which is
among others represented by beliefs as to how society—and its institu-
tions—should be structured and organized. Furthermore, aspects such
as religion, language, and societal values make up the complex concept
of “culture” differentiating between social groups. Long-term histor-
ical path dependencies led to remarkable differences between global
cultures (Weber 1972), and these differences are still important today
(Henrich 2020). Our approach to analyze “cultural spheres” provides
a non-essentialist concept of culture. It results in a two-mode network
approach which provides fuzzy-set clusters with overlapping boundaries
and displays a changing structure and membership in these cultural clus-
ters over time (Windzio and Martens 2021). However, we will argue that
culture closely relates to other dimensions of multiplex network ties, such
as spatial proximity, colonial past, and global trade. If we want to test
whether cultural similarity is a relevant “pipe structure” of social policy
diffusion, which is in our case compulsory education, we must take into
account these correlated networks. Hence, the analyses in this chapter
test the diffusion effects of the respective networks against each other.
Do we still find effects of cultural similarity on the global diffusion of
compulsory education after controlling for colonial history, global trade,
and spatial proximity? Or is the diffusion rather a result of a combination
of multiplex networks connecting countries globally?
Theory
Policy diffusion as a general umbrella term describes multiple mecha-
nisms through which policies travel from one country to another. The
literature mentions, e.g., (1) learning, (2) competition, (3) imitation, or
(4) coercion (Dobbin et al. 2007; Obinger et al. 2013). Which of the
mechanisms is at work in education policy, however, is difficult to discern
using a macro quantitative design. Nevertheless, there are multiple theo-
retical approaches, exploring reasons for the diffusion of compulsory
education. A common approach is Meyer and colleague’s World Society
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theory (Meyer et al. 1997). Another, related explanation can be found in
“critical cultural political economy” (CCPE) (Dale 2000) or in Marxist
functionalist theories such as the World Systems Approach (Wallerstein
2004; Griffiths and Imre 2013). We start our theoretical considerations
with World Society theory, enhance it with insights from research on
global “cultural spheres” and contrast this view with the CCPE approach.
In the globalized world society, individuals and organizations are
interested in common institutionalized standards, especially when they
interact across different national institutions. Aided by powerful Western
states, modern, Western bureaucracies tend to spread around the world
(Meyer et al. 1997) because International Organizations (IOs) require
predictable organizational standards. World Society revolves around the
construction of actor-hood, identity, and legitimization of the state and
non-state actors involved in policymaking. In order to gain legitimacy,
these actors tend to integrate commonly accepted models or concepts
such as human rights or even, the concept of a state itself into their own
system. Recognition of statehood by external actors with scientific and
professional authority such as other states, IOs, or other non-state actors
has always been a crucial dimension of the Western political system.
This element, according to Meyer and colleagues, has led to the devel-
opment of a set of norms and standards, a global culture so to speak,
recognized and influenced by all parties of world society (Meyer et al.
1997). The implementation of these norms and standards grants legit-
imization. Accepting this global culture, however, can be much more a
performative act than an integration of these norms in the local belief
system (Steiner-Khamsi 2000)—it can be just “myth and ceremony”
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). The participation in International Large Scale
Assessments, for example, is an often used tool to gain attention, gather
funds such as developmental aid, or simply legitimize a country further
in the eyes of other nation states (e.g., Kijima 2015). Deviations from
the general standardized systems as well as failed implementation are
not always a contradiction to the common model. Rather, the confir-
mation of these deviations as irregular further validates the existence of
a common model. However, non-compliance with the implicit rules can
have serious negative consequences as well. The non-participation in tests
64 H. Seitzer et al.
like PISA is penalized: The Human Capital Index by the World Bank—
a scale playing the role as a rationalized other with scientific authority
in this instance—is negatively affected for non-participating countries
(Liu and Steiner-Khamsi 2020). World society induces isomorphism
among education systems, of which compulsory education is a crucial
part (Meyer et al. 1997).
The acceptance of a common set of standards makes interactions easier
and increases the chances of ties such as trade, which might be benefi-
cial for some states. As a consequence, the perception of national culture
and identity became important issues in the domestic politics in many
Western countries but also at the global level (Fukuyama 2018). The
adoption of policies according to this model requires an understanding
of similarities between the systems, which further increases interaction
and finally diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993).
The idea of a world society lends itself to explain the isomorphism
of countries’ institutions and the frequent proclamation of policy diffu-
sion we see in educational research. Nevertheless, the diffusion process
of compulsory education might be shaped and moderated by different
cultures in the world. We do not regard cultures as stable entities here
but as embedded in a network of socially constructed elements. There
is no objective point of reference between different cultures. Aspects of
values, attitudes and social behavior in one culture, such as the degree of
individualism or collectivism, are just distributed differently in compar-
ison to other cultures. In ontological terms, the individualism in theWest
gains its existence only in comparison to other cultures that are supposed
to be less individualistic. As we know from social network research,
components of cultures refer to one another like fuzzy-set clusters and
give meaning to each other (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer
1997, 299). Here, we are considering additional approaches as influen-
tial, especially to account for other globalizing influences than culture,
in particular economic aspects. Dale (2000) puts special emphasis on
the economy, in that the education systems we see today are not only
influenced by national culture but also by capitalism as an economic
system. Although the economic system is also an outcome of specific
cultural developments (Weber 1972), Critical Cultural Political Economy
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places emphasis on interrelations between countries shaped by the capi-
talist system at large. Today’s education system prepares students for the
needs of the labor market and graduates from education systems are set
on a path to repeat and further stabilize the system. In this approach,
capitalism is regarded more as a causal force, responsible for shaping
education, rather than an outcome (Dale 2000; Robertson and Dale
2015). Knowledge, rather than production, translates into economic
success (Dale 2005). Here too, diffusion of social policy occurs, albeit
for different reasons than assumed by world society theory. Culture and
the need for legitimization are relevant factors in the diffusion of educa-
tion policy, but CCPE might very well be correct in highlighting the
specific influence of the economy in this process.
According to the view that economic processes influence education
systems, the production of goods and services determines a society’s
economic structure and the degree in which information is processed,
since information is what modern service economies are about (Hidalgo
2015). Even though global economies are based on the division of labor
and comparative cost advantages, implying differences in their economic
structure, global trade requires common standards with respect to quality
assessment, commercial accounting, and legal issues regarding the respec-
tive transaction. If economic transactions go beyond economic exploita-
tion, as we know from colonial dependencies which often came along
with a transfer of institutions, trade partners are becoming more closely
aligned. Extensive trade between nation states extends communication
and can accelerate economic progress, which is why we assume that
countries linked in the network of global trade often introduced compul-
sory education in similar historical periods. In other words, strengthened
economic intersection increases the need for similar institutionalizations
of education systems.
Flipping the argument, we might see that similar institutionalization
might be one pre-requisite for diffusion. We assume that colonial lega-
cies might prove influential through building path dependency in the
institutionalization. Colonial ties between two countries usually imply
asymmetric relationships of economic exploitation. Yet, these ties show
possible avenues for a colonial power imposing at least some of its institu-
tions upon the colony. This “imperial diffusion” (Kuhlmann et al. 2020)
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might have been prevalent in the introduction of compulsory educa-
tion to pacify conflicts. Additionally, we suspect the influence does not
disappear after colonization ends. Former colonies are still exposed to
the educational institutions of their colonizers. These colonizers prove
to still be influential through development aid, for example (Shields and
Menashy 2017), or simply because they are a salient reference country
(Dobbin et al. 2007, 453). Thus, compulsory education might diffuse
also via networks of colonial legacies. To the contrary, it can also be
as equally true that local actors strongly repel institutionalization of
education following a Western model (Craig 1981, 192).
Finally, the basic assumption in policy diffusion research is that spatial
proximity strongly facilitates diffusion. Of course, we agree with the view
that “Space is more than Geography” (Beck et al. 2006), and spatial
proximity itself is not a mechanism that could explain policy diffusion.
Rather, spatial proximity is an indicator of cognitive, social, cultural,
and institutional similarity. On the one hand, this indicator is far from
being perfect, particularly at the margins of a “cultural sphere” (Windzio
and Martens 2021). On the other hand, the determination of spatial
distances is comparatively simple and intuitively easy to follow. We can
measure spatial proximity itself with less error than the “cultural spheres”.
We expect spatial distance to have a “retarding” effect on policy diffu-
sion because the opportunity to meet decreases with increasing distance.
Possibilities for contact depend on specific mechanisms that might be
correlated with spatial proximity. Accordingly, proximity itself is not
a mechanism but has the advantage of a simple and precise measure-
ment compared to more complex constructs, such as cultural similarity
(Windzio and Martens 2021). Thus, in the following, we empirically
test the influence of these different network dimensions on the diffusion
of compulsory education and control for levels of democratization and
GDP per capita in order to take economic and political heterogeneity
between countries into account.
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Data andMethods
In this chapter, we analyze the worldwide diffusion of compulsory
education. We coded the year of the adoption of first regulation, making
education mandatory for the majority of all children in the respective
country. For most cases this means the attendance of state-regulated
schools. We are interested in the moment when the state intervenes in
the education of children and mandates education to be conducted.
We, therefore, code the first de jure introduction and disregard actual
implementation as well as abolitions. For example, a law enacted in
2000 makes school compulsory in Djibouti, implying school atten-
dance. However, 1 in 5 children of primary school age is not attending
school.2 Another example is Singapore, where high enrollment rates
precede compulsory education: Here, compulsory schooling was only
enacted in 2003 with enrollment rates already reaching more than 90%,
even 20 years prior to that (Tan 2010). Our data collection is based
on the “World Education Encyclopedia” by Marlow-Ferguson (2002)
and the Bloomsbury “Education around the World Series” (e.g., Brock
and Alexiandou 2013). We expand the data with extensive research on
concrete laws and a myriad of additional secondary sources.
Lastly, we tried to code according to geographic region as best as
possible. North Macedonia, for example, is coded similarly to Serbia and
Slovenia because at the time of adoption it was part of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and only later gained independence
(Spasenović et al. 2015). Croatia, on the other hand, introduced compul-
sory education earlier. For federal states, we decided to code the first law
on compulsory schooling enacted by the central authority. If this was not
possible, we coded the first time of adoption of compulsory schooling of
the first political entity within the territory, for example, this included
Tasmania in 1868 for Australia.
Figure 3.1 shows the number of introductions per year (yellow) as
well as the cumulative introduction rate of compulsory education (red).
The figure shows that there are only a few points in time where multiple
introductions took place in the same year, for example, around 1920.
2 https://www.unicef.org/djibouti/education.
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Fig. 3.1 Cumulative introduction of compulsory education
Consequently, the cumulative introduction function (red dotted line)
is increasing relatively linear. We, therefore, do not assume a strong
dependence on certain time periods over the course of history.
We assume diffusion through networks of shared cultural similarity
(membership in cultural spheres), colonial legacies, trade, and geograph-
ical proximity from 1880 to 2010. For this purpose, we analyze data on
cultural characteristics of N = 164 countries, including indicators of
political liberties, rule of law, gender roles, dominant religion, language
group, government ideology, classification of civilization, and colonial
past (Besche-Truthe et al. 2020). We generated quartiles of continuous
measurements, e.g., for the index of gender relations, in order to get
discrete categories for a valued two-mode network. If two countries share
a characteristic, they connect to each other in the network. Most coun-
tries establish several relations, for example, by sharing the same language
group and the largest religious group. The higher the number of ties in
this network, the closer the cultural proximity between two countries.
Rather than homogenous clusters and clear-cut “fault lines,” this method
yields a network of “cultural spheres” with relations of varying inten-
sity between countries. The cultural spheres network is time-varying due
to the time-varying measurement of most cultural indicators. Elsewhere,
we used the metaphor of a “pipe structure” as the underlying structure
of the diffusion process (Windzio and Martens 2021), where the “pipe
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diameter” is the number of ties in a dyad and thus, the degree of simi-
larity of two countries. Larger pipe diameters lead to a higher weight of
a tie and indicate higher “cultural exposure” of country A to country B.
This might increase the likelihood of “contagion”, given that a specific
policy has not yet been adopted in one of the two countries. We regard
networks of cultural spheres, spatial proximity, global trade, and colo-
nial legacies as the underlying pipe structures of the diffusion process.
In the spatial proximity network, countries’ ties are weighted by the
inverse of the distance of their capitals, and it is therefore the only time-
independent network. Trade and colonial legacies, on the other hand,
differ over time, where the former shows the logarithmized sum of the
value of all traded goods between two countries. For the latter, we utilize
two different operationalizations of colonial legacy. First, we weigh the
influence of multiple former colonizers against each other. Second, we
assume an overall receding influence after decolonization, while assuming
the influence of two colonizers might be stronger than for entities with
just one colonizer (for a detailed description of the data, see Chapter 1 in
this volume). We report the estimation using the latter operationalization
in the appendix.
Missing data in our control variable GDP per capita from Varieties of
Democracy (Inklaar et al. 2018) was interpolated with a logistic func-
tion to account for the nonlinear rise of GDP. Where there was no data
from the first observation in 1880, the data from the income group of
the respective countries was used as a starting point. The values were
transferred onto a different scale to represent the share of GDP at the
respective time points to the maximum value achieved during our time
of observation. The data was then transformed onto a logit scale, inter-
polated linearly, and transformed back through an inverse logit function
and onto the original scale. This procedure produces the rise of GDP
in a logistic shape, providing a more realistic use of the indicator as a
linear interpolation would. The democracy index stems from the V-Dem
Project (Coppedge et al. 2019). Here, missing data points were interpo-
lated linearly. For our analysis, we utilize the R package netdiffuseR
(Vega Yon and Valente 2021) which defines exposure as the share of j
adopters in the ego-centered network of node i (i = j ) at time t and
is supposed to affect the adoption rate between t and t + 1 (Valente
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1995). If a country is only connected to other countries that already
have adopted compulsory schooling, exposure is 1. If none have adopted,
exposure is 0 (for details of these concepts, see Chapter 1 in this volume).
The introduction of compulsory schooling (no compulsory schooling =
0 and introduction of compulsory schooling = 1) during the window of
observation is the dependent variable in our discrete-time logistic hazard
model. Once a country has introduced compulsory schooling, it drops
out of the risk set. Introductions after 2010 are right-censored, adop-
tions before the window of observation begins (before 1880) are not
considered in the risks set but contribute to the network-exposure of
countries that have not yet adopted. Since compulsory education is an
older social policy than other policy fields dealt with in this volume, we
do not consider the same number of countries in the regression, as some
countries had introduced compulsory education before 1880. Thus, from
the initial set of 164 we only keep 117 countries. However, the full set
of countries contributed to the estimation of exposure. Further explana-
tions on the data and analysis can be found in the introductory chapter
of this volume.
Results
To answer the question of the influence of different networks on the
diffusion and consequently introduction of compulsory education, we
first employed a diffusion model to estimate the effects of contagion in
different networks. These coefficients were then used in a time-discrete
logistic hazard model, estimating the influence of contagion on the final
outcome, the adoption of compulsory education. Time is modeled as
a step function, which means that for every time period of around
25 years, a new constant is assumed. In doing so, we account for unob-
served heterogeneity that develops over time. Figure 3.2 shows the spread
of compulsory education around the globe. The map indicates that
among the first countries to implement compulsory education, Western
or English-speaking countries are very prominent. Additionally, some
Middle and South American countries can be counted among the early
adopters.
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Fig. 3.2 The global diffusion of compulsory education
Table 3.1 shows the outcomes of the logistic hazard models. First, we
estimated the time rates, then included measures for GDP per capita, a
democratization index, and the networks, added step wise. Exposure in
the networks of cultural spheres as well as trade and geographical prox-
imity is estimated with a one-year lag. The final regression coefficients are
corrected with a standard error correction for clustered standard errors, to
account for times when countries to be known as separate entities today,
were one political unit. This implicates that during these times adoptions
could have been dependent on the political overlap, hence the correction
of standard errors. The coefficients were transformed to hazard ratios.
The interpretation, therefore, goes as follows: Coefficients greater than 1
indicate a positive effect while coefficients smaller than 1 indicate a nega-
tive effect of the variable in question. The hazard ratios for the networks
represent the odds of adopting compulsory education, given the exposure
though the network in question to countries, who have already adopted
compulsory education.
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Table 3.1 The introduction of compulsory education in N = 117 countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1880–1914 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
1915–1929 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
1930–1954 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0005***
1955–1979 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004***
1980–2010 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0002***
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Observations 8614 8614 8614 8614
Log Likelihood −550.627 −550.401 −534.053 −524.384
Akaike Inf. Crit 1117.254 1118.802 1090.107 1072.769
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Regarding the control variables neither the GDP per Capita nor the
democratization index are significant in any of the included models.
Interestingly, the cultural spheres network is significant and positive
for three of the four models. Cultural similarity, therefore, significantly
increases the odds of adopting compulsory education. The colonial lega-
cies network as well as the trade network show insignificant effects;
exposure in these networks does not have a significant impact on the
adoption of compulsory education. Geographical proximity, on the
other hand, has a positive impact. In addition to its significant and posi-
tive coefficient, geographical proximity diminishes the cultural spheres
term’s coefficient to non-significance.
Accordingly, in Models (1) to (3) there is no effect of colonial lega-
cies or ties in the global trade network, whereas the effect of ties in
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the cultural spheres network is positive, strong, and highly significant.
Modeling an overall receding influence via linkages with former hege-
mons shows a significant positive influence of the colonial legacy network
at first sight (see Table 3.2 in Appendix). However, when excluding
territories which have been part of the USSR when they introduced
compulsory education, the effect vanishes.3 Hence, we conclude that,
regardless of the operationalization, colonial rule and legacies do not have
an overall effect, but rather, affect isolated cases of imperial diffusion.
However, post-colonial links are not significant “pipes” through which
compulsory education policy diffuses.
After controlling for spatial proximity, the strong effect of the cultural
spheres network vanishes which indicates that exposure in both networks
is highly correlated. We should not conclude from these results that
spatial proximity is the only crucial factor for diffusion of compulsory
education. Simply for the reason, that spatial proximity itself cannot be
a mechanism of diffusion, but rather, is a catch-all indicator. Spatial prox-
imity, thereby also, indicates similarity in institutional forms and culture.
Even though we captured the influence of culture by controlling for our
cultural spheres network, our cultural spheres are construed by theoret-
ical considerations and particular methods (Windzio and Martens 2021;
Besche-Truthe et al. 2020). In contrast to the simple measurement of
spatial proximity, the complex procedure to generate cultural spheres is
prone to measurement error, which is certainly the reason why the strong
effect of the latter disappears after controlling for the former.
Conclusion
In this paper, we tested the impact of four networks of potential policy
diffusion on the implementation of compulsory education around the
globe. Education, as a crucial part of today’s welfare state, is influenced
not only by national but also international forces. When looking at
modes of diffusion for education policy, culture is a factor that has previ-
ously rarely been considered. To test its impact, we utilize a projected
3 Model not included.
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two-mode network of different cultural characteristics such as language,
religion, and gender roles. Culture is influencing education, as education
does not only prepare students for the labor market but also ensures the
continuation of local values and traditions. Similar educational standards
promote communication and interaction between countries, increasing
the opportunities of policy diffusion. Similarly, a trade network as well as
colonial legacies as channels for policy diffusion have been considered as
well. Additionally, a network of geographical proximity, GDP per capita,
and a democratization index were considered as control variables.
The results show, that even when controlling for democratization
and GDP per capita, culture does indeed matter. Exposure through the
cultural similarity network was consistently significant and positive, until
the geographical proximity was brought in. Neither colonial legacies
nor trade could produce significant results, even without controlling for
cultural spheres. This is an unexpected outcome, as one could assume
that similar educational standards might emerge through the need of
standardization for trade. Unfortunately, we do not assess imbalances in
trade or goods. In any case, trade as a “pipe structure” of policy diffusion
was not proven significantly influential. Similarly, colonial relationships
clearly show that they did not influence the diffusion of compulsory
education. The suppression of the cultural spheres effect through the
exposure effect from the geographical proximity network is, however, not
as surprising. The correlation of exposure in these very networks is 0.919
(see Chapter 1 in this volume), signifying that closely located countries
often share similar cultural traits, explaining the correlation between the
networks.
In the end, this result is not easily interpretable. On the one hand,
the effect of the cultural spheres network on diffusion vanishes after
controlling for spatial proximity, on the other hand, researchers often
regard spatial proximity just as an indicator of mechanisms that are
often embedded in communication, social interaction, and culture. Since
the measurement of cultural spheres is much more complex, and the
construct itself depends on contingent decisions made by the researchers,
the resulting measurement error is a crucial disadvantage for the cultural
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spheres network, when compared with spatial proximity and testing
the significance of influences on diffusion. We should, therefore, not
conclude that the network of cultural proximity has no influence, and
spatial proximity is the crucial determinant because of the measurement
error and the lack of theoretical meaning of spatial proximity. In other
words, a theoretical explanation by spatial proximity cannot be done
independently of other, more social or cognitive arguments (Beck et al.
2006).
As discussed previously, the membership in cultural spheres does influ-
ence the introduction of compulsory education, at least to some degree.
This result goes in line with our theoretical assumption that education
is not only derived from singular national factors and history but that
legitimization and adaption to external units is an important aspect of
policy diffusion. The increasing isomorphism of education systems or
at least the global agreement that education should be accessible for all
and, therefore, compulsory, are determined by cultural and geograph-
ical proximity. The fact that neither the trade network nor GDP per
capita showed significant results, do not negate the economic influence
education policy is subjected to, but rather, signify that these measures
are not indicative of this influence. When GDP per capita and trade are
taken out of the analysis, the model fit declines.4 Research on education
policy diffusion should not ignore economic factors but should include
cultural factors in addition to the “usual suspects.” We do not attempt to
disprove Robertson and Dale’s theoretical approach; we simply support
the development of this hypothesis further and consider culture in addi-
tion to economic factors with a more substantial approach than previous
theories do.
Culture is an explanation for the global diffusion of compulsory
education in line with sociological neo-institutionalism. This theory
argues in favor of a global diffusion of institutional forms and
4 Model not included.
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content within education. As argued in the section on theory, neo-
institutionalism expects a global spread of Western bureaucratic insti-
tutions, even though their adoption seems to be in some countries
rather myth and ceremony than a serious implementation (Meyer and
Rowan 1977). In addition, this process of diffusion is shaped by cultural
spheres. These cultural spheres, however, are considerably correlated with
spatial proximity between countries. Future research should systemati-
cally account for the interaction of network-exposure and historical time
periods in order to test, if or how the respective network effects change
over time.
Limitations
As any other study, this analysis has its limitations. First, the quality
of data dating back to 1880 might influence the result. The difficulty
of modeling longitudinal analyses with a changing country sample for
the same geographical area should be kept in mind. Units such as the
USSR as well as Austria-Hungary, for example, have been taken into
account by correcting for clustered standard errors. Nevertheless, this
method has its weaknesses too. Second, as briefly discussed, education
policy is highly shaped by the activities of International Organization
such as the OECD. A network of membership in international organiza-
tions could have been added to the analysis to account for this diffusion
channel as well, but this effect was left for future researchers to discover.
Despite these limitations, we are convinced that the model presented
here still demonstrates interesting results, as it reveals not only the strong
influence of culture on education but also shows the weak influence of
democratization and GDP on the adoption of compulsory education.
Appendix
See Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 The introduction of compulsory education in N = 117 countries—
non-normalized exposure in colonial legacies network
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1880–1914 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004***
1915–1929 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
1930–1954 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0003***
1955–1979 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.0002***
1980–2010 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.0001***
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Observations 8614 8614 8614 8614
Log Likelihood −550.627 −550.627 −532.155 −522.491
Akaike Inf. Crit 1117.254 1119.254 1086.309 1068.982
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Education Systems of Europe, edited by Wolfgang Hörner, Hans Döbert, Lutz
R. Reuter, and Botho von Kopp. Cham: Springer.
Steiner-Khamsi, Gita. 2000. “Transferring Education, Displacing Reforms.” In
Discourse Formation in Comparative Education, edited by Jürgen Schriewer,
4th ed., 155–187. Peter Lang.
Strang, David, and John W. Meyer. 1993. “Institutional Conditions for
Diffusion.” Theory and Society 22 (4): 487–511.
Tan, Jason. 2010. “Compulsory Education in Singapore—Who Benefits?” Asia
Pacific Journal of Education 30 (4): 401–418.
Valente, Thomas W. 1995. Network Models of the Diffusion of Innovations.
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Vega Yon, G. & Valente, T. W. 2021. netdiffuseR: Analysis of Diffusion and
Contagion Processes on Networks, R package version 1.22.3, https://doi.org/
10.5281/zenodo.1039317.
Wallerstein, Immanuel M. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Weber, Max. 1972. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden
Soziologie. Tübingen: Mohr.
Weymann, Ansgar. 2014. States, Markets and Education: The Rise and Limits of
the Education State. Palgrave Macmillan.
Windzio, Michael, and Kerstin Martens. 2021. “The Global Development,
Diffusion, and Transformation of Education Systems: Transnational Isomor-
phism and ‘Cultural Spheres’.” In Global Pathways to Education: Cultural
Spheres, Networks, and International Organizations, edited by Michael
Windzio and Kerstin Martens, 1–35. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
World Conference on Education for All. 1990. Meeting Basic Learning Needs: A
Vision for the 1990s: World Conference on Education for All Background Docu-
ment . Inter-Agency Commission (UNDO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WORLD
BANK) for the World Conference on Education for All. Last accessed
March 2, 2021. http://www.unesco.org/education/information/pdf/11_92.
pdf.
3 Networks of Global Policy Diffusion … 81
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or
exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
4




Adult Basic Education (ABE) policies regulate and ensure access to
training in basic reading, writing, and numeracy skills for those who
did not have the chance to attain these skills in formal education. The
policies are supposed to advance individuals’ economic possibilities and
foster inclusion into society at large (e.g., UNESCO 2015). As a policy
field, ABE is situated between education policy and active labor market
policy (ALMP) as well as being ingrained in human rights discourses.
Data on first introductions of ABE policy show an accelerating surge in
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national policy adoption from the 1960s onwards. This chapter empir-
ically investigates the spread of ABE policies all over the globe. In my
analysis, I take domestic variables into account, but focus primarily on
nation states’ interdependencies. As we know from the extensive canon
of policy diffusion research (e.g., Gilardi 2016; Obinger and Schmitt
2011; Dobbin et al. 2007), clustered policy adoption involves commu-
nication between actors. Thus, diffusion essentially happens in multiplex
networks through which actors are connected to each other (Valente
1995). This chapter highlights the diffusion of ABE policies by asking:
What are the main network determinants for the adoption of first ABE
legislation? In my analysis, I draw on the global network data that is used
throughout this edited volume. Precisely, these networks are depicting
cultural similarity, colonial legacies, trade, and geographic proximity.
The adoption of ABE policy marks a political act in which actors,
at least nominally, problematize the existence of adults without formal
schooling and consciously opt for taking on the problem as a matter
of the nation state. It becomes a responsibility which needs to be
institutionalized in law. Passing a policy, however, does not at all safe-
guard its implementation. Nonetheless, with policy adoption countries
signal their valuation of the policy’s theorized impact and gain legiti-
macy in the global system of nation states. Adopting a policy on ABE
makes sense economically and rationally as well as from a human rights
perspective. Countries not adopting would have the burden of proof for
non-adoption.
This chapter advances on the de jure adoption of ABE as both a
compensatory and a preventive social policy. On the one hand, it is
targeted at adults (and often adolescents) who fell through the cracks
in the formal education system, i.e., compensating for inferiority in
children’s education, sometimes being called “second chance educa-
tion” (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012, 25). On the other hand,
education in general and adult education in particular are framed as
directly impacting the economic and social development of an indi-
vidual, thereby preventing later costs for the social security system (e.g.,
World Bank 1995); essentially following the logic of better (or any
institutionalized) education equals better and safer (regular) jobs. Espe-
cially the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
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(OECD) is a key player in connecting skills with economic progress (e.g.,
https://oecdskillsforjobsdatabase.org).
While the influence of IOs on global education discourses is unques-
tionable, the diffusion of ABE policy is still a blind spot with little to
no global macro studies. Using network diffusion analysis, I aim to esti-
mate the influence of networked relations of nation states on ABE policy
adoption. This chapter progresses with a short introduction of the global
discourse on ABE and the topic itself. After a brief section on theo-
ries of policy diffusion, I will turn to the empirical part testing possible
hypotheses on the influence of domestic as well as relational variables.
Lastly, I will present the estimations and draw conclusions that ought to
motivate future research.
Adult Basic Education
Global discourse on institutionalized adult education started in 1949
when the UNESCO commenced the first “Conférence Internationale
sur l’Education des Adultes” (CONFINTEA) in Helsingør, Denmark—a
recurring conference bringing together policymakers, NGOs and experts
on topics concerning adult education (Knoll 2008).
A Google Ngram (in Appendix) suggest, discourse on “Adult Educa-
tion” as well as its French translation peaked in the 1950s but stayed
at a high rate until decreasing in the 1980s, only to be exceeded by the
more encompassing term “Lifelong Learning”. IOs like the UNESCO
and specifically its sister organization the UNESCO Institute for Life-
long Learning (UIL) were of significant impact in the emergence and
evolution of international conversations on the issues of lifelong learning
(LLL) and, accordingly, adult education (Jakobi 2009). This chapter
focuses on the diffusion of one part of the vast thematic complex of
LLL, which is adult basic education. The “Recommendation on Adult
Learning and Education”, which was adopted at the UNESCO General
Conference in 2015, states that adult education comprises informal,
non-formal, and formal education which aims at fostering adults’ partic-
ipation in society and work (UNESCO 2015, 6). The idea of developing
and enriching capabilities for living and working give those learning
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schemes a very important role in the education system of the respec-
tive state. This chapter deals with ABE policy as the constitutive part of
state-led adult education endeavors, which are also specifically targeted
at marginalized groups.
There are several ways of raising the skill level of a society, but offering
basic education to those who did not gain any formal education in child-
hood is, in combination with widening access to school education in
general, the most effective. It is situated in an ingrained human rights
discourse in which “Education for All” problematizes the existence of un-
or undereducated adults. The topic of adults’ skill development indis-
putably gained importance in global education and economic policy
(Jakobi 2009, 55f.). Debate increased despite isolated critiques from the
World Bank (Torres 2009), mainly concerned with missing returns on
investment in adult education in general. Nevertheless, ABE policies
have spread around the globe quite rapidly.
The map in Fig. 4.1 depicts the de jure adoptions of ABE policies
for 164 countries. In comparison to other social policies dealt with in
this volume, the map shows that diffusion of ABE policies started rather
late with Finland in 1921 as the first country to introduce; followed by
Turkey in 1929, and the USSR as well as Germany in 1957 and 1953,
Fig. 4.1 ABE policy adoption map
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respectively. The bulk of adoptions started in the 1960s and accelerated
in the 1990s and 2000s (see below).
The UNESCO has been pushing for adult education since its foun-
dation (Jakobi 2009, 67f.) with its “Conférence Internationale sur
l’Education des Adultes” (CONFINTEA) hosted by the UIL. The 1985
conference in Paris “established a new right—the right to learn for all,
throughout life. Special attention was to be paid to marginalized groups
such as women, youth, the elderly, minorities […]” (Bhola 1989, 57).
Now, virtually all IOs active in education or economy refer to the
strategy of learning and skill formation throughout the whole lifetime
as key for successful education and economic systems (see, e.g., OECD
2012; UNESCO 2017; World Bank 2003; World Conference on Educa-
tion for All 1990); intergovernmental organizations follow the same path
(European Council 2011; African Union 2016). The rise in attention to
the educational needs of adults is part of the general universalizing trend
in education. According to Weymann, inclusive education for everyone
at every stage of their life is the “undisputed normative goal” (2016,
19; translation by author). The goal is to create equal opportunities by
providing access to adequate competences and knowledge and avoiding
the emergence of a disadvantaged group of both low- and not formally
skilled workers (see Spilker 2013, 102).
Theories of Policy Diffusion
The mechanisms behind global policy adoption trends can be as diverse
as policies themselves. Indeed, one of the main ideas behind this edited
volume is to test different assumptions within different (social) policy
fields. Dobbin et al. (2007) describe four major theoretical strands when
it comes to diffusion research: constructivism, coercion, competition, and
learning . Elkins and Simmons (2005) take a stricter route when they
confine diffusion to a process driven by uncoordinated interdependence.
In its rawest form, in this volume, diffusion is defined as “any process
where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the
probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang 1991, 325).
With these mechanisms and definitions in mind, it is no surprise that
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a myriad of scholars has argued for different paths of policy diffusion.
These paths are, furthermore, very diverse depending on the policy field
and, sometimes, on the country sample used. In the following, I attempt
to summarize past evidence and theoretical bases that might be relevant
for the diffusion of ABE. Accordingly, I introduce the networks which
serve to depict possible diffusion avenues.
Constructivism
In a constructivist view, policy adoption is a matter of ideology with poli-
cies representing appropriate and legitimate means to important ends.
Both are socially constructed, thus, shifting over time and space (Dobbin
et al. 2007, 451). Especially in the field of education policy, a lot of schol-
arship is situated in neo-institutionalist accounts, which, in its purest
form, is the most popular in the constructivist camp. These scholars see
shifts in recognizing problems that are universal to all states and bring up
universal solutions for those problems rooted in the world society (Meyer
et al. 1997). All around the globe, actors, including nation states, legit-
imize themselves by holding on to universally legitimized world models
like citizenship, the need for education, capitalist economy, etc. The
supposedly “best” models gain such a strength that their raison d’être is
their rationality, legitimization without being questioned, and universal
applicability (Meyer et al. 1997).
ABE being framed as a human right is both an indicator for the
normative institutionalization as well as cause for further institutional-
ization. Spilker finds that (in Germany) the discourse on educational
opportunities has shifted toward risk groups that, due to a lack of
education, are unable to participate in the globalized world (2013, 74).
Illiteracy and lack of skills are major problems that need to be tackled
by governments, creating an enormous pressure on states to enact poli-
cies. Refusal to offer new educational opportunities through ABE appears
as a failure to render assistance (Spilker 2013, 225). Moreover, the
global discourse specifically targets whole political entities that are not
sufficiently participating in the globalized world (e.g., UNESCO 2017).
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The emergence of the norm of formally skilled and educated citi-
zens of every age is shaping policies all over the globe. The norm itself
is shaped and carried throughout the international sphere not only by
states but especially through professionals and epistemic communities
which are most likely found in IOs and science (Meyer et al. 1997,
166). In this light, the “institutional conditions for diffusion” (Strang
and Meyer 1993) and not national differences are key in understanding
the phenomenon itself. Diffusion is greatly accelerated in instances where
actors fall into the same category and conceptions of formal organi-
zations are institutionalized (Strang and Meyer 1993, 490–491). For
the latter that means that “theoretical accounts of practices simplify
and abstract their properties and specify and explain the outcomes they
produce” (Strang and Meyer 1993, 497). Actors, on the other hand, are
theorized as sufficiently similar so that practices can have similar effects
all over the globe.
The ensuing institutionalization culminates in an impressive isomor-
phism of state structures and policies that are not easily explained
by classic functionalist theories. Consider, for example, the cumulative
adoption plot in Fig. 4.2: On the x-axis one sees the year of observa-
tion and the y-axis represents the percentage of countries in the specific
World Bank income group that have adopted an ABE policy. We can
discern that the general trend of policy adoptions only started in 1960
and accelerated until almost 90% of high-income and around 70%
of low-income countries adopted an ABE policy. Differences in slopes
between the income groups are hardly visible. This is in line with neo-
institutionalist theory, in that the global discourse seems to render other
influences nugatory. Following this logic, one would assume no statisti-
cally significant influence of either national factors or interdependencies.
On the other hand, a lot of scholars decidedly diverge from the teleo-
logical neo-institutionalism. Though I am unable to test the underlying
micro-mechanisms of policy adoption, I aim at testing the influence of
the macro-structures nation states have built. In line with this edited
volume, it is clear that countries have multiplex ties with one another,
i.e., they have ties in different dimensions. I regard these networks as
the underlying structure through which communication, and, hence,
diffusion happens. This underlying structure can be best explained by
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Fig. 4.2 ABE policy adoptions by income group
a “pipe-structure” (Martens and Windzio 2021). The innovation, in this
case ABE policy, travels through the pipes and actors that are exposed to
other actors that already adopted a policy should have a higher risk of
adopting the policy itself (see below). The underlying structures, investi-
gated in this chapter, are cultural similarity, colonial legacies, trade, and
spatial proximity. In the following, I will give a short overview of all these
structures.
Cultural Similarity
Since education is inherently intertwined with culture, i.e., is reproduced
by and reproduces specific cultural configurations, being exposed to a
culturally similar country that has already introduced ABE might prove
influential. The influence of world society is not ignored, but rather
thought to be not as influential as neo-institutionalists would suspect.
Hence, external ideational influences are translated into cultural config-
urations and, thereby, probably so much skewed that the general pattern
4 The Global Diffusion of Adult Basic Education 91
of adoptions of ABE policies is affected. For instance, values of meritoc-
racy, i.e., the individual being the locus of development, would prompt a
state to address under-education when the problem comes up in political
debate (Ramirez 1989). On the other hand, adoptions of ABE might be
delayed in countries that show more familialistic community structures.
In these compositions, the penetration of the global discourse might take
longer to be actualized through policy (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Boli et al.
1985). This would constitute waves of diffusion in which the exposure
inside cultural spheres has an impact on the rate of adoption. For this
purpose, I will estimate the effects of a network of cultural similarities.
The basis for that is a two-mode network which connects countries with
cultural characteristics such as dominant religion, civil and gender liber-
ties, government ideology, and language group (for a detailed description
see Chapter 1 in this volume). Through a one-mode projection on the
country set, the resulting network links countries to one another if
they share cultural characteristics. Furthermore, the ties are weighted
by the number of shared characteristics and through their time-variant
nature, the network is time-variant itself (Besche-Truthe et al. 2020).
With this approach, we build a flexible and more encompassing defi-
nition of culture which shows overlapping cultural spheres rather than
rigid boundaries between groups of countries. Staying true to the pipe
metaphor, one can discern that the more similar countries are, the larger
the pipe is through which ABE policy can diffuse.
Colonial Legacies
In a world full of power imbalances coercion theorists argue that hege-
monic actors exercise a lot of influence over weaker actors. I include
a network depicting power imbalances as countries’ colonial relations.
Contrary to some widely used operationalization like, e.g., the Gravity
Model by CEPII in which a colonial tie is constant over time and
either existent or non-existent, this network is based on time-variant
data spanning as far back as the sixteenth century and includes formerly
overlooked forms of “colonization” such as the Ottoman Empire or the
USSR. The raw data stems from the COLDAT dataset by Becker (2019).
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Additionally, I am able to not only catch “imperial diffusion” (Kuhlmann
et al. 2020, 85) but account for past colonial relationships as well. Thus,
I assume the influence of a previous colonial power that has already
ended getting proportionally smaller to the currently existing colonial
power. When the country then becomes completely independent, the
proportions of influence no longer differ from each other (for a detailed
description see Chapter 1 in this volume). Since a comprehensive theory
describing the mechanism of post-colonial ties between countries on
policy diffusion in a macro-perspective is missing, I use the possibility
to report a second operationalization of the experience of colonial legacy,
in that they have an overall declining strength on the diffusion process
(see Appendix). Lastly, the network is directed—which means I assume
that only the metropole influences the diffusion process and not vice
versa.
In the colonial ties network, I expect to find metropoles which intro-
duced ABE and which extended the policy to countries still under
colonial rule (Kuhlmann et al. 2020). This could be especially valid for
tight colonial interlinkages based on political ideologies. For instance,
Obinger and Schmitt (2011) demonstrate that social policy making was
subject to political regime competition during the ColdWar. Introducing
policies to advance the average education of the work force not only helps
in technological advancement but keeps (colonial) subjects satisfied and
“in line” with the current ideology by projecting a caring state as well as
promising opportunities for better pay in higher skilled jobs. Addition-
ally, former colonies receive a significantly higher amount of donations
from their former occupiers than other countries (Shields and Menashy
2019). Furthermore, former colonies, to some extent, orientate them-
selves toward the metropoles either positively or negatively. On the one
hand, policies might be emulated because they appear on the public
agenda and are perceived as valuable (Dobbin et al. 2007, 453). Path
dependencies laid out through institutionalizations during the period of
colonization might play a huge role as well (Kuhlmann et al. 2020). On
the other hand, knowledge about policy adoptions in former metropoles
could very well culminate in a strong retention of this very policy, which
would manifest in a negative or at least non-significant relation. In short,
relations with a higher intensity might increase the possibility for contact
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and orientation on policy models of the metropole, especially because
this network can catch possible path-dependencies that started with colo-
nization. Nevertheless, the opposite could be true, which would manifest
itself in negative coefficients.
Trade and Geography Network
Based on Marxist research, policies are increasingly influenced by inter-
linkages of countries as a direct result of economic and social global-
ization (Dale 1999). We see the influence mostly in policies with direct
impacts on the economy, e.g., neoliberal tax policy (Swank 2006). Diffu-
sion is rarely observed for policies that take a long time to become fruitful
like infrastructure investments (Dobbin et al. 2007, 458). If economic
competition plays a huge role in policy diffusion, one would expect
reinforcement of existing power imbalances. Already powerful countries
could have larger impacts on the spread of policies than weaker coun-
tries; with, for instance, Swank showing the pivotal role of US tax policy
in the neo-liberalization of Western tax regimes (Swank 2006). On a
similar note, Jahn (2006) shows a “race to the bottom” in social spending
through economic ties in the OECD.
Also, research on active labor market policies in the EU shows free-
rider effects of neighboring countries (Franzese and Hays 2006). I
suspect these effects to also be visible in the global trade network: If
one country has the upskilling policy of ABE in place, it might demoti-
vate a strongly connected country to implement the same, thus slowing
the diffusion process. Although education expansion has been shown
to be a result of a growing integration into the global economy (Grif-
fiths and Imre 2013, 51), it is unclear what to expect when taking the
trade network as structural basis for the diffusion of ABE policy. Espe-
cially in this case, the intermediary role between education and ALM
policy might dampen economic impacts. The data used to build an
undirected time-variant trade network were drawn from the “Correlates
of War Project” (Barbieri and Keshk 2016). Total trade values between
two countries were logarithmically transformed and are used as relational
weights (for a detailed description see Chapter 1 in this volume).
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Lastly, I consider countries’ geographic proximity as a structure of
the multiplex ties which aides in establishing communication channels
through which diffusion can happen. In this network, countries are more
strongly connected the geographically nearer they are to each other (for a
detailed description see Chapter 1 in this volume). With increased prox-
imity, I believe, the probability of direct connection of large numbers of
the population, cross-border work arrangements, politically institution-
alized meetings, research endeavors, etc. increases as well. Additionally, a
neighboring country serves in most cases as a more prominent ground for
comparison. Exposure to policies in the geographic proximity network is,
therefore, a catch-all indicator which still can show significant influence
on the diffusion of ABE policies (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016, 93). Thus,
it functions as a control variable which non-geographic interdependen-
cies need to withstand. More directly, however, in combination with
education and skills, we find these effects of positive externalities through
policies of adjacent states for example in the phenomenon of brain drain.
The 2019 Global Education Monitoring Report, for instance, finds that
persons who emigrate are on average highly educated (UNESCO 2018,
38). If the supply of adults with basic skills is met through immigration
from nearby countries, a state would not need to invest in basic skills of
its own population. By looking at geographic proximity and trade rela-
tions, I hope to consider free-rider effects, especially in circumstances of
positive externalities (see also Franzese and Hays 2006).
Methods
The empirical part of this chapter will test the influence of the described
networks as structural bases for diffusion. As dependent variable, first
introductions of ABE policies were collected for N = 164 countries. I
define ABE as education targeted at adults with low or no proficiency in
basic skills, with the explicit aim to teach these skills. For instance, the
North Macedonian Law on Primary Education (Official Gazette of R.
Macedonia No. 44/95) qualifies because in Article 6 it stipulates: “The
primary education of adults can be organized in a mainstream primary
school” (emphasis added by Fabian Besche-Truthe). Another example
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would be the Brazilian Lei de Diretrizes e Base da Educação Nacional
section V, article 37, which determines that adult education should be
geared toward those who did not have either access to or continuity in
primary and secondary education at the right age. It is the first actual
mentioning of ABE in Brazilian federal education laws, despite its long
history of literacy campaigns from civil society. These civil society literacy
programs, however, do not qualify as being coded, with this chapter
dealing with the momentum of nation states taking responsibility in
ABE.
In accordance with the edited volume at hand, the time frame of
inquiry spans from 1880 to 2010. Although the first introduction
happened in 1921, in theory, countries were at risk of adopting an ABE
policy at all times. The exposure variables have been calculated using
the netdiffuseR package (Yon and Valente 2017), and I predict hazard
ratios by using a discrete-time logistic hazard model . Network exposure
is calculated as the weighted average of alters that already adopted ABE
policy ego is connected to. If, for instance, ego trades equally with two
countries, and one of them has already adopted ABE policy, the expo-
sure would be 1/2 = 0.5. For all networks, the weights distinguishing
between strong and weak connections are taken into account (for a
detailed description see Chapter 1 in this volume).
To control for time-dependency, i.e., unobserved heterogeneity, I
control for time as a piecewise constant rate function. Other chapters
in this volume choose rather steady time intervals of 25 years each, but
I diverge from this operation because, first, since adoptions start quite
late, I would assess time periods without any event which would greatly
distort the estimation. Secondly, in accordance with theories described
above, I believe the global discourse to have a great determining effect on
the overall susceptibility of nation states to introduce ABE policies. Thus,
I make use of the CONFINTEA as the determining cut points of time
slices. Figure 4.3 shows these points in accordance with counts of yearly
adoptions. Especially the conference in Paris was revered by Western
countries claiming that a new “right to education for all” was instituted
(Bhola 1989). Other commentators simply see the conference as a shift
toward a neo-liberalist direction (Knoll 2008, 141). Indeed, one can
surmise a spike in yearly adoptions between the conferences of Paris in
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Fig. 4.3 ABE policy adoptions per year (Note The largest number of adop-
tions [third bar from the left] is due to the USSR introducing ABE which is
automatically valid for a high number of single countries as well)
1985 and Hamburg in 1997. All in all, this builds the base of a vertical,
i.e., top-down, diffusion against which other effects and interdependen-
cies need to align. Technically it means that for every period between
conferences a new baseline hazard of policy adoption is assumed.
As control variables, I introduce GDP per capita (Inklaar et al.
2018) and levels of democratization (Lührmann et al. 2018). Both have
been interpolated for missing data points as described in Chapter 1
of this volume. Including the former is supposed to control for both
economic performance and states’ financial capabilities. I presume that
more educated persons are needed if high economic performance should
be maintained. Moreover, economic performance serves as a proxy for
state budgetary opportunities to actually implement ABE policy which
would make it more likely that the policy is adopted in the first place.
Also, I suspect the more democratic a system is, the more possi-
bility there is for participation and actively trying to influence political
decisions toward more social spending (Lindert 2004), which includes
opening education for the masses. On the other hand, democracies might
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prove resilient to ABE because marginalized groups have less opportu-
nity to actually participate although it is a free democracy. As shown by
Paglayan (2021), autocracies have expanded school education by a large
margin to keep the populace in line. Education is here a double-edged
sword, it serves as enculturation in the nation state’s will but at the same
time can give individuals the means to overthrow the status quo (Grif-
fiths and Arnove 2015, 91). Though the USSR is among the first actors
to introduce ABE, other non-democratic regimes fall into the group of
late adopters.
Lastly, I include a variable representing the problem pressure. My
suspicion is straightforward: The higher the number of adults without
formal educational attainment is, the higher is the pressure to implement
ABE as a salvation for these individuals and a quick upskilling of the
population. Thus, I depict the percentage of adults without any formal
schooling attainment, i.e., they did not finish primary school (Barro
and Lee 2015). Also, high rates of persons with no formal schooling
should make the global discourse fall on open ears more easily. Especially
because IOs might publicly problematize these statistics while depicting
them as easily fixable through adult education policies. Furthermore,
with the average of formally unskilled adults over extended periods of
time, I do, in part, proxy the general capabilities, performance and
past importance of formal, state-led education. Large values indicate
a suboptimal inclusion rate as well as a potential undervaluing of the
state’s formal education. The data in five-year intervals has been linearly
interpolated.
Finally, I face a problem with non-independent observations: There
are historical time periods in which several countries did not exist because
they were part of a larger, embracing unit, e.g., Croatia was part of
Yugoslavia. In the following network diffusion model, I address this
statistical non-independence by correcting for heteroscedasticity with




Table 4.1 presents results of the discrete time logistic hazard estimations
in hazard ratios. These are interpretable analogously to odds ratios, i.e.,
a positive relationship is signified by ratios larger than 1 and a negative
relationship by estimations between 0 and 1.
Table 4.1 Diffusion of adult basic education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1880–1948 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0003***
1949–1959 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.007***
1960–1971 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.003***
1972–1984 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.004***
1985–1996 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.008***
1997–2010 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.006**
trade existed
(=1, else = 0)
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Observations 18,190 18,190 18,190 18,190 14,445 14,445
Log Likelihood −598.944 −591.409 −581.906 −581.431 −476.715 −473.804
Akaike Inf. Crit 1211.888 1198.819 1183.811 1184.862 981.429 977.607
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
4 The Global Diffusion of Adult Basic Education 99
The six models presented here are built in an additive fashion, intro-
ducing exposure in different networks one at a time and subsequently
adding national factors as controls. After several estimations, I opted
to include the interaction effect of exposure in the trade network and
problem pressure. The significance levels as well as model fit statistics
justify this decision.
First, while refraining from substantially interpreting the effects of
the different time slices, it is worth noting that they are all signif-
icant and somewhat differing in size. That means that the baseline
hazard to adopt ABE policy is different considering the time between
CONFINTEA meetings and the highest after the one in Paris (1985–
1997). Although this might reflect other similar global or domestic
developments, I suspect it as being consistent with the neo-institutional
account of differing strengths of norms in world society.
Exposure to culturally similar countries that already adopted an ABE
policy proves to be a significant positive influence even when considering
exposure in some other networks. In combination with the spatial prox-
imity network, it is only significant on the 10% level and after including
the pressure variable, the effect becomes insignificant, hinting at only a
small role of culture in the diffusion process. On the other hand, the
colonial ties network has a robust and positive effect on the adoption
risk. Regardless of additional variables, the estimated hazard ratio stays
almost the same with, e.g., 2.635* in the last model. One confounding
influence, however, is that Russia, being defined as a colonizer, influences
the adoption of ABE policy in almost all USSR countries. Indeed, when
deleting these countries from the estimation and running the models
again, exposure in the colonial ties network no longer proves to be a
significant influence (see Table 4.3 in Appendix).
Trade, as hypothesized, has a negative influence on the risk of adoption
of ABE all models. This leads me to believe that strong trade relations
with a country that already had implemented ABE decreases the adop-
tion risk. The estimation, however, shows a huge limitation: through
estimating an interaction with problem pressure we see that exposure
in trade networks affects countries with differing strengths.
As shown in Fig. 4.4 a country with a large formally unskilled popu-
lation has a higher risk of policy adoption with exceeding exposure in
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Fig. 4.4 Interaction effects (Note The graph shows the predicted probabili-
ties of adopting ABE in relation to exposure in the trade network. The lines
represent the change in predicted probabilities for a country with the mean
percentage of adults without formal schooling [47.06] as well as for countries
with a value of one standard deviation below [15.17] or beyond [78.96] the
mean)
the trade network than countries with generally lower percentages of
unskilled adults. Exposure in the trade network still has a negative effect
on risks of policy adoption, however, the smaller the percentage of adults
with formal education gets, the more dampened is this effect. Although
this difference through interaction is quite small, it hints at the free-rider
effects described by Franzese and Hays (2006) being stronger in countries
with larger shares of formally educated adults, e.g., OECD countries.
The described effects even hold against controlling for geographic
exposure to ABE policies. It makes it all the more enlightening to see the
robustness with the coefficients being not strongly affected by controlling
for exposure through spatial proximity as well as economic development
and democratization.
In sum, we can for certain discern two specific network effects. On
the one hand, links through (past) colonial relationships significantly
increase the risk of adopting. Hence, we see a case of imperial diffusion
(Kuhlmann et al. 2020) in that the USSR’s early adoption of ABE poli-
cies impacted all the dependent countries as well. Not considering USSR
countries in the regression estimation, while still having them contribute
to network exposure, makes democratization borderline significant on
the 10% level, though with a rather small coefficient of 1.087+ (see
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model 1 in Table 4.3 in Appendix). This somewhat hints at a certain
degree of regime competition between the East and West, in that demo-
cratic non-USSR states seem to have a slightly higher risk of adopting,
all other things equal.
On the other hand, high exposure to trade partners that already
adopted ABE decreases the risk of policy adoption for countries by the
quite large factor of 0.099*, although a higher margin of formally unedu-
cated adults slows this dampening effect down. Nevertheless, with a total
adoption rate of 75% the diffusion itself will probably not be entirely
stopped.
Lastly, considering the operationalization of an overall receding influ-
ence of colonial legacies, i.e., non-normalized exposure rates, only a
few differences are discernable. The results, presented in Table 4.2 in
the Appendix, clearly affirm the weakness of the previously mentioned
interaction effect since it loses significance. Solely the main effect of the
percentage of adults without formal schooling shows a negative influence
on the adoption risk, corroborating the assumption that a weak state
education system slows down the adoption of new (inclusive) education
policies. Again, not considering USSR countries in the estimation shows
that exposure through colonial ties is, although significant in the full
sample, mainly influenced by the USSR (see Appendix Table 4.3).
Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the diffusion of policies on adult basic educa-
tion by estimating the effects of network determinants on the adoption
of first ABE policy. I stressed the policy as marking a specific political
act in which states problematize the existence of adults without formal
schooling and consciously opt for taking on the problem as a matter
of the nation state. In that regard, ABE with its preventive and compen-
satory rectification intersects not only with human rights discussions and
extensions but also fits into the spread of human capital theory after
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World War II. The surge is mirrored in the concurrent adoptions of ABE
policies which sped up in the 1980s and 1990s. By 2010 almost 90%
of all countries assessed had introduced ABE policy. I utilized network
diffusion analysis to macro-quantitatively assess which of the multiplex
ties of countries around the globe were most prevalent. In doing so,
I utilized four different social networks, connecting countries to each
other: cultural similarity, colonial legacies, trade, and spatial proximity. I
hypothesized that especially the global discourse in the world society is
very influential in the diffusion. Following neo-institutionalist theory,
domestic variables as well as interlinkages would be rendered nugatory
over time.
Accordingly, the results show no striking effects. Cultural similarity,
which shows a strong influence on the diffusion of generic education
policies, has no robust influence in the case of ABE. On the other hand,
exposure through colonial ties and operationalized in two different ways
significantly increases the risk of policy adoption. That is, however, a
sign of imperial diffusion of the USSR imposing upskilling policies on
its satellite states.
Lastly, one can discern possible free-rider effects in that exposure in
the trade network tends to decrease the adoption risk more strongly for
countries that have a low number of formally uneducated adults than
it does for countries with a large percentage of adults without formal
schooling. Nevertheless, the effect is small and weak.
In a nutshell, all the results lead me to believe in a diffusion process
that might not be fully erratic but is also not structured through inter-
dependencies between countries. With these results in mind, it is worth
considering neo-institutionalist accounts (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997) which
predicted these results. Policies travel around the world and get more
and more dispersed. I believe that ABE policies get adopted because of
“taken-for-granted” knowledge of their usefulness and necessity, rather
than via any diffusion mechanism that is discernable on this macro-level.
Nevertheless, what has not been considered is the decidedly strong
discursive power of IOs on topics like ABE, lifelong learning, and educa-
tion systems in general. As “rational others” (Meyer et al. 1997, 156), IOs
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have the opportunity to influence countries either directly or indirectly
to adopt policies. This assumption does not claim that IO influence is per
se harmful or actually forces countries to adopt policies they otherwise
would despise; it just confirms that more research needs to be done on
how IOs maneuver, change, and influence the macro-structure of a world
society. Additionally, it might be worthwhile to focus on ABE as a labor
market policy and operationalize trade asymmetries and real competition
between countries.
Appendix
See Fig. 4.5 and Tables 4.2, 4.3.
Fig. 4.5 Google Ngram for “adult education” and “lifelong learning”
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Table 4.2 Diffusion of adult basic education results with non-normalized expo-
sure in network of colonial legacies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1880–1948 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0003***
1949–1959 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.007***
1960–1971 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.003***
1972–1984 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003***
1985–1996 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.008***








































Observations 18,190 18,190 18,190 18,190 14,445 14,445
Log
Likelihood
−598.944 −586.811 −577.593 −576.803 −472.636 −470.642
Akaike Inf.
Crit
1211.888 1189.621 1175.186 1175.605 973.272 971.284
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Table 4.3 Diffusion of adult basic education. Results without considering USSR








trade existed (=1, else = 0) 1.138 1.166
cultural spheres netw.: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 27.446 29.213+
colonies netw.: w. exposure 1.642
non-normalized, colonies netw.: w. exposure 1.278
trade net: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 0.134 0.157
spatial proximity netw.: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 0.961 1.203
GDP per capita / US$10,000 1.077 1.049
democratization 1.089+ 1.075
percentage adults w/o schooling 0.985 0.985




Log Likelihood −429.564 −429.564
Akaike Inf. Crit 889.128 889.128
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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The Emergence of Healthcare Systems
Alexander Polte, Sebastian Haunss, Achim Schmid,
Gabriela de Carvalho, and Heinz Rothgang
Introduction1
Healthcare systems address basic and often immediate human needs for
medical care in case of illness or injury. Of all welfare policies, health
is probably the area where the lack of a functioning system has the
most severe and direct negative consequences. Nevertheless, healthcare
systems that guarantee access to medical services for relevant parts of
1This chapter is a product of the research conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
“Global Dynamics of Social Policy” at the University of Bremen. The center is funded
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the population were, globally, not the norm during most of the twen-
tieth century. State-run or sponsored hospitals go back a long time, but
meaningful healthcare systems only started to emerge at the end of the
nineteenth century, together with old age pension systems and often in
conjunction with work injury protection (Schmitt et al. 2015). Today,
there are only a few countries left without at least a rudimentary health-
care system. Unfortunately, this doesn’t mean that access to necessary
healthcare services is available to everyone. Often, medical services are
inadequate and do not meet the needs of the population.
A healthcare system, therefore, is more than the existence of a certain
number of hospitals or medical doctors. In line with the established
literature, we understand healthcare systems as the sum of all formal
arrangements concerning the financing, regulation and provision of qual-
ified health services within a society dealing specifically with healthcare as
an area of social protection (Roemer 1991; Freeman and Frisina 2010;
Rothgang 2021). Here, we are only interested in systems in which the
state is substantially involved in at least one of the aforementioned
dimensions of healthcare. We call this a healthcare system under public
responsibility. Such a system is introduced when (a) the first nationwide
legislation is passed, (b) entitlements to healthcare benefits are secured
by law, and (c) the elements of the healthcare system are integrated
(de Carvalho and Fischer 2020). Today, based on this comparatively
demanding definition, we find healthcare systems that establish entitle-
ments to healthcare for increasingly larger parts of their population in
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Fig. 5.1 Adoption of healthcare systems through time
What has driven the remarkable expansion of healthcare systems from
a handful of countries at the end of the nineteenth century to almost all
countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century? Was it a logical
consequence of industrial development and/or increasing wealth? Did
healthcare systems develop as a result of democratization, or was it a
slow diffusion process whereby states copied the policy innovation from
their neighbors?
In what follows, we start with a literature review on theories that might
explain the introduction of healthcare systems. The explanatory model
we use in the modeling is informed by these theories as well as by the
general framework of diffusion theory as laid out in the introductory
chapter of this book. After presenting the results of the statistical anal-
ysis we then review the theory and draw some conclusions on how the
introduction of healthcare systems can be explained.
114 A. Polte et al.
Theoretical Background: Factors Influencing
the Introduction of Healthcare Systems
Although scholarship on the emergence of healthcare systems is often
limited to descriptive case studies, lacking large-scale comparisons and
generally neglecting countries of the Global South,2 there does exist an
extensive body of literature dealing with the introduction and reforms
of social policies. This section reviews this literature to layout possible
explanations for the emergence of healthcare systems. In doing so, we
distinguish between domestic factors on the one hand and horizontal as
well as vertical interdependencies on the other.
Domestic Factors
The emergence of public protection against the major risks of sickness as
well as old age, work accidents, or unemployment have been explained
as a result of modernization processes related to industrialization and
urbanization (e.g., Wilensky 1974). The claim of the modernization
hypothesis is that these developments have damaged traditional means
of social protection, but the resulting economic growth provided the
resources to establish public social protection programs, including health
insurance as one of the major schemes. In particular, for larger samples
of countries at varying stages of economic development, per-capita GDP,
or other indicators for the level of industrialization have been found to
correspond with earlier adoption of social protection schemes (Collier
and Messick 1975; Usui 1994). The level of industrialization has been
found to increase the likelihood of introducing health insurance among
43 African nations (Kangas 2012). In a study of 177 territories and inde-
pendent states over the period 1820–2013, Schmitt et al. (2015) identify
a positive effect of GDP on the adoption of health insurance. However,
the effect disappears if the sample is reduced to independent states. By
contrast, Cutler and Johnson (2004), who study a smaller sample of 20
2 Following de Carvalho et al. (2021) we operationalize the “Global South” as all low to upper
middle-income countries according to the World Bank (2019) classification.
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OECD and Latin American countries, find evidence that higher levels
of GDP per capita slow down the implementation of national health
insurance defined as compulsory coverage for a broad class of people.
Modernization processes also apply to the medical system. By the
second half of the nineteenth century, medical progress helped to estab-
lish public health and sanitation measures to control epidemics of infec-
tious or parasitic diseases (Trein 2018). The colonial powers disseminated
European medical knowledge globally and, in the inter-war period, also
began to promote the education of local medical professions, albeit still
focusing on disease control and mother and child health (Bruchhausen
2020). Since the 1930s more sophisticated medical interventions have
evolved, enabling the development of effective cures for many diseases
(OECD 1987). Health-specific problem pressure, as manifested by recur-
rent epidemics or indicators of population health status, stimulate public
healthcare policies. In particular, as therapies become more sophisticated
and expensive, regulation of access and third-party financing are required
(Moran 2000). Both health-specific problem pressure and dissemination
of medical knowledge, as represented for example by the foundation
of medical schools, may pave the way for the formation of a public
healthcare system. These two correlations can be reformulated as a capa-
bilities hypothesis—countries with more advanced medical infrastructure
and knowledge may introduce healthcare systems earlier—and a problem
pressure hypothesis—medical needs may speed up the development of a
healthcare system.
Conflict and power resource theories have highlighted the role of
democratic representation and the power of left-wing parties and unions
in the emergence and evolution of welfare states (Korpi 1983). Based on
a sample of 76 nations, Cutright (1965) finds that, on a similar level of
economic development, nations with more representative governments
introduce social security programs earlier. At the same time, studies high-
light the role of monarchies or autocratic governments as early adopters
of social policy (Flora and Alber 1981; Mares and Carnes 2009). Early
implementation of social policy is explained as a means to appease
and control workers, to acquire output legitimacy, and stabilize regimes
with weak or without democratic legitimacy. Apart from the political
regime type, institutional characteristics of political systems contribute
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to the explanation of timing and expansion of social policies. Blake and
Adolino’s (2001) analysis of 20 advanced economies suggest that feder-
alism and a fragmented executive slow down the introduction of national
health insurance. Immergut’s (1992) comparative case study of health
policy implementation in France, Sweden, and Switzerland shows that
the numbers of veto points in the legislative process provide opportuni-
ties for opponents of healthcare reforms to block legislation seeking to
implement or expand public health insurance. The literature pertaining
to the regime type hypothesis is thus undecided whether democracies or
autocracies are more likely to create healthcare systems.
Interdependencies
Over the past few decades, new strands of research have emerged to
address the limitations of classical comparative social policy studies,
which have not been fully able to systematically capture the transnational
context and interventions that may impact social policies (Deacon 2007;
Yeates 2008). Nowadays, social policies in every country face similar
challenges that may require solutions beyond the nation-state level (e.g.,
demographic changes, growing inequality, global socioeconomic crises).
The global social policy literature and the international interdependen-
cies framework seek to address this shortcoming by accounting for the
transnational contexts within which social policymaking is developed
(Deacon 2007; Kaasch 2012; Obinger et al. 2013). They emphasize the
role of international organizations (IOs) in shaping social policies, espe-
cially for the countries of the Global South where the possibilities for
both financial and technical resource mobilization are frequently limited
or non-existent. Relating to the healthcare field, the literature shows
how IOs can be influential for the adoption, reform, and maintenance
of healthcare policies (see e.g., Walt and Gilson 1994; Marmor et al.
2009). These organizations operate as (a) financing agents through loans
and aid, (b) champions of regulation and rights, (c) sources of ideas and
normative standards, (d) facilitators of policy exchange, and (e) dissemi-
nators of models and prescriptions (Kaasch 2013). Since the introduction
of the first healthcare system in 1883 in Germany, IOs have always
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been involved in the field, notably the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO), the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP),
the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO), and the World
Health Organization (WHO) in the early period, and the WHO and
the World Bank more recently. In what we call the IO hypothesis, we thus
assume that the likelihood of implementing a healthcare system increases
or accelerates with the creation of policy field-specific IOs.
The most substantial and influential way in which IOs operate within
the healthcare field is through loans and/or aid, either by means of direct
transfers and interventions or via the support of recipient countries’
domestic policies and institutions (Addison et al. 2015). The literature
shows that often the disbursement of loans is tied to conditions aligned
with the donors’ agenda, which has a massive impact on domestic social
policies (Babb and Carruthers 2008; Clements et al. 2013; Kaasch 2013).
Although there is considerable scholarly work on aid and healthcare,
this is mainly limited to the last 30 years (see e.g., McCoy et al. 2009;
Dodd and Lane 2010), when aid in all its forms exponentially increased:
For instance, from 1990 to 2016, aid from donors provided more
than US$531 billion to economies of the Global South for financing
healthcare (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) 2017).
Existing scholarship, therefore, mainly focuses on how aid shapes and/or
influences preexisting systems, but does not address whether aid affects
the emergence of healthcare arrangements. In order to fill this gap, we
examine the development assistance hypothesis, assuming that the like-
lihood of a country introducing a healthcare system increases as aid
grows.
Another recent strand that attempts to explain the introduction
and expansion of social policies is the warfare and welfare hypoth-
esis concerning the linkages between war and the welfare state. This
relationship was already studied in the 1950s (Titmuss 1958); more
recently, Obinger et al. (2018) have addressed this in a global perspective.
According to this strand of theory, military conflicts and war experi-
ences are a driving force behind changes in the welfare state. Demands
for redistribution and risk-pooling that emerged in the aftermath of the
Second World War and resulted in access expansion to social security
in Europe are a classic illustration of the warfare and welfare hypothesis
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(Dryzek and Goodin 1986; Obinger et al. 2018). Obinger and Schmitt
(2018, 2020) argue that war enhances state capacity, encourages social
protection demands, and increases social spending. The expansion of
the state is interpreted as a consequence of wars. It strengthens the legal
system and the assertiveness of jurisdiction and has the capacity to bolster
democratization. The horrors of military conflicts heighten demands for
social protection in order to provide income, employment, education,
and housing for invalids, war victims, and their dependents. Lastly, wars
impact social spending levels via newly created social protection schemes
and the introduction of income and inheritance taxation. Even though
case studies and, to a lesser extent, comparative work on the linkages
between social policies implementation and wars are abundant for richer
countries (Kasza 2002; Ferrera 2018; Lloyd and Battin 2018; Obinger
and Schmitt 2020), this relationship has not been fully examined in
non-Western countries.
Finally, we assume that diffusion patterns that have been observed
in other areas of social policy (Kangas 2012; Schmitt et al. 2015) may
also influence the political decision to establish a healthcare system. This
might be policy learning among neighboring states or between states
among which strong relationships of political exchange exist. One inter-
dependency that has not yet been addressed sufficiently in comparative
welfare state research, but which is prominent in studies on transnational
political networks (Maoz 2011) is trade relations. Following the theoret-
ical reasoning in this book (see Mossig et al. 2021, in this volume), we
therefore also assume that cultural ties, colonial ties, geographic prox-
imity, and the network of trade relations may influence the introduction
of a healthcare system.We assume that these four networks may build the
underlying structure for the policy diffusion process in general and for
the diffusion of the idea of creating a healthcare system in particular. The
networks can be seen as avenues or channels through which communica-
tion and information about social policies can travel. Under the heading
of the network hypothesis we seek to test whether countries are more likely
to introduce healthcare systems if they are closely connected through one
or more of these networks to other countries that have already established
a healthcare system.
5 The Emergence of Healthcare Systems 119
Modeling the Introduction of Healthcare
Systems
As previously mentioned, we are interested in determining at what point
in time a government takes responsibility for healthcare, and we define
healthcare system introduction as (a) passing the first nationwide legis-
lation, (b) legally establishing entitlements to healthcare benefits, and
(c) integrating the elements of the healthcare system.3 For our anal-
ysis we utilize the R package netdiffuseR (Vega Yon and Valente 2021)
to model the adoption of healthcare systems over time (Valente 1995).
In order to operationalize the dependent variable we created a dataset
containing the de jure introduction dates for all countries with more
than 500,000 inhabitants in 2017, taking into account the first nation-
wide legislation that defines the population group receiving benefits and
an institution or a set of institutions responsible for healthcare. In order
to test the eight hypotheses lined out in the theory section above we
then have to operationalize the respective independent variables, once
again distinguishing between domestic factors and interdependencies.
This description is followed by a short section on data preparation.
Domestic Factors
To address the assumption of the modernization hypothesis that the
creation of a healthcare system may be easier for wealthy countries and
that therefore countries with a higher GDP per capita may introduce a
healthcare system earlier than poorer countries, we include data on GDP
per capita as introduced in Chapter 1 to measure a country’s wealth. For
the analysis we convert the values to units of US$10,000.
Another variable to capture domestic institutional developments that
may precede the creation of healthcare systems and can serve as a measure
for the capabilities hypothesis is data on founding years of medical schools.
The binary variable indicates whether a country has an operational
3 An in-depth description of our conceptualization and operationalization can be found in de
Carvalho and Fischer (2020).
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medical school (“1”) or not (“0”). The data is based on the “World Direc-
tory of Medical Schools” (www.wdoms.org). We see this as a proxy for
higher levels of medical knowledge.
While the introduction of healthcare systems may depend on the avail-
ability of resources and financial capability, it may also be a response to
urgent healthcare needs. In line with the problem pressure hypothesis we
assume that a higher problem pressure may induce countries to introduce
a healthcare system earlier than their counterparts with a lesser burden of
disease. In the model we use two indicators to measure problem pressure
or burden of disease, namely, life expectancy and child mortality . Neither
indicator is ideal because they only reflect the effect of poor health on
mortality in general and on mortality of one, especially vulnerable popu-
lation group. But these indicators are the only alternatives available with
reasonable accuracy for the whole historical period under observation.
Both indicators were obtained from the Gapminder project (Gapminder
2017). Life expectancy is measured as the average number of years a
newborn child is expected to live if current mortality patterns were to
stay the same.4 Child mortality describes the number of children which
die below the age of five years per 1000 children born alive.5
In line with the other chapters in this book and to address the regime
type hypothesis, we include as a measure of regime type the level of democ-
ratization in our analysis. As introduced in Chapter 1, the index ranges
from low levels of democracy (closed autocracy = 0) to high levels of
democracy (liberal democracy = 9).
Interdependencies
In order to address the IO hypothesis and the development aid hypothesis
we also include three variables that capture the health-related institu-
tional landscape before system introduction. These are the role of the
World Health Organization and its regional organizations, the avail-
ability of medical education and research facilities, and the sum of
4 Source link: https://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd004/.
5 Source link: https://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd005/.
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external health-related funds, namely bilateral development assistance for
health (DAH). The inclusion of these variables reflects the possibility
that being actively involved in international health politics may speed up
the introduction of domestic healthcare systems. We include a binary
variable with a default value of “0,” which is set to “1” for a period
of 10 years around a country’s involvement in the foundation of four
early international health organizations; the Pan American Health Orga-
nization (PAHO) in 1902, the Office international d’hygiène publique
(OIHP) in 1907, the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO)
in 1920, and finally the foundation of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) in 1948. Because the foundation of these institutions
was preceded by multilateral negotiation, our international organizations
variable becomes active for the countries involved in the negotiations
already one year before the official founding dates (t − 1).
The Development Assistance for Health indicator is defined by the sum
of values of all DAH commitments in constant 2011 US$ received
from international donors in a given year. All data points were obtained
from the “AidData Core Research Release, v3.1”6 data set (Tierney et al.
2011). Incoming dyadic project level commitment amounts have been
transformed to yearly country-level aggregates.
The motivation for our decision to include a variable that measures in
which years a country was involved in wars lies on the one hand in the
argument that wars will likely increase the healthcare needs of affected
populations. Involvement in wars can thus be interpreted as another
measure of problem pressure . On the other hand, the inclusion of a vari-
able that measures involvement in wars also addresses the recent claim of
the welfare and warfare hypothesis that the military played an active role
in advancing social policies in general and health services in particular
to secure healthier and fitter recruits (Obinger 2020). In this study, we
include war as a binary variable, which is coded “1” for countries that
are affected by war in a given year and “0” for those who are not. Since
6 Source link: https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddata-core-research-release-level-1-3-1.
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we expect that wars increase the problem pressure only after a certain
time, we decided to lag the start of the war effect by one year (t + 1).
The end of a war is lagged by two years (t + 2), because it is unlikely
that war-induced healthcare needs of the population immediately cease
to exist with the end of the conflict. The war effect used in our model
accounts for both intra-state wars as well as inter-state wars as defined
by the “Correlates of War” project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), from
which the original data was obtained.
The operationalization of the networks is described in detail in
Chapter 1. The proximity network measures the inverse of the distances
between countries’ capitals, the trade network measures the volume of
trade between country pairs. The network of cultural proximity results
from clustering similarities in religion, gender relations, civil liberties,
rule of law, government ideology, language, and colonial relations. And
the colonial network represents ties between colonizers and colonies.
Data Preparation
Following Aiken and West (1991), we centered several continuous vari-
ables of our models to facilitate a more straightforward and meaningful
interpretation of the estimated coefficients. We did so by subtracting the
grand mean from every value, so that variable values equal to the mean
value of the sample in the respective year are exactly at “0” after this
procedure. While centering may help us to better interpret the results of
our model, it does not affect the overall meaning of the model or its effect
sizes, because the variable values are merely proportionally shifted (Aiken
and West 1991). The following continuous variables are centered: life
expectancy in years, child mortality per 1000 born, development assis-
tance for health, GDP, and regime type. As proposed in the introductory
chapter, we also addressed the issue with non-independent observations
by using cluster-robust standard errors (Zeileis et al. 2020).
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Findings
Table 5.1 presents the log hazard rates for our models of introduction
of healthcare systems. Statistically significant effects with p-values lower
than 0.1 are printed in bold to facilitate better readability. Model 1
Table 5.1 Network diffusion of healthcare systems—log-hazard ratios
Dependent variable: Introduction
Year of Healthcare Systems
Model 1 Model 2
1880–1913 −4.418 (1.339)*** −3.903 (1.512)***
1914–1945 −4.421 (1.274)*** −6.047 (1.433)***
1946–1978 −4.280 (1.377)*** −5.327 (1.506)***
1979–2010 −5.042 (1.473)*** −6.017 (1.583)***
Existence 2.268 (0.419)*** 2.787 (0.488)***
Foundation of IOs 0.019 (0.274) −0.009 (0.279)
Medical Schools −0.417 (0.264) −0.382 (0.262)
Life Expectancy in Years 0.003 (0.020) 0.013 (0.023)
Child Mortality per 1 k born −0.005 (0.002)** −0.004 (0.002)*
Development Assistance for Health 0.027 (0.032) 0.028 (0.032)
GDP 0.086 (0.064) 5.475 (1.613)***
Regime Type −0.157 (0.053)*** −0.181 (0.056)***
Wars 0.111 (0.424) 0.109 (0.439)
Network: Culture 1.139 (0.881) 0.642 (0.901)
Network: Colonies 0.220 (0.318) 0.402 (0.328)
Network: Proximity 2.688 (0.857)*** 10.167 (2.989)***
Network: Trade −0.242 (0.523) −10.272 (4.201)**
Interaction: 1914–1945*GDP −6.588 (1.794)***
Interaction: 1946–1978*GDP −5.393 (1.614)***
Interaction: 1979–2010*GDP −5.309 (1.708)***
Interaction: 1914–1945*Proximity −7.167 (3.180)**
Interaction: 1946–1978*Proximity −7.946 (3.127)**
Interaction: 1979–2010*Proximity −8.287 (4.228)*
Interaction: 1914–1945*Trade 11.663 (4.091)***
Interaction: 1946–1978*Trade 9.661 (4.033)**
Interaction: 1979–2010*Trade 7.988 (4.094)*
Observations 10,771 10,771
Log Likelihood −650.898 −623.706
AIC 1335.797 1299.412
McFadden’s R2 0.176 0.211
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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contains the complete set of variables, in Model 2 we added interac-
tion effects between process-time control variables and GDP per capita,
network exposure by geographic proximity, and the trade network.7
We defined four time periods as intervals for the piecewise constant
step function for our discrete time logistic hazard models. The first period
covers the years from 1880, the start of our observation period, until
1913, the last year before the beginning of the First World War. The
second period from 1914 is historically shaped by the societal and
political interruptions of two world wars, and ends in the year of the
capitulation of the axis powers in 1945. Starting in the aftermath of
Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the third period
from 1946 until 1978 is characterized by the bloc conflict between the
two superpowers USA and USSR, and their two competing ideologies,
and it is at the same time a period in which much of the current system of
international organizations was created—a period of increasing economic
globalization (Su 2002), and decolonization (Betts 2004). The final time
period covers the more recent past and extends from 1979 until the end
of our observation period 2010. It is shaped by the rise of globalization,
the rise and climax of neoliberalism, the collapse of the socialist bloc
in the 1990s and the “so-called golden age of development assistance
for health” (Dieleman et al. 2017) in the first decade of the twenty-first
century.
Among our explanatory variables, Model 1 identifies significant effects
only for child mortality, regime type, and proximity. The negative corre-
lation for the regime-type variable indicates that non-democratic states
are likely to introduce healthcare systems at an earlier point in time
than democratic states. Concerning the regime type hypothesis, our find-
ings therefore support the strand of literature which highlight the role of
autocratic regimes in the emergence of social policies. Here, it has to be
considered that the early healthcare systems often cover groups pivotal
to maintaining political power such as the military, state employees, or
7 The exposure in networks of trade and geographic proximity have been centered by the grand
mean like the “GDP per Capita” variable.
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workers in the manufacturing industries. Plausible motives for the intro-
duction of social policies under autocratic regimes include the forging of
loyalty, striving for output legitimacy, and the appeasement of workers
and socialist movements. Moreover, in autocratic regimes there tend to
be less veto points to consider in the legislative process, which reduces
the chances of bills granting entitlements to healthcare being blocked or
rejected.
A positive statistically significant correlation with the proximity vari-
able shows that the introduction of healthcare systems followed regional
patterns with mostly European countries among the early adopters,
many South American countries following in the second time period, a
large number of Asian and North African countries introducing health-
care systems in the third time period. Among the 28 countries that
introduced healthcare systems after 1978 only three were not in Africa.
The effect for child mortality is negative, indicating that countries
with lower child mortality rates were more likely to introduce healthcare
systems earlier than countries with higher child mortality rates. Contrary
to the assumption of the problem pressure hypothesis that higher problem
pressure may drive the introduction of healthcare systems, the negative
sign of the child mortality variable suggests that it is rather countries
with better infant health which are more likely to introduce healthcare
systems earlier. Since child mortality is often caused by poverty-related
illnesses (Black et al. 2010), improved infant health may thus rather be
seen as an indicator for better social conditions that usually accompany
higher GDP. However, the model does not show a statistically signifi-
cant correlation between levels of GDP per capita and the introduction
of a healthcare system. This finding seems to contradict the existing
knowledge of healthcare system emergence (Schmitt et al. 2015).
Model 2 offers an explanation for the puzzling GDP result. There,
we have added interaction effects that capture the time dependence of
several of our independent and network exposure variables. The intro-
duction of the interaction effects with time periods implies that for
each variable the main effect and the interaction effect must be added
up to get the overall effect of the independent variable in the respec-
tive period. Including these interaction effects significantly improves the
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overall model fit and explained variance. By adding interaction terms for
GDP and the last three time periods, the main GDP effect which now
represents the log hazard rate of GDP per capita in the first time period
becomes positive and significant. We thus see a correlation between GDP
per capita and the likelihood of a healthcare system being introduced
in the first time period (1880–1913). Hence, early adopters were more
likely to be found among rich countries than among poor ones. In
the earliest period of observation, mostly comparatively affluent Euro-
pean states such as Germany, Austria-Hungary, Norway, Russia, and
Luxemburg, or Uruguay and Cuba in South America, introduced health
systems. In the remaining time periods healthcare systems were intro-
duced in countries with GDP per-capita levels above and below the
average. Seemingly, other factors like nation-building in former colonies
gain more importance while the wealth of a nation loses its predictive
power. The model therefore does not support a general moderniza-
tion hypothesis. Only for the pioneering states did higher levels of
economic development strongly correlate with earlier healthcare system
introduction.
Looking at the other interaction effects the model shows signifi-
cant correlations between adoption and geographical proximity with a
declining magnitude over time. This indicates that regional patterns
structure the introduction of healthcare systems, but the importance
of proximity to states that have already introduced a healthcare system
decreases over time. This reflects on the one hand a saturation process
in which the importance of proximity naturally declines with growing
cumulative adoption. On the other hand, it also reflects that early
adopters were already widely distributed over the globe and can be found
in Europe, South America, Asia, and Oceania.
When looking at trade flows, we see a negative significant correlation
for the baseline effect for the first period and positive and significant
interaction effects between trade flows and process time compared to the
first time period. This indicates that for early adopters, trade relations
were clearly not a diffusion channel for healthcare system introduction.
Compared to the first period, the negative effect of trade relations seems
to be damped in later years, with the result that the overall effect is not
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stable. The negative and insignificant trade exposure coefficient in Model
1, which accounts for the complete time period, also suggests no clear
correlation.
The two other network effects—cultural similarity and colonial ties—
are not significant, which means that from the networks included in
our models only geographical proximity seems to be a candidate for
explaining the introduction of healthcare systems for all time periods
and for all countries of the world. As Table 5.2 in the appendix shows, an
alternative, non-normalized operationalization of colonial network expo-
sure does not substantially alter these results. Of course, this does not
preclude the possibility that they were highly important for specific cases.
None of the other variables show statistically significant effects in
either of the two models. Nor do they become significant when control-
ling for the possibility that they may only affect the hazard rate of
health system introduction in specific time periods. Being part of one
of the groups of countries that founded the major health-related interna-
tional organizations has not had a measurable impact on these countries’
politics in terms of creating domestic healthcare systems. Some coun-
tries, such as Austria, Hungary, or France, had already established health
systems before the first international organization was founded. Some,
like Cuba or Uruguay, fitted the expected pattern, and others, like the
USA, participated in all institution-building processes but only created a
domestic healthcare system much later. Our models thus do not provide
support for the IO hypothesis. One reason for this may be that the role
of IOs is possibly more relevant for shaping the structure of healthcare
systems than for spurring their introduction. But this aspect is outside
the scope of this article.
The foundation of medical schools does not seem to be related to
the introduction of healthcare systems, either. Both indicators—interna-
tional organizations and medical schools—may be more closely related
to a country’s concern for public health, which does not directly translate
into the creation of a healthcare system. We thus find no support for the
capabilities hypothesis, but obviously, the existence of medical schools is
only a very rough measure of medical knowledge and capabilities in the
area of health.
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The amount of development assistance for health, for which data was
only available for the last two time periods, also does not seem to make a
difference regarding the willingness of a country to establish a healthcare
system, nor does involvement in wars seem to translate into health-
care system creation. The finding that these indicators and also the life
expectancy indicator remains not significant in our models, in combi-
nation with the negative significant effect of child mortality, strongly
suggests that health-related problem pressure does not seem to induce
countries to introduce healthcare systems. Fighting the burden of diseases
with public health measures does not necessarily go hand in hand with
creating entitlements for medical services.
Conclusion
The first major conclusion we can draw from our analysis is that none
of the factors highlighted in the theory section is able to fully explain
the timing of healthcare system introduction worldwide. Nevertheless,
we clearly see regional diffusion patterns and some domestic factors
show significant correlation with the hazard rate of introducing health-
care systems. This observation suggests that full explanations should go
beyond the realm of traditional comparative welfare state analysis and
incorporate ideas from global social policy research, diffusion research,
and global history.
As in other instances (e.g., Rothgang and Schneider 2015) the expla-
nation of change demands a complex framework that takes different
strands of theory on board and combines domestic factors and inter-
national interdependencies.
Starting our review of hypotheses on domestic factors , our models
clearly reject a strict modernization hypothesis that assumes a universal
correlation between economic development and wealth on the one hand
and the creation of healthcare systems on the other. We rather come up
with a highly interesting result: The hypothesis holds for our first period
of observation, i.e., for the introduction of healthcare systems before
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First World War. In this period the introduction of a health system was
more likely in more affluent countries, thus confirming modernization
theory. In subsequent periods, however, other factors like nation-building
in former colonies have gained importance, leading to a decline in the
influence of wealth on the introduction of healthcare systems.
Turning to the capabilities hypothesis, we find no evidence to support
it. The absence of a statistical correlation in our model may, however,
reflect the relatively crude operationalization of this hypothesis due to a
lack of better data for the whole period.
The negative correlation between child mortality seems to strongly
refute the problem pressure hypothesi s and suggests that problem pressure
rather decreases the likelihood of earlier healthcare system introduction.
This interpretation is, however, misleading. Based on reports from several
case studies we rather assume that typically, public health measures in the
area of hygiene, water supply, etc., precede the introduction of a health-
care system. Only after such public health measures have brought on a
decline in (child) mortality figures, states introduce healthcare systems
under conditions of already lower problem pressure.
The literature on the effects of regime types already suggests that in
some instances autocracy increases the likelihood of healthcare systems
being introduced. Our findings support the observation that healthcare
systems often predate democracy. While democratic representation is
not a necessary condition for the introduction of a healthcare system,
the likely motives of non-democratic regimes for implementing social
protection suggest that these policies are not independent of democ-
ratization processes, as they seek to stifle the growth of democratic
movements.
According to the IO hypothesis we should see a jump in the number
of healthcare systems being introduced after the WHO or its preceding
health-related international organizations were founded. Figure 5.2
shows that this is not the case. Healthcare systems are introduced at a
relatively constant rate over time, with small peaks especially in years
in which empires like the Austro-Hungarian empire (in 1888) or the
Russian empire (in 1912) introduced systems. Correspondingly, the
diffusion models show no significant effect of the foundation of IOs.
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Fig. 5.2 Introduction of healthcare systems over time
Our analysis does not support the warfare and welfare hypothesis at
all. While the literature has shown that wars have accelerated and even
driven social policy developments in some countries, they do not seem
to be drivers of healthcare system introduction, globally and over time.
Finally, we find mixed support for the network hypothesi s. Trade
networks cannot explain policy diffusion. While gaining some impor-
tance over time they do not seem to represent relevant channels of
policy diffusion regarding healthcare systems. Nor do the links created
through cultural similarity and colonial ties offer a universal explanation
of healthcare system introduction. But the introduction of health-
care systems clearly followed a regional pattern with European coun-
tries coming first, and (South-)American, Asian, and African countries
following roughly in this order. Whether this result reflects actual policy
learning or follows mainly other logics, e.g., the timing of decoloniza-
tion and nation-building, needs to be assessed with other methods. Based
on our knowledge of healthcare systems around the world, we actually
assume that it is more likely the type than the timing of the system
introduction that is influenced through transnational policy diffusion
networks.
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While our results shed some light on possible factors influencing the
emergence of healthcare systems worldwide, our analysis clearly has its
limitations. Our model can only explain about 21% of the variance in
the data. Clearly, other factors not included in our model and case-
specific idiosyncrasies play an important role in the decision of a country
to create a healthcare system. The long time frame also severely limits the
possibility to operationalize some of our hypotheses, as data on many of
the—theoretically interesting—variables is unavailable for most of the
countries prior to the 1980s. This is especially true for more qualitative
data, e.g., on the strength of progressive political actors, which might
have enabled us to operationalize the otherwise promising power resource
theory. Data on networks other than the four most basic networks
included in our model is especially hard to come by. Therefore, it was
not possible to test policy-specific relational aspects.
Nevertheless, our modeling for the first time systematically tests many
of the assumptions present in the social policy literature which usually
looks at individual countries or smaller samples of countries mostly from
the OECD world. It shows that so far, no universal model of healthcare
system introduction emerges from these assumptions. In the other hand,
it highlights regional diffusion and the time-dependent relevance that
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Table 5.2. Network diffusion of health care systems—additive modeling
approach
Health care system introduction—hazard ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1880–1913 −4.590*** −4.620*** −4.362*** −4.418*** −4.429***
1914–1945 −4.625*** −4.672*** −4.363*** −4.421*** −4.534***
1946–1978 −4.660*** −4.747*** −4.197*** −4.280*** −4.476***
1979–2010 −5.453*** −5.531*** −4.950*** −5.042*** −5.224***
Existence 2.165*** 2.185*** 2.186*** 2.268*** 2.295***
Foundation of
IOs
0.038 0.045 −0.007 0.019 0.065
Medical Schools −0.340 −0.340 −0.434* −0.417 −0.348
Life Expectancy
in Years
0.011 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.001
Child Mortality
per 1 k born




0.029 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027
GDP 0.090 0.090 0.094 0.086 0.091
Regime Type −0.139*** −0.140*** −0.158*** −0.157*** −0.157***
Wars 0.201 0.201 0.101 0.111 0.106











Network: Trade −0.242 −0.179
Observations 10,771 10,771 10,771 10,771 10,771
Log Likelihood −656.524 −656.482 −651.082 −650.898 −649.820
Akaike Inf. Crit 1341.048 1342.964 1334.165 1335.797 1333.641
Note *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Introduction of Long-Term Care Systems:
The Nascent Diffusion of an Emergent
Field of Social Policy
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Introduction1
Old age is a life stage associated with a wide variety of experiences,
depending, for instance, on residential location, socioeconomic charac-
teristics, individual life trajectory, health and economic status (Lloyd-
Sherlock 2010, 231–235). From a welfare policy perspective, it is also
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a period in which particular social risks are likely to occur that calls for
mitigation through state intervention. One such risk is long-term care
(LTC) dependency, that is, enduring physical and/or mental impairments
necessitating assistance with daily living activities.2 Unlike acute illness or
loss of income in old age, LTC is a so-called “latecomer” of welfare policy
which was historically—and in many parts of the world still is—not
addressed as a (separate) social policy field (Österle and Rothgang 2010;
Ranci and Pavolini 2015; Scheil-Adlung 2015). Nevertheless, we can see
that over the past three decades in particular, debates, policy proposals,
and reforms dealing with social protection for LTC dependency have
picked up in many states as well as in international and transnational
exchange. For instance, specific social LTC insurance schemes have been
established in countries such as Israel, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan,
and South Korea (Schmidt 2005; Companje 2014, 102; Maags 2020).
In Latin America, Uruguay recently introduced a National System of
Care, and similar proposals are being discussed elsewhere in the region
(Matus-Lopez and Cid Pedraza 2016; Esquivel 2017). Meanwhile, LTC
is also increasingly addressed on the international level, for example in
different forums and entities of the United Nations (UN) (SecondWorld
Assembly on Ageing 2002; WHO 2015, 2017).
In the present chapter, we aim to investigate what factors—interna-
tional as well as domestic—have so far contributed to the introduction of
LTC systems under public responsibility for the elderly worldwide. That is,
our explanandum is the point in time at which states first adopted statu-
tory entitlements concerning social protection for LTC for (at least) the
old-age population. To this end, we employ data on introduction points
taken from the novel Historical Long-Term Care Systems Dataset (Fischer
and Sternkopf 2021). In the next section, based on theoretical consid-
erations borrowed from welfare state research and literature focusing on
LTC policy, we specify several hypotheses on the role of horizontal and
vertical diffusion channels and countries’ national constellations in the
2 In general, care dependency can occur at any age, e.g. due to a disability causing loss of
functional capacity. However, there is a strong (statistical) association between age and LTC
dependency, making old age the period of life with the highest risk of needing LTC (WHO
2015; Colombo et al. 2011).
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introduction of LTC systems. Subsequently, we outline the operational-
ization of our dependent and independent variables. We then move on to
conduct the empirical analysis using a discrete-time logistic hazard model ,
presenting the method, results, and limitations. In the final part, we
discuss the findings and conclude.
Theory and Hypotheses
Generally, there is a lack of (cross-country) explanatory analysis on
the introduction of social protection schemes for LTC which makes it
difficult to build on previous theoretical specifications and results for
formulating hypotheses. However, some insights for explaining the intro-
duction of LTC systems can be drawn from assumptions and observa-
tions in publications on LTC in general and in particular from the body
of (case) studies exploring LTC policy reform and design (e.g., Camp-
bell et al. 2009; Theobald and Kern 2011; Esquivel 2017). Furthermore,
the theory strands used to analyze welfare policies in general (see e.g.,
Schmitt et al. 2015) seem to be a fruitful starting point for theorizing
about the policy field of LTC (cf. Leitner 2013, 51–52). Consequently,
we use these existing bodies of literature to structure and underpin our
subsequent theoretical discussion. In line with the focus of this edited
volume, we start with interdependencies and then move on to identify
relevant domestic factors.
International Interdependencies
Moving beyond “methodological nationalism,” the study of policy diffu-
sion and policy transfer (see e.g., Marsh and Sharman 2009; Obinger
et al. 2013) has highlighted the relevance of transnational and inter-
national interdependencies for countries’ (social) policy decisions. The
concept of diffusion assumes “contagion” between different entities.
Consequently, in comparative policy research, diffusion describes a
process “in which policies in one unit are influenced by concepts,
proposals, policies or ideas from another unit” and can occur in different
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constellations: horizontally from country to country, vertically from
international organization (IO)3 to country or vice versa, or in the form
of imperial diffusion (Kuhlmann et al. 2020, 82, 85). As regards the
diffusion of LTC system introduction, diffusion both between countries
and from IOs to countries seems plausible. In the following, we outline
both.
As described in the introductory chapter (Mossig et al., in this
volume), multiple types of ties may drive diffusion of social policies
between countries: geographical, cultural, and economic proximity and
colonial ties (cf. Elkins and Simmons 2005; Schmitt and Obinger 2013).
So which “contagion channels” do we expect to play a role for the hori-
zontal diffusion of LTC systems in particular? While “macro” diffusion
patterns of LTC schemes have not been analyzed so far, there are studies
on the role of LTC policy transfer in a small number of European and
East Asian countries that provide clues on relevant ties. This body of
literature points to the role of relationships established through similar
welfare state institutions (Maags 2020, 13; Campbell et al. 2009) as
well as “geographical and cultural proximity” (Theobald and Kern 2011,
334). In general, it seems plausible that spatial proximity fosters the
spread of ideas on establishing social protection for LTC dependency.
From LTC research, at least two groups of geographically close coun-
tries with similar LTC models and evidence of international exchanges on
the topic come to mind: the Scandinavian countries with their universal
public service model (Sipilä et al. 2000), and the spread of social LTC
insurance in East Asia (Maags 2020). Therefore, it may also be the
case that countries learn from a geographically close “reference group”
(Elkins and Simmons 2005, 45) with regard to the introduction of an
LTC system, which leads us to investigate the following hypothesis: Close
geographical proximity to countries with an established LTC system increases
the likelihood of introduction of LTC systems (H1a, geographic diffusion
hypothesis).
Furthermore, we assume that cultural similarity is especially interesting
in the policy field of LTC (cf. Pfau-Effinger 2019, 222). For instance,
3 We use the term ‘international organization” in a broad sense, subsuming both global as well
as regional associations of states and including supranational organizations such as the European
Union.
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in their analysis of LTC policy transfer in several European countries,
Theobald and Kern (2011, 334) point to the shared cultural and histor-
ical heritage of Austria, the Czech Republic, and the Italian region of
South Tyrol, arguing that this may be one of the reasons why the latter
two have oriented themselves to the Austrian LTC system. A particular
aspect of culture that seems to be relevant with regard to the field of LTC
is family values, that is, “cultural values and notions with respect to the
structure of the family and the gender division of labour” (Pfau-Effinger
2005, 328). For instance, shared norms about the role of informal care
provision by women could foster countries’ exchange on the need for
and form of social protection for LTC. We test the relevance of shared
cultural norms with the following hypothesis: Close cultural similarity to
countries with an established LTC system increases the likelihood of diffusion
of LTC systems (H1b, cultural diffusion hypothesis).
LTC is a comparably recent field of social policy which has devel-
oped mostly since the dissolution of colonial empires. Moreover, at
the time of publication relatively few LTC schemes have been intro-
duced in the Global South (see Fig. 6.2), which suggests that there is
no strong theoretical correlation between the direct role of colonial ties
and the establishment of LTC systems. However, shared colonial heritage
has facilitated the development of similar national (welfare) institutions
(Schmitt 2015), which, in turn, could encourage later exchanges on
finding a fitting “policy solution” for LTC. For example, there is evidence
that countries with preexisting social insurance models such as Japan
or South Korea sought advice from countries with similar institutions
and experiences for modeling their LTC systems (Campbell et al. 2009;
Maags 2020). For this reason, we explore the relevance of colonial ties
as a third channel for horizontal policy diffusion: Colonial relations with
countries with an established LTC system increases the likelihood of diffusion
of LTC systems (H1c, colonial diffusion hypothesis).
Aging and LTC are not only discussed in and among countries, but
also by IOs. Organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Orga-
nization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the
World Bank or the World Health Organization (WHO) address these
issues through recommendations, comparative studies, or monitoring
systems. While the topic has recently also gained importance among
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globally active IOs as well (see e.g., WHO 2015; UN DESA 2016),
organizations of the Global North have been especially active in the field
since the 1990s. For instance, the OECD published its first report on
the situation of the elderly in the mid-1990s (Hennessy 1994) and has
since established a comprehensive LTC database. In the EU, which, as a
supranational organization, can exercise a strong influence on its member
states, calls for national policies on LTC in the face of an aging society
came on the agenda as early as 1993 (Pacolet et al. 1999). At the end of
the “European Year of Older People and Solidarity between Generations”
in 1993, the Council of Ministers published a declaration calling on
Member States to initiate regulations in the field of LTC (Council of the
European Union 1993). In the same year, the Commission published a
report comparing health care and social protection schemes in European
countries (Commission of the European Communities 1993; Hervey
and Vanhercke 2010). Thus, EU membership since 1993 may have
been a channel for vertical LTC policy diffusion. Not only the current
members, moreover, but also applicants may have been influenced by
the EU’s agenda-setting, particularly in the 1990s, at a time when some
of the Central and Eastern European countries aspired to membership
in the EU and were therefore perhaps more eager to reform their welfare
systems (Mattli and Plümper 2002; Theobald and Kern 2011). Thus, our
hypothesis on vertical diffusion is the following: (Prospective) Membership
in the European Union after 1993 increases the likelihood of introducing an
LTC system (H2, EU diffusion hypothesis).
National Constellations
As regards domestic explanatory factors, (at least) three theoretical
strands are classically differentiated in welfare (state) studies to account
for the emergence, change, and variation of social policies (see e.g.,
Huber and Stephens 2001, 15; Pierson 1996; Schmitt et al. 2015, 510).
These are functionalist or socio-economic theories that stress the relevance
of economic, technical, and societal change in driving social policy intro-
duction, actor and interest-based theories that focus on the influence of
political and societal groups and coalitions, and institutionalist theories
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which postulate the influence of existing (political) rules, structures and
norms on social policy development. In this section, we turn to these
theoretical schools and specify four hypotheses on the role of national
constellations in the introduction of LTC systems.
Many publications dealing with LTC in different parts of the world
frame the need for (political) activity and research in the field in terms of
growing problem pressure (e.g., Österle et al. 2011; Feng 2019, 291–293;
Colombo et al. 2011, 62–70). Two aspects are frequently cited. On the
one hand, there is a (projected) increase in care dependency prevalence4
in conjunction with demographic aging of societies; on the other hand, a
decrease in informal (familial) care provision due to higher female labor
market participation and more dispersed family structures is discernible.
This narrative is clearly embedded in functionalist theory. Accordingly,
economic and technical change leads to changing demographic and soci-
etal structures which create new social issues and risks—in this case, a
“care gap”—which call for mitigation from the (welfare) state (Obinger
2019; Bonoli 2007). To examine whether states act in line with this
modernization logic, we formulate the following hypothesis: The higher
the prevalence of LTC dependency in a country, the higher the likelihood of
LTC system introduction (H3a, problem pressure hypothesis).
Besides problem pressure, functionalist theory also stresses the impor-
tance of economic resources for social policy adoption and expansion:
With growing wealth, countries have more means available for welfare
spending (Obinger 2019; Leitner 2013, 41). While up to now this
assumption has yielded ambiguous results for different social policies and
time periods (see e.g., Schmitt et al. 2015; Jensen 2011), it has to our
knowledge never been tested with regard to LTC specifically. We there-
fore investigate whether the following hypothesis holds for LTC policy:
The more economically wealthy a country is, the higher is the likelihood of
LTC system introduction (H3b, economic wealth hypothesis).
With a view to the role of actors and interests, a classical explanation
for the expansion of welfare transfer programs (e.g., old-age pensions,
unemployment benefits) in the Global North stresses the importance of
different classes’ power resources, in particular the influence of strong
4 LTC prevalence describes the share of care dependent persons within the population.
146 J. Fischer et al.
left-wing and social democratic parties and trade unions (Pierson 1996,
150; Orloff 2005). However, this seems to be less the case for social and
health care services (e.g., Leitner 2013; Jensen 2011; Bonoli and Reber
2010). Consequently, in the policy field of LTC, it is more plausible
to consider the influence of other actors and ideologies. For instance,
several case studies on LTC policy reform point to the relevance of
women’s organizations and movements (e.g., Peng 2005; Esquivel 2017).
As (informal) care provision is feminized to a large degree (WHO 2015,
130; Österle and Rothgang 2010), women in particular are likely to be
interested in relief from or support with unpaid care provision—either by
remuneration and recognition of informal provision or by strengthening
the formal LTC sector. Therefore, the extent of women’s political oppor-
tunities and participation within a society stands out as a potential factor
influencing the introduction of an LTC system. In terms of actor-based
theories, we therefore explore the following hypothesis: The more that
women in a country are politically empowered, the higher is the likelihood
of LTC system introduction (H3c, women empowerment hypothesis).
The configuration of political institutions and regimes can gener-
ally also influence welfare policy (Pierson 1996, 152). One assumption
regarding the role of a country’s political regime type is that democracies
tend to expand social policy benefits more than autocratic states because
freedom of association and elections offer the population possibilities to
successfully press for social protection schemes (Haggard and Kaufman
2009, 13–14). In the case of LTC, these could be groups directly affected
by (the risk of ) care dependency, but also those indirectly affected,
such as family caregivers and people working in the formal care sector.
Although the connection between regime type and the size of the welfare
state is not straightforward (Schmidt 2019; Schmitt et al. 2015, 511),
we explore the following hypothesis: The more democratic a country is,
the higher is the likelihood of LTC system introduction (H3d, regime type
hypothesis).
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Operationalization and Data
After the theoretical framework has been outlined above, we now turn
to the empirical analysis. This section firstly outlines the dependent
variable, i.e., LTC system introduction, and, secondly, specifies the
operationalization and data sources used to measure our independent
variables.
Dependent Variable: Measuring the Introduction
of LTC Systems
Country-comparative data on the recently developed, complex policy
field of LTC is scarce, in particular with a view to information on the
historical development of LTC schemes.5 Up until very recently, there
was no data available on the emergence of LTC systems (or similar
concepts) across countries. This paper therefore uses a novel dataset
generated in the CRC project A04 Global Developments in Health Care
Systems and Long-term Care as a New Social Risk, the Historical Long-
Term Care Systems Dataset (HLTCS) (Fischer and Sternkopf 2021). This
dataset covers all countries globally with more than 500,000 inhabitants
in 2017 and contains, among others, two different measures for the exis-
tence and introduction dates of LTC systems under public responsibility.
Thus, on the one hand, the introduction of an LTC system (type A)
can be defined (i) as the first point in time when nationwide legislation
is adopted, (ii) this legislation establishes entitlements to LTC bene-
fits, and (iii) the elements of the LTC system are integrated to some
extent (De Carvalho and Fischer 2020, 12–15).6 On the other hand,
when applying a stricter understanding, an LTC system is only defined as
5 There are some exceptions, most notably: since 2004 yearly updated comparative tables
presenting a structured description of countries’ LTC schemes in the wider European area
by the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) and the Mutual Infor-
mation System on Social Protection of the Council of Europe (MISSCEO), and a collection
of laws on LTC for ten European countries by the Social Policy and Law Shared Database
(SPLASH).
6 The latter point is operationalized as the existence of an institution or set of institutions
explicitly responsible for LTC.
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having been introduced if the former criteria are fulfilled and in addition,
in acknowledgment of LTC dependency as a distinct social risk (type B),
LTC is institutionally treated as a social policy field of its own. Overall,
while the development of such distinct LTC systems is often regarded as
a remarkable event in the social policy landscape of a country, type B
systems are globally still extremely rare, totaling 15 in 2010 and 18 by
2020 (see Fig. 6.1, dark red dotted line). By contrast, LTC systems of
the former definition may often represent rather incipient and hidden
developments, but are nevertheless an important first step toward social
protection for LTC. Therefore, in this chapter, we analyze the introduc-
tion of the more widespread type A LTC systems, using as our dependent
variable the adoption year of the foundational law which introduces for
the first time statutory benefits relating to social protection for LTC for
(at least) the old-age population. In the remainder of this section, we
briefly describe the distribution of this variable over time, which is also
visualized in the (cumulative) adoption graph in Fig. 6.1.
As shown by the light red lines in Fig. 6.1, LTC systems started to
emerge from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The first country to
introduce an LTC system was the United Kingdom with the adoption of
Fig. 6.1 Adoption of LTC systems (type A and B) worldwide, until 2010 (Source
Own representation, data taken from HLTCS [version 31.01.2020])
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Fig. 6.2 World map of LTC system introductions (Source Data taken from HLTCS
[version 31.01.2020]; Data missing for the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal,
New Zealand, North Korea, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda,
Zimbabwe)
the National Assistance Act in 1948. In the subsequent decades, the adop-
tion process was rather slow and mostly took place in Europe. The first
Asian country to introduce an LTC system was Japan in 1963, closely
followed by the United States in 1965 as the first on the American conti-
nent (see Fig. 6.2). Introduction picked up in the 1990s, as indicated
by the steep light red dotted curve in Fig. 6.1. As many as 16 coun-
tries, mostly Eastern European states some of which were newly (re-)
established shortly beforehand, adopted a novel LTC system from 1991
until 1998. In the 2000s, the regional diversity of countries increased
to some extent, with introductions in several Asian countries as well as
in South Africa. Overall, less than a third of all countries worldwide
had introduced an LTC system by 2018, indicating that the diffusion
process of this social policy is still at an early stage. As shown on the map
in Fig. 6.2, the majority of system introductions until today is clearly
centered on Europe.
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Independent Variables
Following our theoretical framework, the independent variables can be
divided into two groups: international interdependencies (H1, H2) and
national constellations (H3). We operationalize horizontal international
interdependencies by calculating network exposure values (Valente 1995;
2005) for three potentially relevant horizontal networks: geographic
proximity (H1a), cultural similarity (H1b), and colonial legacy (H1c).
Network exposure is defined by the proportion of a country’s neighbors
which already adopted an LTC system. In this regard, all countries to
which the focal state is linked via a certain network tie (e.g., colonial
legacy) count as neighbors. It is also possible to account for the weights of
network ties. An in-depth explanation and discussion of network expo-
sure and its calculation are provided in Chapter 1 of this volume (Mossig
et al. 2021, in this volume).
To operationalize vertical policy diffusion from the EU to the national
level (H2), we created a dataset that indicates the point in time at which a
country applied for EU membership and when it became an EU member
state. Based on this data, we identify for each year those countries that
are members of the EU or official EU applicants. In the following, we
will refer to this country set as the extended EU group. Starting with
1993, which marks the beginning of EU engagement in LTC (see theory
section), the variable is set to “1” if a country is part of the extended
EU group. For the years prior to 1993 and for non-group members it is
coded “0.”
We now turn to the operationalization of our hypotheses on national
constellations. Measuring LTC dependency as specified in the problem
pressure hypothesis (H3a) is challenging, as there is no data source
providing information about the prevalence of LTC dependency that
covers countries worldwide or historically. As research clearly indicates
that LTC dependency is strongly associated with (very) old age (see e.g.,
WHO 2015, 65–69; Colombo et al. 2011, 40–43), we use the share of
old-age population as a proxy measure. While statistics on the Global
North indicate that LTC prevalence increases significantly at the age
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of 80 years and above (Colombo et al. 2011, 40–43), data for coun-
tries in the Global South, where the average life expectancy is lower,
indicates limitations in activities of daily living even for the “younger
elderly” (WHO 2015, 68). As a compromise, we use the share of popula-
tion aged 75 years and older to operationalize LTC dependency. To do so,
we employ data provided by UN DESA (2019). It includes information
about the share of population aged 75+ years in percent at five-year inter-
vals and covers the period from 1950 until 2020. To cope with missing
values, we use linear interpolation to impute data for unobserved country
years.
For the wealth hypothesis (H3b), we use the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita in units of 10,000 US$ to operationalize countries’
economic power. Since this variable is extensively described in Chapter 1
(Mossig et al., in this volume), we forego redescribing the data here.
To operationalize the women empowerment hypothesis (H3c) the
women’s political empowerment index (Sundström et al. 2015) is used,
which is obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset
(Coppedge et al. 2020). The index is an aggregate of three subindices—
women’s civil liberties index, women’s civil society participation index,
and the women’s political participation index—and ranges from “0,”
indicating a low level of political empowerment of women, to “1,” indi-
cating high political empowerment. Missing values have been filled with
linearly interpolated values.
Finally, for the regime type hypothesis (H3d), we use the level of
democratization taken from V-Dem (Lührmann et al. 2018; Coppedge
et al. 2020) and described in Chapter 1. Values range from “0”—
closed autocracy—to “9”—liberal democracy—and missing data has
been interpolated linearly (see Mossig et al., in this volume). Now that
our measurements have been specified, we move to the presentation of
the employed method, results, and limitations of our analysis.
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Explaining the Introduction of LTC Systems
Method
In line with the methodological approach followed in this volume, we
use discrete-time logistic hazard models to estimate the influence of the
independent variables on the hazard ratio of LTC system introduction
(cf. Windzio 2013; Valente 1995; 2005). Due to missing data in at
least one of the independent variables, our models do not include the
following countries from the original country sample of this volume:
Bhutan, East Timor, Fiji, Guyana, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, South Sudan, and Suriname. Thus, the models cover observa-
tions from N = 154 countries during the time period 1945–2010. We
selected 1945 as the starting point for several reasons. Firstly, it does
not exclude any LTC system introductions (the first is in 1948), and,
secondly, data for some of our independent variables are only available
from the 1940s/50s onwards. Under these circumstances, we deem it
reasonable to pick a historic turning point—the end ofWorldWar II—as
the starting point for our analysis.
We defined two time intervals for the piece-wise constant rate function
of logistic hazard models—one period from 1945 to 1977, and one from
1978 to 2010. The choice is motivated by the aim of creating intervals of
similar length on the one hand, and by reducing the amount of control
variables on the other. We consider this to be a reasonable approach, since
the total number of LTC systems introduced by the end of the observa-
tion period in 2010 is still very small (n = 43) compared to the sample
size (N = 154). Countries which did not introduce an LTC system until
2010 were treated as right-censored cases.
To facilitate a straightforward interpretation of the model results we
also conducted certain data transformations. Firstly, the women’s polit-
ical empowerment index has been converted to a percentage scale.
Secondly, the variable values of “share of population 75+” and “GDP
per capita” have been centered, by subtracting the grand mean from
each. Since centering only shifts the values proportionally, the proce-
dure does not affect the model results, while it may improve the models’
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readability (Aiken and West 1991). As proposed in the introductory
chapter, we addressed the issue with non-independent observations by
using cluster-robust standard errors (Zeileis et al. 2020).
Results
Table 6.1 shows the predicted hazard ratios of LTC system introduction.
While Model 1 contains the full set of independent variables introduced
above, Model 2 additionally includes an interaction term for the centered
variables “share of population 75+” and “GDP per capita.”
Of the three network diffusion variables, only network exposure by
geographical proximity shows a significant and positive effect in both
models. This supports the geographic diffusion hypothesis (H1a), showing
that geographic proximity promotes the diffusion of ideas and policy
innovations. On a substantial level this result reflects the large cluster
of LTC systems in Europe, where the first LTC systems were developed.
Table 6.1 Discrete-time logistic hazard model of LTC system introduction (N =
154)
Dependend variable: Introduction
Year of Long-Term Care Systems
Model 1 Model 2
1945–1977 0.0000*** (1.20) 0.0000*** (1.36)
1978–2010 0.0000*** (1.29) 0.0000*** (1.45)
Network exposure: proximity 203.80*** (1.28) 117.12*** (1.27)
Network exposure: culture 0.05 (2.21) 0.10 (2.20)
Network exposure: colonies 1.00 (0.46) 0.98 (0.43)
Extended EU group 1.23 (0.59) 1.11 (0.59)
Share of population 75+ 1.30 (0.18) 1.52* (0.17)
GDP per capita 1.19 (0.22) 1.15 (0.12)
Women pol. empowerment index 1.06** (0.02) 1.06** (0.02)
Democratization 1.21* (0.09) 1.24* (0.08)
Interaction: GDP*Pop 75+ 0.86* (0.06)
Observations 9080 9080
Log Likelihood −195.104 −192.451
Akaike Inf. Crit 410.208 406.903
McFadden R2 0.285 0.295
Note: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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The culture diffusion hypothesis (H1b) is not supported by our models
and must be rejected under the conditions of Model 1 and Model 2,
because the coefficients are not significant. Similarly, the lack of statis-
tical significance of network exposure by colonial relationships is not in
line with the colonial diffusion hypothesis (H1c). While the rejection of the
colonial diffusion hypothesis is understandable as the theory section has
already highlighted the weak connection between LTC policy and colo-
nial empires, it is indeed surprising that we find no evidence for diffusion
by cultural similarity in our analysis.
Regarding the EU diffusion hypothesis, both models yield unexpected
results. The effects are not statistically significant, indicating that the EU
agenda-setting on LTC policy since 1993 did not influence the risk of
LTC system introduction among EU members and applicants. This is
a puzzling result, as it implies that the role of the EU in the field of
LTC is less influential than in other social policy fields described in the
literature, such as pensions or gender equality (Cerami 2008; Guillén
and Palier 2004; O’Connor 2005).
Model 1 shows a positive but not statistically significant effect for the
problem pressure (H3a) variable “share of population 75+.” This result
indicates that countries do not generally tend to introduce LTC systems
earlier as the prevalence of LTC dependency increases, and therefore H3a
is rejected by Model 1. Similarly, “GDP per capita” shows no significant
correlation to the adoption risk in Model 1. This finding contradicts the
economic wealth hypothesis (H3b), which assumes that economic affluence
increases the likelihood of introducing an LTC system. To investigate this
result further, we discuss the effects of the interaction term included in
Model 2 at the end of this section.
The coefficients of the women’s political empowerment index are
significantly positive in both models. Since the variables represent the
original index on a percentage scale, the hazard of introducing an LTC
system increases by 6% for each additional percent of the index. Recap-
turing the 10% interval of the original index, an increase by one level
statistically results in a 60% higher risk of LTC system introduction.
Thus, the model results support the women empowerment hypothesis
(H3c). Similarly, both models predict a significant positive effect of the
level of democratization. Since the effects in both models point in the
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same direction, we can draw from them at least weak empirical support
for the regime type hypothesis (H3d).
In Model 2, we have added an interaction term for economic wealth
and problem pressure, because we expected that the influence of problem
pressure could be of greater relevance if a country is comparably rich
and can better afford to introduce LTC benefits. Furthermore, we were
surprised by the absent statistical significance of problem pressure and
economic wealth in Model 1. Consequently, the additional interaction
hypothesis reads: The higher the economic wealth, the stronger the effect
of high prevalence of LTC dependency on the risk of LTC system adoption
(IH).
In Model 2 the effect of “share of population 75+” increases compared
to Model 1 and becomes significant (p < 0.05). Thus, in countries of
average economic wealth an increase of the “share of population 75+”
by one percent increases the odds for LTC system introduction by 52%.
The GDP per capita coefficient, however, remains insignificant and thus
indicates that economic wealth has no influence on the risk of adoption
for countries with average problem pressure.
Finally, the interaction term itself shows a significant negative coef-
ficient. Figure 6.3 shows the predicted probabilities of LTC system
adoption related to the share of population aged 75 and older, while the
lines represent the effect difference among countries of average (blue),
low (red), and high (green) economic wealth. The latter two indicate
values which are one standard deviation below and above the mean,
respectively. As shown in Fig. 6.3, the overall positive effect of problem
pressure on the adoption risk is dampened as economic wealth increases.
However, Fig. 6.3 also shows that this dampening effect almost only
applies to countries with relatively high problem pressure (1.02% above
average and higher).
Our interaction hypothesis therefore has to be rejected. The positive
effect of high problem pressure on the introduction of LTC systems
does not increase with economic wealth. One possible explanation for
this surprising finding could be that elderly people in richer countries
may have better opportunities to make provisions for future LTC depen-
dency during their working life. They also might receive higher old-age
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Fig. 6.3 Interaction effects
pensions allowing them to pay for LTC services more easily. Conse-
quently, with high problem pressure, the necessity for social protection
for LTC (especially for the poorest population strata) could be even more
pressing in less wealthy countries.
Limitations
The analysis faces several limitations. As already mentioned, LTC is a
relatively nascent social policy field, and LTC dependency as a new social
risk only recently became more salient in many societies. The data on the
introduction of LTC systems presented in this study underlines this fact
and shows that the global diffusion of LTC systems is still at an early
stage. Only 43 of the 154 countries incorporated in our model have
been classified as adopters of LTC systems by 2010. Five further coun-
tries7 introduced an LTC system after the end of our observation period
7 Azerbaijan (2014), Uruguay (2015), Uzbekistan (2015), Albania (2016), Greece (2016).
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and were treated as right-censored in our model. Furthermore, the intro-
duction data was missing for 20 countries,8 which we also treated as
cases without an LTC system, because initial country screenings suggest
that they did not introduce an LTC system until 2010. Both the early
stage of diffusion and data uncertainty restrict the present analysis. As
mentioned above, these concerns also led us to use only two steps for the
piece-wise constant rate function. We also refrained from including trade
network exposure and the additional trade existence control variable used
throughout the edited volume, because there are neither substantial theo-
retical arguments for the relevance of economic interdependencies in
LTC, nor did it show any significant empirical result when included in
the model. However, for the sake of completeness, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 in
the appendix show model results which include trade exposure effects as
well.
Besides the measurement problems associated with a lack of appro-
priate data discussed for some explanatory variables—especially problem
pressure—above, there are also limitations concerning the operational-
ization of the dependent variable. As discussed in the section on oper-
ationalization and data, type-A LTC systems constitute rather incipient
forms of social protection for LTC which are sometimes not recognized
as such (at the time) and often establish only rudimentary entitlements
which may in fact be irrelevant to large parts of the population. However,
political activism, the role of economic means for funding, and the diffu-
sion of ideas may be stronger with regard to “big bang” events like
the introduction of distinct LTC systems (type B). For instance, the
insights on LTC policy transfer provided by existing case studies (see
theory section) all refer to the adoption of distinct LTC systems since
the 1990s. Therefore, it might be fruitful to also further investigate the
establishment of distinct LTC systems, even if their small number makes
a (statistical) analysis currently difficult.
8 Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Moldova, Morocco,
Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda,
Zimbabwe.
158 J. Fischer et al.
Conclusion
Our analysis has identified several factors which advance the introduc-
tion of LTC systems. These are, most notably, diffusion by means of
geographical proximity, high political empowerment of women and, to
some extent, a high level of democratization. In general, it is surprising
that both of our strongest LTC-specific hypotheses on international inter-
dependencies, that is horizontal diffusion through cultural similarity and
vertical diffusion within the extended EU group, have to be rejected.
One explanation for the absent influence of the EU on the introduction
of LTC systems may be that LTC policy in particular is regarded as a
national matter by the member states, which is justified by the low legit-
imacy of the EU in social policy issues. Moreover, many member states
had already introduced LTC policies before 1993, which in turn allows
the reverse assumption that member states influence the social policy
agenda of the EU institutions. Moreover, as agenda setting only started
in the 1990s, it is possible that the EU influences the further develop-
ment toward distinct LTC systems rather than the first legal provisions
in the field.
On a more general note, when analyzing the results on the different
“contagion channels,” it is important to bear in mind that LTC system
diffusion is still an ongoing, accelerating process. Consequently, our
current model provides a description of the early phase of diffusion,
and not a generalizable explanation of the global diffusion process as
a whole. The same methodological approach may identify other factors
or assign different relevance to them as more countries introduce LTC
systems subsequent to 2010. Recapturing the self-referential/endogenous
dynamic of network diffusion processes, this might even lead to the iden-
tification of further diffusion channels, which become more relevant as
exposure thresholds mediated by their increase.
With regard to national constellations , our findings provide very
limited support for the functionalist explanations on economic wealth
and problem pressure. The lack of statistical evidence of the problem
pressure hypothesis is an unexpected result in view of the fact that the
body of international literature on LTC continuously stresses the rele-
vance of aging while urging governments to introduce social protection
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schemes for LTC. Nevertheless, as the result of the interaction model
shows, a high share of elderly people seems to matter in countries
with low to average wealth. Although not explicitly hypothesized in this
chapter, one can regard this finding as partly supporting the functionalist
explanation relying on problem pressure. Unfortunately, due to a lack of
data, we were unable to test the flip side of the problem pressure hypoth-
esis relating to the availability of informal care as a functional equivalent
to public LTC systems. Wealth itself does not seem to be a major driving
force behind the introduction of LTC systems introduction. However,
it still appears to be of importance as the influence of other factors,
especially problem pressure, depends on economic affluence.
Our actor-centered assumption about the political role of women is
confirmed. This result shows that women’s political participation is not
only important for the establishment of childcare policies (e.g., Bonoli
and Reber 2010) but also with regard to elder care, which has until
now been less examined. However, it is not completely clear what the
underlying mechanism of this positive effect is. On the one hand, as
specified in the theory section, it could be directly related to women’s
political participation and activism. On the other hand, a general culture
of gender equality associated with high political empowerment of women
could also be behind this result. Furthermore, as regards one other
common hypothesis of welfare theory, namely, the role of the political
regime type, our findings also provide statistical evidence for the positive
influence of democratization. In fact, there have been very few introduc-
tions in (strongly) autocratic regimes—only eight countries with an LTC
system, mostly former members of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
display a regime type score below five at the time of introduction.
Overall, the present chapter provides—to our knowledge—the first
cross-country statistical analysis that explores why countries introduce
social protection for LTC dependency. By including variables which
measure both horizontal as well as vertical diffusion processes, we also
go beyond the explanatory factors rooted in “methodological national-
ism” which has often accompanied analyses of social policy development
(cf. Obinger et al. 2013). Due to the fact that LTC is only recently
evolving as a (distinct) policy, the field can provide fruitful ground for
studying both international interdependencies as well as sectoral path
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dependencies, as we can currently observe the spread of the policies.
Moreover, information and data are more readily available for this recent
historical period than for the beginning of the twentieth century. We
therefore conclude that the global diffusion of LTC systems will remain
a worthwhile field for future study.
Appendix
See Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
Table 6.2 Results—additive diffusion models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1945–1977 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.00*** 0.00***




1.05** 1.06** 1.05** 1.05**
Share of population
75+
1.31+ 1.30+ 1.26 1.26
Extended EU group 0.97 1.23 1.20 1.21
GDP per capita 1.12 1.19 1.14 1.14
Democratization 1.17+ 1.21* 1.20* 1.20*
Trade existence 684,293.90*** 685,783.60***
Network exposure:
proximity










Observations 9080 9080 9080 9080
Log Likelihood −195.847 −195.104 −194.559 −194.557
Akaike Inf. Crit 407.695 408.208 411.117 413.115
Note: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Table 6.3 Results—additive diffusion models with non-normalized colonial
exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1945–1977 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.00*** 0.00***




1.05** 1.06** 1.05** 1.06**
Share of population
75+
1.31+ 1.30+ 1.26 1.34
Extended EU group 0.97 1.23 1.20 1.16
GDP per capita 1.12 1.19 1.14 1.13
Democratization 1.17+ 1.21* 1.20* 1.20*
Trade existence 684,293.90*** 789,606.40***
Network exposure:
proximity










Observations 9080 9080 9080 9080
Log Likelihood −195.847 −195.104 −194.559 −194.026
Akaike Inf. Crit 407.695 408.208 411.117 412.052
Note: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Origins of Family Policy: Prerequisites
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Introduction1
Compared to other areas of social policy, the historical origins of family
policy, i.e., the public provision of cash, time, and services to assist
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child-rearing and reconcile care and work, have received only scant atten-
tion. Gauthier’s book (1996) remains the definitive comparative in-depth
study of the diverse origins and trajectories of family policy in the coun-
tries that now belong to the group of rich, democratic welfare states.
Comparative studies with a Latin-American (Blofield and Martinez Fran-
zoni 2015; Blofield and Touchton 2020), East-Asian (Fleckenstein and
Lee 2017; Saraceno 2016), and even a global focus (Filgueira and Rossel
2020) have started to appear, but for the most part, ignore the histor-
ical roots of the policies they study. We provide the first global analysis
of the origins of family policy, systematically testing established theories
and propositions. This facilitates an assessment of the influence of inter-
national linkages on the development of family policy, which is widely
acknowledged but proves difficult to pin down (White 2020).
While contemporary family policies are often analyzed as a more
or less coherent “whole”, which can be characterized along dimensions
such as “defamilization” or typologized according to how these poli-
cies structure gender relations within the family, state interest in and
support for families historically first appeared as “piecemeal interven-
tions” rather than “comprehensive packages” (Gauthier 1996). It took
more than half a century before family policies (plural) coalesced into a
distinct and explicit family policy (singular), and even then, state inter-
vention often remained far from coherent. Since we are interested in
the historical origins of family policy, we look at the adoption of paid
maternity leave, child benefits, and workplace childcare regulations in
isolation, i.e., analyzing the first adoption of each of these family poli-
cies. This also poses a relatively “easy” test for the effect of international
linkages, which may wither away or work differently following these first
adoptions.
To give an overview of the historical origins, to assess the types of
domestic drivers put forward, and to gauge possible channels of diffu-
sion, we first review the literature dealing with the three types of family
policy. Then, we present data and models and appraise the generaliz-
ability of earlier findings across time and space. A brief discussion of
methodological and substantive limitations concludes.
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Family Policies: Historical Origins and Drivers2
(a) Paid Maternity Leave
Paid maternity leave policy was the earliest social protection policy
explicitly aimed at women workers. While other protective legislation,
such as unpaid maternity leave and the prohibition of night work, often
had adverse effects on women’s economic empowerment by limiting
the job opportunities of women workers, paid maternity leave policy
minimizes the difficulties of working mothers that go along with giving
birth without jeopardizing their economic independence (Htun et al.
2019). Because paid maternity leave policies provide income compen-
sation and often prohibit employers from dismissing women workers
during and after confinement, they secure their independence vis-à-vis
their employers and spouses. Whereas the different factions within the
women’s movement disagreed on whether women-specific labor laws
were needed to achieve gender equality in the labor market, they agreed
on the necessity of paid maternity leave (Berkovitch 1999; Boris 2019).
Despite this fundamental role in providing social protection for
women workers, little is known about the historical development of
paid maternity leave policies. Historical accounts of social protection
programs focus on the risks of old age, unemployment, and sickness
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981), often treating
paid maternity leave only as a corollary to the general development of
social insurance principles. This research gap reflects the fact that the
unit of analysis in early comparative welfare state research has always
been the average production worker in the manufacturing industry with
a dependent spouse and two children, assuming, if not reflecting, the
gendered division of labor (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 2001). While femi-
nist studies criticized this male breadwinner-centric conceptualization
and measurement of social rights, their own studies focused on the more
recently introduced childcare and parental leave policies. While pivotal
2 The history and analysis of paid maternity leave was authored by Keonhi Son, of child benefits
by Simone Tonelli and of workplace childcare by Tobias Böger.
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to the question of how contemporary welfare states shape gender rela-
tions (Leitner 2003; Saraceno 2011), these studies shed little light on
the forces that have “gendered” the welfare state since its beginnings.
The few studies that focus on the historical development of paid
maternity leave emphasize the significant role of domestic actors and
institutional developments. Gauthier argues that the fear of “family
decline” following industrialization and urbanization in early twentieth-
century Europe triggered government responses, including paid mater-
nity leave (Gauthier 1996). Case studies of European countries and
the U.S. have also emphasized the role of female agency (Hobson and
Lindholm 1997; Koven and Michel 1990; Sainsbury 2001). A recent
publication from Son and Böger expands the research scope to the global
scale and finds that women’s political empowerment and the general
expansion of social protection policies have contributed to the extension
of access to maternity benefits from the 1880s to 2018 (Son and Böger
2021).
Among the scant studies of national maternity leave introduction,
processes of observation of legislative activity in other countries rarely
figure in and neither do references to norms set by global bodies. This
is surprising because maternity protection was an agenda that arose
with the founding of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and
has continued to be a salient issue ever since. In the early twentieth
century, women’s movements struggled to introduce and extend the
right to maternity benefits by lobbying the ILO to adopt the Maternity
Protection Convention, which functioned as an important organizational
platform spreading maternity protection policies at the nation-state level
(Berkovitch 1999). The ILO adopted the first Maternity Protection
Convention (C003) when it was founded in 1919 during its first confer-
ence and has since updated the standards for maternity protection every
three decades in two consecutive Maternity Protection Conventions
(C103, C183), in 1952 and 2000. The ILO had been the only standard-
setter until the European Union implemented its own standards in 1992
(Pregnant Worker Directive 92/85/EEC) (Linos 2013, 130–131). Son
and Böger (2021) find that nation-states tend to extend the coverage
and lower the eligibility criteria of maternity benefits shortly after they
7 Origins of Family Policy: Prerequisites or Diffusion 173
join the ILO. Their findings also signal the significant effect of long-
standing membership, implying that the ILO consistently contributes
to the extension of paid maternity leave policies by utilizing technical
expertise and continuous dialogue with national governments.
Another strand of studies emphasizes the impact of colonial domi-
nation and legacies on welfare systems in the Global South. Schmitt
(2015, 2020) finds that nation-states that share the same colonial experi-
ence are likely to introduce social protection programs at a similar time,
as colonizers often institutionalized social policies in response to a rise
of labor strikes in the 1940s. Importantly, France introduced a unified
labor code that mirrored the French labor code in all French colonies
to stabilize the labor issue, namely the French Code du Travail (1952)
which provided family allowances and maternity insurance for wage
earners (Cooper 1996). Despite the limited coverage of the French Code
du Travail , its adoption brought about the introduction of paid mater-
nity leave in 14 of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries with a generous
amount of benefit (half of the previous wage) and a substantial duration
of benefit (14 weeks) in the early phase of economic development (1952)
in comparison to other middle- and low-income countries.
Overall, the literature points toward the influence of the ILO (ILO
hypothesis) and the reaction of colonial administrations to labor unrest
(colonial hypothesis) as the main drivers of paid maternity leave intro-
duction.
(b) Child Benefits
Early forms of child benefits, then mostly referred to as “family
allowances,” were introduced duringWorldWar I as a way to compensate
for the separation of men in the armed forces and their families, largely
because it was found difficult to recruit them otherwise (Land 1985).
These benefits were quickly withdrawn after the end of the conflict, but
the economic hardship, mounting unemployment, and political turmoil
of the interwar period brought home the importance of having an
income stabilizer for large families (Hoffner 1935). The acknowledg-
ment that having children was associated with a higher risk of poverty
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helped establish the principle that workers’ salaries should also be a func-
tion of the size of their families. Such a principle pushed some advocates
of eugenics to argue against the introduction of family allowances, as it
would have only increased “the rate of multiplication” of individuals at
the bottom of the social scale (Darwin 1925). However, fear of depopu-
lation prevailed over arguments of eugenics, and family allowances were
introduced as a form of population policy to counter falling birth rates
(Gille 1954; Watson 1954a, b).
All in all, it is hard to find a single driver for the adoption of family
allowances. An overview of early writings on the topic highlights three
major arguments that were put forward in support of their adoption.
First, family allowances were considered a way to compensate a family
for the consequences of war, be it the absence of the breadwinner or
the economic hardship that followed the two world wars (compensa-
tion hypothesis) (Breul 1953; Doublet 1948; Kitchen 1981; Land 1985).
Second, family allowances were intended as a living wage, i.e., adjusted
for family size (redistribution hypothesis) (Campbell 1927; Cousins
1999; Hoffner 1935, 1940; Land 1985; Rathbone 1940), and finally,
family allowances were intended as a means to counter falling birth rates
(population hypothesis) (Biagi 1937; Campbell 1927; Cousins 1999;
Gille 1954; Hoffner 1935, 1940; Land 1985; Watson 1954b).
Although these three hypotheses advance our understanding of the
mechanisms that might drive the adoption of family allowances, there
have been few systematic attempts to test them. Partial support for
the compensation hypothesis can be found in recent contributions that
include some form of family benefits in the analysis. The authors find
evidence that the two world wars were a catalyst in the development
of European welfare legislation (Obinger and Schmitt 2020). Further-
more, Schmitt (2020) argued that mass conscription during WW2 in
French African colonies advanced the cause of extending social rights to
groups previously excluded. In support of Schmitt’s argument, previous
research has shown a positive statistical association between the timing of
the introduction of family benefits and a colonial link to France (Kangas
2012; Schmitt et al. 2015). Misra (1998, 2003) provides support of the
redistribution hypothesis, showing that the working class and women’s
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movement were important factors leading to family allowance adop-
tion in 18 industrialized countries. An empirical test of the population
hypothesis in the literature is missing, however, an association between
fertility levels and the development of certain family benefits has been
suggested (Ferrarini 2006).
Finally, recent scholarship in social policy diffusion has started to
investigate the effect of state interdependencies on the introduction of
early programs. Studying countries’ colonial relationships, Schmitt et al.
(2015) present evidence that French and British colonial links impacted
the timing of adoption of family benefits. French colonial ties accelerated
the timing of the introduction of family benefits, while British colonial
ties slowed it down, even in the postcolonial era.
(c) Workplace Childcare Regulation
The public provision of care for children, especially those under three
years old, was only weakly institutionalized in many countries until
recently (O’Connor 1990). However, governments in the early twen-
tieth century, as well as today, also utilized labor regulation to promote
the availability of childcare for young children without having to step
in as a provider themselves. Factory (or workplace) crèches or nurseries
were an early institution catering to working mothers. While these have
become less widespread in European countries after the second world
war, factory crèches and nurseries remain a viable avenue for work-family
reconciliation across the globe even today (Hein and Cassirer 2010).
There are multiple historical antecedents of factory crèche legislation.
In Europe, there was the charitable provision of childcare, promoted by
F. Marbeau in France, as well as early philanthropic endeavors by busi-
nessmen, such as R. Owen’s experiments in workplace education in the
factories of New Lanark, Scotland (Caroli 2019). These were driven,
among other motives, by a shared concern for the health of newborn
children, notably, the fear of rising infant mortality. At the time, they
were the first institutions that did not provide care to the illegitimate
children of the poorest of the poor, but responded to the needs of
working mothers. State intervention was pioneered in France: While the
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legislation passed in 1867 and 1897 only regulated crèches run as char-
itable institutions, government interest began to shift as young women
entered the labor market. When female labor was needed in the produc-
tion of ammunition during World War I, the French Act of the 5th
of August 1917, prescribed the provision of nurseries to any establish-
ment employing more than 100 women over 15 years old. It marked
the first introduction of regulatory measures, obliging private employers
to provide relatively extensive childcare arrangements in Europe (Burger
2012; Reynolds 1990). Even though—or perhaps because—it was only
perceived as a “second-best” option by the left-wing socialists as well as
the right-wing pronatalists, after the War, the factory crèche had become
a highly visible and highly legitimate institution (Reynolds 1990).
This convergence of various political forces on the issue of infant
mortality and female employment is also apparent in a wide array of
countries, which adopted similar policies in the early twentieth century.
Among these were the fascist regime in Italy (1925/1926) and the Soviet
Union (1932) (Caroli 2019), but also the late-late-developing countries
of the southern cone of Latin America: Chile (1917) and Argentina
(1924) (Aguilar 2018; Casas and Herrera 2012).
However, the parallel adoption of workplace childcare regulations may
also have been triggered by processes of diffusion. Caroli (2019) notes
that the observation of French practices and models of childhood devel-
opment helped foster the introduction of crèches in Italy and Russia,
but also contends that national peculiarities shaped each country’s unique
institutionalization of the crèche. While the ILO was involved in devising
standards for the employment of pregnant women and mothers from its
foundation onwards, it was not until after the Second World War that
it took on the issue of care in one of its recommendations (Maternity
Protection Recommendation 95 in 1952; Workers with Family Respon-
sibilities Convention 156 in 1981). However, the ILO never committed
itself to the private provision of facilities, emphasizing the need for public
financing, regulation, and clearly expressing preference for provisions
outside of the workplace.
Since no systematic comparative study of workplace childcare regula-
tion has been undertaken so far, and the available historical literature
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refrains from generalizing, our analysis of legislation remains mostly
explorative.
Data andMethods
The models in this chapter closely follow the framework laid out in the
introduction, which is based on the work by Valente (1995). The dates of
adoption were generated using newly collected data of legislative activity
in three main areas of family policy: paid leave, child benefits, and public
care (Son et al. 2020; Tonelli et al. 2021). Figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 show
the spatial distribution of adoptions over time. To accommodate the
field of family policy, two key independent variables are added. The total
fertility rate (Gapminder 2020) reflects demographic pressures, which
have often been hypothesized to trigger state intervention in families.
Given that we are concerned only with the first adoptions of policies,
higher fertility rates should decrease the hazard of adopting a family
policy, especially family allowances. The membership in the ILO captures
an additional type of international linkage, which may facilitate (vertical)
diffusion. Since the ILO’s advocacy for family allowances and workplace
Fig. 7.1 The introduction of paid maternity leave
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Fig. 7.2 The introduction of child benefits
Fig. 7.3 The introduction of workplace childcare regulation
childcare regulations has been limited in scope and its commitment to
paid maternity leave has been renewed three times over the past hundred
years, we expect ILO membership to exert the strongest influence on the
adoption of paid maternity leave.
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Regarding the other control variables, we do not hypothesize specific
effects for two reasons. First, family policy does not possess any elec-
tive affinity to democracy. Pronatalist family policy developed in fascist
regimes in the context of “authoritarian, largely anti-modern but also
nationalist familism” and as a project of the democratic left as a part
of social reform (Therborn 2004). Second, we expect policy diffusion
prompted less developed countries to adopt family policies at an early
stage of economic development, therefore nullifying the effect of the
degree of economic development (Collier and Messick 1975).
(a) Maternity Leave
Table 7.1 shows the results of five discrete-time logistic hazard models,
first displaying each type of network exposure separately then combined,
thus capturing different potential avenues of diffusion. While we find
little surprise in our results, three observations warrant elaboration. First,
the stepwise-time-function is highly significant across models. While we
refrain from its substantive interpretation in terms of hazard ratios, this
indicates that unobserved heterogeneity matters. Substantively, this is
taken to imply that global trends, which affect all countries, influence the
likelihood of the adoption of maternity leave. While these may in part
consist of concurrent changes in domestic conditions, it may also reflect
truly global developments, such as the intensification of global trade or
the promulgation of global norms by the ILO and other standard-setting
bodies, i.e., the activities of global “rationalized others” as hypothesized
by world society theory (Meyer et al. 1997). Second, and in line with
expectations, we find that membership in the ILO increases the hazard of
introducing paid maternity leave by 65–82%. The strength of this effect
is especially noteworthy when compared to the weak effects exerted by
networks. The high legitimacy of the standards and expertise by the ILO
in the field of maternity protection easily crowds out possible other chan-
nels of diffusion. The colonial network stands out as an exception but can
easily be attributed to the outsize influence of the French Overseas Labor
Code (1952) and the impact of the USSR on its republics. Finally, the
effect of democracy defies expectations of standard welfare state theory
but squares easily with the fact that the socialist countries in Eastern
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Table 7.1 Global network diffusion of paid maternity leave
Dependent variable: introduction of paid
maternity leave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1880–1904 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
1905–1929 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.010***
1930–1954 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.008***
1955–1979 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.006***
1980–2010 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003***
Trade existed (=1,
else = 0)
3.817*** 4.795*** 3.683*** 3.798*** 4.484***
GDP per capita
(log)
1.521*** 1.543*** 1.514*** 1.508*** 1.531***
Democratization 0.909+ 0.868** 0.910+ 0.916 0.872**
ILO Membership 1.807* 1.756* 1.819** 1.778* 1.652*


















Observations 10,663 10,817 10,663 10,663 10,663
Log Likelihood −665.988 −653.125 −666.374 −665.744 −651.903
Akaike Inf. Crit 1353.977 1328.25 1354.748 1353.489 1331.806
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Europe combined political disenfranchisement with the establishment of
generous social rights, especially for women workers.
(b) Child Benefits
Child benefits diffused rapidly between the end of the First World War
(WW1) and the 1960s. Most countries that introduced a child benefit
scheme did so within this time frame. After the 1960s, new introductions
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followed slowly, with only a marginal acceleration in the 1990s, occur-
ring due to the diffusion of conditional cash transfers in middle-income
countries.
The models in Table 7.2 are again noteworthy in that the stepwise-
time-function indicates strong time dependence across all specifications.
Given that the larger coefficients can be found during the interwar and
postwar periods, these can carefully be interpreted as giving some indirect
support to the compensation hypothesis.
Most of the other covariates included in the models are not statisti-
cally significant, but given that the sample includes a large share of the
population of reference, it seems relevant to discuss at least the estimated
Table 7.2 Global network diffusion of child benefits
Dependent variable: introduction of
child benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1880–1904 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1905–1929 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
1930–1954 0.043** 0.040** 0.030** 0.027**
1955–1979 0.062+ 0.027** 0.022** 0.019**
1980–2010 0.017** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
Trade existed (=1, else =
0)
1.522 1.844 1.314 1.511
GDP per capita (log) 1.154 1.124 1.161 1.145
Democratization 1.008 0.985 1.001 0.996
Total fertility rate 0.666*** 0.617*** 0.683*** 0.690***
ILO Membership 0.718 0.638 0.728 0.749
Cultural spheres netw.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
0.165
Colonies netw.: exposure 2.378**
Trade net: w. exposure
(lag 1 year)
1.576
Spatial proximity netw.: w.
exposure
2.287
Observations 15,124 15,278 15,124 15,124
Log Likelihood −464.908 −461.165 −465.858 −465.743
Akaike Inf. Crit 951.816 944.33 953.717 953.486
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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effects. Existing states are 52–84% more likely to adopt child benefits,
however, the estimates are not significant across specifications. GDP per
capita is positively associated with child benefit introduction. In line
with our expectations, the level of democracy does not seem to affect
the hazard of introducing child benefits. The only statistically significant
association is the number of births per woman. A one-unit increase in
the total fertility rate reduces the hazard of introducing a child benefit
by 31–38%. This strongly supports the population hypothesis. Finally,
even though the ILO called for the introduction of family benefits in its
1952 Social Security Convention (C102), being a member of the ILO is
associated with a lower probability of introducing child benefits, but the
association is again not significant.
Network exposures are similar to other policy fields displaying stable
effects for the colonial and trade networks and highly unstable effects
for the cultural spheres, which are highly sensitive to the inclusion of
spatial proximity. Interestingly, the higher the number of countries in a
country cultural network introducing child benefits (model 1), the lower
the hazard of introducing child benefits. The association is, however, not
significant. The colonial network exerts a high degree of influence on
the adoption of child benefits, increasing the hazard by 138% on its
own. Again, this is likely driven by the impact of the French Overseas
Labour Code and the adoption of child benefits in the USSR. Simi-
larly, the hazard of introducing child benefits is more than doubled when
neighboring countries do so. We refrain from reporting the results of the
model including all networks, because VIFs of the cultural and spatial
network in this model are 13.8 and 9.7, respectively, suggesting that the
coefficients are inflated due to multicollinearity.
(c) Workplace Childcare Regulation
We finally turn to the set of models dealing with the adoption of work-
place childcare legislation (Table 7.3). These follow the already familiar
pattern of exhibiting significant time dependency, limited national
effects, and the identification of a single powerful diffusion channel. We
again discuss each in turn.
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Table 7.3 Global network diffusion of workplace childcare
Dependent variable: introduction of workplace
childcare legislation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1880–1904 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002***
1905–1929 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002***
1930–1954 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.003***
1955–1979 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002***
1980–2010 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
Trade existed (=1,
else = 0)
1.703 2.021+ 1.709 1.865+ 1.932+
GDP per capita
(log)
1.059 1.103 1.045 1.048 1.134
Democratization 0.835** 0.850** 0.823*** 0.819*** 0.853**
Total fertilty rate 0.938 0.941 0.920 0.903 0.915


















Observations 14,219 14,373 14,219 14,219 14,219
Log Likelihood −519.634 −508.983 −520.417 −520.548 −507.071
Akaike Inf. Crit 1061.268 1039.965 1062.834 1063.095 1042.142
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Just as in the models of other types of family policy, we observe a peak
of global legislative activity in the interwar and immediate post-World
War II period, which is reflected by the coefficients of the stepwise-time-
function. Again, this may be due to common trends, but common shocks
originating in global culture and politics must also be considered.
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As is the case with the other family policies, the presence of trade
(data), which de facto acts as a proxy of political independence, exerts
some influence. Independent countries with their own national trade
accounts are between 70 and 93% more likely to adopt legislation
mandating the private provision of factory nurseries than dependent
territories. Regarding GDP per capita, our expectation of an unclear
effect is substantiated by the coefficient as well as its lack of significance.
We also find, contrary to expectations, a small but significant effect
of regime type with more democratic regimes exhibiting a decreased
hazard—by around 15–20%—of adopting workplace childcare. While
the fertility rate remains insignificant across models, it points in the
expected direction decreasing the hazard of adoption by around 10%
for each child per woman. Given that the ILO has only made limited
strides into the field of factory childcare until recently, the strong effect
of the ILO on workplace childcare legislation—more than tripling the
hazard of adoption—is surprising.
Turning to network exposition, we again find a strong effect of colo-
nial ties on adoption, increasing hazards threefold. Similarly to the other
policies, we suspect that this is largely driven by the influence of the
USSR and the activity of the French colonial administration, which
enacted three pieces of legislation that included nursery clauses across
the French possessions: French Indochina in 1927, French Equatorial,
and West Africa, both in 1954. The cultural spheres network proves to
be the most unstable as well as the hardest to attach substantive meaning
to, yet again. While its effects point in the expected direction in models 1
and 5, its inclusion substantially alters the effect of spatial proximity. We
suspect that cultural similarity does not function as a channel of diffu-
sion wholesale, but only for a much more restricted set of countries or
cultures.
Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, the results of the discrete-time-hazard models are in some ways
sobering: they did little to identify channels of diffusion, whose pres-
ence was not established by earlier research. However, as a test of existing
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hypotheses, they broaden our understanding by expanding the historical,
spatial, and policy-specific reach of previous analysis.
Paid maternity leave, as the earliest form of decommodification as
well as defamilization for women, is confirmed as a showcase for the
agenda-setting power of the ILO. Regardless of the ratification of specific
conventions, continuous advocacy and technical assistance have urged
more and more countries to fulfill the standards laid out in its conven-
tions.
Family allowances or child benefits, while also being advocated for by
the ILO, seem, except for the ‘imperial diffusion’ (Kuhlmann et al. 2020)
through the Code du Travail , to be driven more by domestic concerns in
comparison. Our models provide the first test of the hypothesis that low
fertility levels spur the adoption of benefits toward families with children,
i.e., the emergence of family policy as population policy. However, this
should not be interpreted as a purely domestic mechanism, since fears
of population decline were often understood in terms of comparative
military strength (Barrett and Frank 1999). The relational and transna-
tional dimension of the “population hypothesis” is captured through
the inclusion of the stepwise-time-function in our models: Coefficients
reflect effects relative to a period’s baseline hazard, which in turn implies
that cross-country trends in fertility are captured by the stepwise-time-
function. Hence, what is modeled is the effect of fertility relative to the
general level during each time period, which provides a very rough proxy
for processes of mutual observation.
Finally, we analyzed the adoption of workplace childcare regulations,
which have not been analyzed within comparative social policy literature
so far. Due to data limitations, we could not test the most prominent
hypothesis found in the historical literature which connects the adop-
tion of factory nurseries to infant mortality. We do, however, find that
colonial networks, with the French again standing out, exert an outsized
influence on adoption.
Across models, we find instructive patterns of time-dependency. We
have refrained from giving much substantive weight to these since in
itself “time is not a theoretical variable” (Beck 2010). Yet, mentions of
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trends, phases, and periods that cut across cases and signify deep struc-
tural shifts in the global environment of policymaking permeate the
family policy (Daly and Ferragina 2018) and the broader welfare state
literature (Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010). Scholars in the tradition
of world-society theory go so far as to assign explanatory primacy to
the global level, treating national legislative activity as mere emanations
of a “transnational event” (Abbott and DeViney 1992). The baseline
hazards of all three policies indicate that the early twentieth century (paid
maternity leave) and the interwar years (child benefits and workplace
childcare) are decisive periods with heightened legislative activity across
varied national contexts. This suggests linking the emergence of family
policy to industrialization, but also to the ideational and political shifts
of the early twentieth century.
While the inclusion of networks is clearly a step forward in modeling
linkages between countries, their construction raises challenges and
needs to be informed by theory and historical case knowledge. The
colonial network, in particular, suffers from treating linkages alike,
whose effects differ systematically not only between colonizing/imperial
powers but also within colonial empires according to previous research
(Lange 2004; Schmitt 2015). Results of auxiliary regressions with non-
normalized exposure (see appendix) display more pronounced effects of
colonial/imperial ties, indicating that family policies spread via direct
imperial linkages rather than colonial legacies.
Despite these caveats, our analysis has highlighted that some of the
main hypotheses identified by earlier research, which looked at a much
smaller set of cases and a much shorter time frame, do in fact “travel”
across time and space. It has also shown that colonial and other imperial
relations play an important role in the origin of family policies outside
of Western Europe. While these analyzes do not say anything explic-
itly about the trajectories that followed introduction, earlier research
demonstrated that family policy in Europe developed through a process
of “layering” (Daly and Ferragina 2018), suggesting that the identified
drivers have lasting effects which will shape family policy across the world
for decades to come.
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Appendix
See Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6.










Trade existed (=1, else = 0) 6.280*** 5.444***
GDP per capita (log) 1.523*** 1.530***
Democratization 0.902* 0.899*
ILO membership 1.929** 1.699*
Total fertility rate 0.948 0.968
Cultural spheres netw.: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 2.394
Non normalized colonies netw.: exposure 3.247*** 3.333***
Trade net: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 1.502
Spatial proximity netw.: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 0.938
Observations 10,817 10,663
Log Likelihood −649.41 −648.054
Akaike Inf. Crit 1320.82 1324.109
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Table 7.5 Global network diffusion of child benefits (alternative)








Trade existed (=1, else = 0) 3.373*
(continued)
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Table 7.5 (continued)
Dependent variable: introduction of
child benefits
(1)
GDP per capita (log) 1.156+
Democratization 0.974
Total fertility rate 0.598***
ILO Membership 0.754
Cultural spheres netw.: w. exposure (lag
1 year)
Non normalized colonies netw.: exposure 4.300***
Trade net: w. exposure (lag 1 year)
Spatial proximity netw.: w. exposure
Observations 15,278
Log Likelihood −453.297
Akaike Inf. Crit 928.594
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001











Trade existed (=1, else = 0) 2.412* 2.163+
GDP per capita (log) 1.027 1.060
Democratization 0.845** 0.855*
Total fertility rate 0.870* 0.867+
ILO membership 3.700** 3.835**
Cultural spheres netw.: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 14.448
Non normalized colonies netw.: exposure 4.517*** 4.491***
Trade net: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 1.749
Spatial proximity netw.: w. exposure (lag 1 year) 0.077+
Observations 14,373 14,219
Log Likelihood −503.793 −501.746
Akaike Inf. Crit 1029.587 1031.491
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Johannes Huinink. 2021. “Codebook of Historical Dataset of Child Benefit
(HDCB).” SFB 1342 Technical Paper Series. https://www.socialpolicydyn
amics.de/crc-publications/crc-1342-technical-paper-series.
Valente, Thomas Q. 1995. “Network Models of the Diffusion of Innovations”.
New Jersey: Hampton.
Watson, Cicely. 1954a. “Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and
Other Benefits II.” Population Studies 8 (1): 46–73.
Watson, Cicely. 1954b. “Population Policy in France: Family Allowances and
Other Benefits. I.” Population Studies 7 (3): 263–286.
White, Linda A. 2020. “Do International Organizations Influence Domestic
Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries?” In the Palgrave Handbook of
Family Policy, R. Nieuwenhuis and W. van Lancker. 1st ed. 2020, 69–86.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or
exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
8
From Geneva to the World? Global
Network Diffusion of Antidiscrimination
Legislation in Employment
and Occupation: The ILO’s C111
Jenny Hahs
Introduction1
Labor law, especially in its origins as an initially domestic domain, devel-
oped in the context of, and in exchange and reaction to, developments
in economic markets that required labor to produce their respective
goods. These disputes did not always include the discernment that
related negotiation processes should be or had to be embedded in a
social–political framework. Labor law initially developed as individual
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law, which provided a contractual definition of rights and obligations
within the framework of subordination between employee and employer.
A collectivized understanding of the common interests and problems
was a much later phenomenon and culminated in the emergence of
collective labor law. It is no coincidence that the advent and heyday
of collective labor law coincided with the nation-state-centered welfare
state of the Golden Age of the 1960s and 1970s. It formed one of the
dimensions of democratic self-determination based on national citizen-
ship, which became a pillar in the interplay with the expansion of social
welfare, of normative legitimacy, and of factual acceptance of demo-
cratic processes (Hurrelmann et al. 2007). Until today, the normative
foundation and justification of either expansion and democratic legiti-
macy are the subject of constant renegotiation and renewal. However,
these processes became increasingly decentralized and so power shifted
to the international sphere—with a mixed summary to date in terms of
advocacy, implementation, and effectiveness.
While the original idea of labor law was primarily the protection
against economic disadvantages, impairments, and health hazards, it
developed into a regulation of working life as a whole, mainly through
the increasing involvement of collective actors and interest groups. In
this process, the mutual integration with the prevailing social-political
ideas began. In its historical development, labor law has thus not only
experienced a horizontal differentiation but also a vertical one (Arthurs
2011, 21–22; Davidov 2011). Moreover, areas of regulation were now
no longer only negotiated between national legislators (horizontal), but
increasingly relocated to transnational and global contexts between states
and under the organizational umbrella of international organizations
(vertical).
Even if upheavals are on the horizon, the International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO) is still considered the central international organization
for internationally agreed labor standards (Ebert 2015, 135; Helfer 2019)
which must be implemented nationally. Its 102-year regulatory history
has produced international labor standards that provide a comprehen-
sive basis and framework for social policies. Their normative nature is
not without controversy and has raised the question of the cultural foun-
dations, assumptions, and (regional) ideas on which they are based, for
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whom they are easier or more difficult to implement and comply with,
and what function they thus have in international concertation. On the
contrary, it has been argued that over the last decades the ILO were not
in a monopolistic position anymore (Chen 2021) on labor standard-
setting, since a growing body of these standards has been nested into
transnational labor standards such as free trade agreements, investment
arrangements, policy documents of international financial institutions,
and social missions of multinational corporations.
These remarks are based on the assumption that prior to these recent
developments, the ILO was the sovereign body in the field of interna-
tional labor standards. And while territoriality as a fundamental principle
of labor law is widely uncontested (Mundlak 2009), developments in the
context of globalization have raised new regulatory needs and demands,
resulting in concepts such as ex- or deterritorialized forms of labor law.
One of the consequences has been the increased international concerta-
tion and the massive expansion of labor regulation at the international
and global levels.2
The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
1958 (No. 111) (from now on referred to as C111) is particularly inter-
esting in this context. The adoption of C111 marked the ILO’s first
legally binding endorsement of nondiscrimination and an early equal
opportunity approach at work. Although considered to be premised
upon “a traditional, formal-equality and formal-workplace vision of
antidiscrimination law” (Sheppard 2015, 249), the convention marked
a genuine new strand in international standard-setting in the post-
World War II and Philadelphia Declaration time. As a classic regulatory
instrument, it was elevated to the status of a core labor standard in
1998 in the course of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. These standards are not only subject to the usual rati-
fication and national implementation procedures. Core labor standards
apply universally to all members by virtue of their ILO membership.
As a classic regulatory instrument at the international level, C111 thus
2 For a concise overview of the expansion of ILO international labour standards after World
War II, see Hahs (2021b).
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retains the principle of territoriality (since the content of the regula-
tions must be implemented nationally), while as a universal standard
within the framework of the Declaration it becomes normatively valid
in a deterritorializing manner.
The aim of this article is to first examine in principle if network speci-
ficities have influenced the ratification of C111. Like the other authors,
I draw on the global network data that is used throughout this edited
volume. These networks depict cultural similarity, colonial legacies,
trade, and geographic proximity. Furthermore, the diffusion of interna-
tional labor standards can have a homogenizing effect on national forms
of labor regulation. However, there is also the question of the influence of
already existing similarities between ratifying states. I will refer to this in
a broader sense as, second, the influence of the national legal homogeneity
in light of the territoriality of labor law. To map these national character-
istics, I utilize a new national equality index that measures the de jure
implementation status of national equality legislation. Further, the legal
origin of a member, and the duration of membership in the ILO are
considered.
While the general portfolio and history of ILO standards are now well
studied, theory-based statistical analysis of their ratification history and
diffusion along national characteristics are rare. To the author’s knowl-
edge, studying the ratifications of an ILO convention as interaction
processes in a network is both a novelty and the methodological aim of
this chapter. I thereby contribute to the existing body of literature on the
diffusion and ratification of ILO labor standards by adding a large-scale
quantitative assessment through network analysis.
The chapter is structured as follows: In section “State of the Art:
Transnational Antidiscrimination Law as a Tool to Provide Spaces and
Vehicles to Challenge Domestic Labor Law’s Exclusion?”, I situate C111
in the field of transnational antidiscrimination law and in its interac-
tion with national law. In section “Theorizing Transnational Diffusion
Processes of International Labor Standards”, I discuss the state of the art
in diffusion research of international labor rights, while in section “Data
and Methods”, I present the underlying data construction and anal-
ysis methodology. Section “Results” presents the results of the network
analysis and section “Conclusion” concludes the chapter.
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State of the Art: Transnational
Antidiscrimination Law as a Tool to Provide
Spaces and Vehicles to Challenge Domestic
Labor Law’s Exclusion?
The ILO’s standard-setting function has produced a vast number of
international labor standards. In essence, transnational labor law (TLL),
according to Blackett and Trebilcock (2015, 4):
has emerged to problematize and resist the direction of social regulation
under globalization. Recognizing globalization’s asymmetries, and identi-
fying spaces for action, TLL operates within, between and beyond states
to construct counter-hegemonic alternatives. The field critically encom-
passes actions beyond the state, to take into account the actions of
transnational enterprises, labour federations, civil society and other actors.
Moreover, TLL does not stop where national labour law begins: the two
are deeply intertwined and challenge each other. TLL is a form of multi-
level governance, including the international, the regional, the national,
and the shop floor: its ability to address challenges of economic inter-
dependency is similarly enmeshed with its ability to acknowledge and
deal with complexity, diversity and asymmetries across time and space—
amongst states, across uneven regional development, amongst vastly
differently empowered institutions and actors. TLL holds no monopoly
on either the rise of legal centrism through the prevalence of “rule of
law” doctrines, or the expansion of pluralist, reflexive new governance
methods. Its distinctiveness lies in its capacity to be counter-hegemonic
and promote social justice.
Blackett and Trebilcock emphasize further that “law’s normative char-
acter is indeterminate and must be the basis of continuous struggle for
social justice, that is at the core of TLL’s emergence” (Blackett and Trebil-
cock 2015, 4). Indetermination and its inherent struggle are thus the
basis and the result of the world society’s negotiation and agreement to
develop the desired legal regulations, to endow them with binding force,
and to implement them. As commonplace as it may sound at first, TLLs
themselves are not a product of chance, nor is their dissemination (Chau
et al. 2001; Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi 2014).
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Universalization and the idea of equality were already conceived and
named as fundamental and desirable in both the ILO Constitution of
1919 and in its Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944. However, they were
only given concrete legal expression in two instruments in the post-war
period: C100, with a clear reference to gender equality (“equal pay for
work of equal value”) and C111 (Hepple 2009, 129).
C111’s core message is a universal idea of equal treatment and equal
opportunities in employment and education, free from discriminatory
practices based on race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national
extraction, or social origin. Although the convention directly referred to
the globally universalizing aims of the Declaration of Philadelphia in its
preamble, it retained, however, a Global North and formal employment-
prone loophole in allowing that “other special measures designed to
meet the particular requirements of persons who, for reasons such as
sex, age, disablement, family responsibilities or social or cultural status,
are generally recognized to require special protection or assistance, shall
not be deemed to be discrimination” (Art. 5. Para. 2). Even though
the introduction of C100 and C111 made great steps toward the de
jure acceptance and regularization of women’s work in particular (which
had not been a matter of course until then), there was still no regu-
latory idea for the diverse forms that women’s work brought with it.
This was and still is especially true for informal and nonstandard forms
of employment (NSFE), even though they represented the dominant
labor practice in the Global South. There was also a lack of framing
regulatory ideas for the equitable distribution of care work between the
genders and accompanying public support structures. Although C111
created the basis for a future holistic social policy concept, major ques-
tions of adequate, concrete implementation and embedding remained
unanswered. It should also be noted that Afro-Asian countries used the
process around the adoption of C111 to make the hitherto still existent
differences in regulatory practices of the colonial labor regime between
regular, mainly European workers and indigenous laborers more visible
and to also condemn the colonial powers (Maul et al. 2019, 239). This
was another result of the segmented regulatory world of work along the
lines of unequal working conditions for women and men, as well as
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between colonial and noncolonial labor law regimes, which were also
a corollary of ILO norm-setting at the time of C111’s creation.
In 1998, C111 entered the canon of the core labor standards. The
elimination of discrimination with respect to employment and occu-
pation (and within that C111) became one of the four constitutional
principles as outlined in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work of 1998. This altered its status. It is a core principle
of the ILO Constitution that members may adopt and ratify conven-
tions freely and without coercion. In turn, the core labor standards were
chosen because they embody rights that are considered fundamental in
the ILO Constitution. Consequently, regardless of ratification and level
of development, ILO members are constitutionally obliged to respect
and promote them.3
As opposed to traditional labor law, which tries to focus on coun-
tering vertical inequality, C111 tackles horizontal inequality as part of
antidiscrimination law (Sheppard 2015, 257):
Anti-discrimination law was historically limited to remedying horizontal
inequality linked to group-based exclusions and disadvantages based on
discrete grounds, such as race, national or ethnic origin, sex, disability,
sexual orientation or religion. In contrast, labor laws primarily concerned
with remedying social inequality and poverty based on the vertical
inequalities between workers and employers. Labor law, with its focus
on collective bargaining and employment standards in the formal labor
market, too often excluded the concerns of marginalized workers who
also tend to be members of the social groups traditionally protected by
anti-discrimination law.
By virtue of its conception, C111 had the potential to be a tool “to
provide spaces and vehicles” to counter domestic labor law’s exclusions.
Figure 8.1 shows the development of ratifications of C111 over time.
Compared to the other diffusion processes in this volume, the ratifi-
cations of C111 are a more recent phenomenon. The Convention was
3 The status of the Core Labour Standards also means a higher annual reporting cycle for each
country that has not ratified one or more core conventions. For a comprehensive discussion of
the systemic effect of the core labour standards on the ILO’s international labour rights regime,
see Alston (2004) and the reply of Langille (2005).
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Fig. 8.1 Ratifications of discrimination (employment and occupation) conven-
tion, 1958 (No. 111)
adopted in 1958 and finally entered into force in 1960. The largest wave
of ratifications took place between 1960 and 1980. This coincided with
decolonization and the new or re-entry of numerous former, mainly
African, colonies into the ILO, which also explains the large propor-
tion of ratifications by countries in the Global South. Between 1981
and 2000, more sovereign members of the former Soviet Union and new
members, especially from Asia, ratified. The third wave included mainly
Central African and South Pacific countries, but also China. To date, 12
ILO members have not ratified the Convention.4 Nevertheless, C111 is
one of the best-ratified conventions in the ILO’s regulatory portfolio.
With its regulatory scope, C111 paved the way for the UN’s third
generation of human rights: the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) were adopted in 1965 and 1979, respectively. It is often
discussed to what extent the UN human rights conventions—to the
4 These are: Brunei Darussalam, Cook Islands, Japan, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Myanmar,
Oman, Palau, Singapore, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America (International Labour
Organization 2021).
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detriment of the ILO’s C111—became necessary as “true” universal
antidiscrimination instruments for strongly overlapping areas of regu-
lation, since this convention, despite its universalist claim, primarily
addressed workers in formal employment.
Theorizing Transnational Diffusion Processes
of International Labor Standards
The transnational diffusion of international labor standards has so far
been surprisingly undertheorized. This is probably due to the predomi-
nantly qualitative-comparative empirical share of mostly country studies
on the interplay of ILO standards and national legal developments. To
the author’s knowledge, no theorizing meta-studies have been done so
far—probably because the academic debate on international labor stan-
dards is a complex interdisciplinary undertaking. It operates on the
verge of organizational theory at the edge of international relations,
organizational sociology, and political science as well as legal (history)
approaches.
The interlinkage of the ILO’s internal governance structures with its
resulting standard-setting processes has so far been studied quantitative-
comparatively and predominantly in the framework of power depen-
dence theory (Landelius 1965), neofunctionalism (Haas 1962, 2008
[1964]), and rational choice (Boockmann 2001).
Extended borrowings can be made from approaches in the field
of norm diffusion within international organizations (Park 2006) and
transnational idea and policy diffusion (Gilardi 2013). Although a
specialized field, theoretical approaches of the legal scholarship related
to the interaction of the different levels of labor law (Davidov 2011) and
the interaction of the different implementation systems of international
labor standards (Leary 1982) have been elaborated for much longer and
in greater depth, making them relevant as well.
The International Relations scholarship has contributed largely
through constructivist insights (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Park
(2006) builds on their previous work and links an organizational iden-
tity that goes beyond former rationalist nation-state interests and the
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influence of intraorganizational norms that define appropriate behavior
of actors within the international system and can thus explain norm
diffusion success or failure. Her argument is hence that “the norms IOs
espouse are the result not only of state power but of their socializa-
tion by non-state actors, and more specifically, by transnational advocacy
networks” (Park 2006, 353). A more recent strand of post-functionalist
research explains the structure of the policy portfolio of international
organizations as a contingent functional and social outcome of the
ongoing social negotiation processes of actors bargaining about the orga-
nizations’ internal governance in light of a common social structural
framework (Hooghe et al. 2019). The strength of both approaches resides
in explaining the approval of seemingly counterintuitive policy decisions
by members. This is the case, for example, when members ratify conven-
tions that initially appear to be disadvantageous for them in terms of
their status quo.
According to Gilardi (2013, 454), there exists a scholarly consensus
that diffusion can be defined as a consequence of interdependence. He
refers more specifically to the work of Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett
who declared that “[i]nternational policy diffusion occurs when govern-
ment policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned
by prior policy choices made in other countries” (Gilardi 2013, 454). In
line with Elkins and Simmons’ work, he adds that “the definition empha-
sizes diffusion as a process, as opposed to an outcome” and concludes
that because of this, “diffusion is not equivalent to convergence. A signif-
icant increase in policy similarity across countries – a common definition
of convergence […] – can, but need not, follow from diffusion. Even if
it does, convergence characterizes the outcome of the process, but not
the nature of the process itself ” (Gilardi 2013, 454).
In drawing on his earlier work with Braun, he states that the
underlying diffusion mechanisms are “systematic sets of statements that
provide a plausible account of how policy choices in one country are
systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other coun-
tries” (Gilardi 2013, 460). Furthermore, Gilardi subsumes that the
scholarly consensus is that most mechanisms can be grouped into four
broad categories, which the other authors of this book have also referred
to: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.
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Coercion is the imposition of a policy by powerful international orga-
nizations or countries; competition means that countries influence one
another because they try to attract economic resources; learning means
that the experience of other countries can supply useful information on
the likely consequences of a policy; and emulation means that the norma-
tive and socially constructed characteristics of policies matter more than
their objective consequences. (Gilardi 2013, 461)
The diffusion processes examined below are understood and analyzed
in terms of emulation. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have argued
that norm diffusion processes involve the mechanism of emulation.
This occurs in a three-step process: norm emergence, norm cascade,
and norm internalization. In the first phase of norm emergence , new
rules of appropriate behavior are brought to the tableau by norm
entrepreneurs and with the help of internal support of the organiza-
tion. It takes a critical mass of states, about one-third of the potential
adopters according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 901), who have
been successfully convinced to recognize the new norm and to advance
the dynamic toward the stage of norm cascade . In this second phase,
norms are promoted in a socialization process by rewarding conformity
and punishing noncompliance. In this phase, the reaction of the inter-
national community to their behavior is increasingly important to the
member states. This can have a sensitive influence on their domestic
legitimation and power. With the establishment and consolidation of
this influence from the second phase, the process of norm integration
has entered its final phase: the internalization stage. The norms are then
so profoundly accepted that they are now taken for granted as the only
possible type of accepted behavior. Gilardi has added another interesting
outcome of this process which Finnemore and Sikkink themselves only
indirectly address, which is that the burden of proof shifts over time:
In the early stages, it is the actors who wish to introduce women’s suffrage,
smoking bans, or any other policy who need to demonstrate that these
policies are needed, appropriate, and politically feasible. As the norm
dynamic unfolds, the burden shifts to actors who do not want the policy
to be introduced, who need to work harder to make their case than those
who support it. Because norm dynamics lead to a change in dominant
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norms, once the new norm has taken over or is about to do so (around
the tipping point in the “norm cascade”), the new rules become orthodox
and the old heterodox, which shifts the balance of power between propo-
nents and opponents. In other words, late in the process it is opponents,
and no longer proponents, who need to engage in ‘norm contestation’.
(Gilardi 2013, 467–468)
As was shown in the previous section, the evolution of C111 itself as well
as the importance it was ascribed over time in the norm portfolio of the
ILO is a perfect example of the three-stage emulation process of norm
diffusion as presented by Finnemore and Sikkink.
Data andMethods
I attempt to explain the development of the ratifications of the ILO’s
C111 by using a discrete time logistic regression with network effects
of networks of geographical distances, global trade, cultural spheres,
and colonial legacies as well as by the mediating influences of covari-
ates. The latter reflects national specifics such as the legal origin and
degree of integration into the intraorganizational context through the
duration of membership in the ILO. The specificity of the dependent
variable ratification of the C111 requires methodological adjustments to
the original diffusion model as outlined in Chapter 1. These adaptations
are succinctly sketched out below. Nevertheless, the analysis follows in
essence the methodology detailed in Chapter 1 and thus contributes
comparable findings to those of my colleagues from the other social
policy fields in this volume on the global diffusion of international labor
rights.
The assumed diffusion mechanism of contagion, according to which
the probability of encountering to meet an “infected” and thus of “infect-
ing” oneself increases over time as a result of increasing contact between
subjects, also makes sense in principle for the study of ratification diffu-
sion within international organizations. However, in comparison to the
study of intergovernmental diffusion processes, this means an additional
level of interaction (see Fig. 8.2), with its own intervening possibilities of
contagion which must be methodologically considered and taken into
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Fig. 8.2 Level of analysis and risk set identification in network analysis of
intraorganizational ratification behavior
account. On the one hand, a merely limited subgroup of all states that
are together members of the organization (here the ILO) meet and can
only infect each other within this framework. This is because ratifica-
tions of ILO conventions are only possible for and therefore restricted
to ILO members. On the other hand, members of an organization are
also members of the “world sample” of all existing and interacting states,
thus in the original sense of the conceptualization of the networks used
here according to Chapter 1. Organization members are not decoupled
from world events outside the organization, but at the same time addition-
ally determined by intra-organizational contagion processes. This means,
for example, that colonialist influences can be given additional weight,
as they can exert an effect both outside and inside the organization.
Trade relations can also amplify existing extraorganizational imbalances
within the organization. This is particularly the case when hegemonic
extra-organizational inequality structures find a renewed reflection in the
intraorganizational ones. However, these organizational structures also
have the potential, at least in principle, to counter external hegemonic
structures with alternatives through intraorganizational organization.
Conceptualizing this is not without risk of getting lost in the
complexity of the processes that affect decision-making and opinion
formation within organizations. For this reason, the covariates proposed
here cover the three possible intervening levels with reference to indi-
vidual member states only. They are not intended to control for
individual country involvement in intraorganizational decision-making
processes, which could also boost or mitigate ratification aspirations.
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In order to test for the influence of national characteristics, the legal
origin and a newly created national de jure equality index were taken
into account. To check on a generalized level for mediating influences
of organizational membership, the duration of membership in the ILO
was considered. Aspirations toward a respective regulation norm, which
could motivate states to ratify conventions faster, are only taken into
account insofar as the duration of membership can be understood as
a proxy for a basic acceptance of the general organizational idea behind
the ILO itself.
The original country sample of the networks presented by Mossig
et al. (2021, in this volume) also has consequences for the sample of
ILO members examined here. Of the 164 countries in the original risk
set, three have never been members of the ILO: Bhutan, South Sudan,
and Taiwan. They are therefore excluded in principle from the risk set,
resulting in a total of 161 countries. The period covered spans from
1880 to 2010, meaning ratifications that took place after 2010 are not
taken into account. This does not affect a lot of ratifications, thus the
data is right censored. Another restriction of the networks weighs more
heavily: the exclusion of states with less than 500,000 inhabitants from
the networks. Especially in the last decades of ILO membership devel-
opment, it is precisely and predominantly these states that have become
new members. These members are therefore also not part of the risk set
in the study presented here. Since this mainly concerns island states, the
findings here are not relevant for them and there remains a residual risk
that their influence is systematically underestimated. Further studies are
needed on this. A total of 112 ILO members are thus included in the
analysis.
C111 comes with a twofold determined temporality of its own
compared to the other diffusion processes in this volume. The conven-
tion was adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1958 and
entered into force in 1960, after the first two mandatory ratifications
were registered. The analysis presented here therefore essentially refers
to the period from 1958 to 2010. Furthermore, the time intervals
with which time dependency as a result of unobserved heterogeneity in
the piecewise constant step function is to be controlled were therefore
adapted. Although they are oriented toward intraorganizationally impor-
tant epochs, these are often connected with extra-organizational events.
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Table 8.1 gives an overview of the main ILO milestones and (UN) histor-
ical turning points relevant for the chosen periods which were taken
into account for the analysis. The selection is based on the assumption
that both key ILO declarations on the core issues of the Convention
and relevant UN global political developments had an influence on the
ratifications in the designated periods.
The data on the national ratification dates of C111 was taken from
the new History of ILO Instruments Database (HILODB, Hahs 2021a),
which will be published soon. A convention creates legal obligations
qua ratification for the ratifying member. According to Article 19, 5(d)
of the ILO Constitution, these are to “take such action as may be
necessary to make effective the provisions” of a ratified Convention.
Table 8.1 Periodization alongside ILO milestones and (UN) historical turning
points
Periodization ILO milestones (UN) historical turning points













the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD) (in force 1969)
First World Conference on
Women (Mexico City, 1975)
1980–1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at
Work (1998)
Second, Third and Fourth
World Conference on
Women (Copenhagen 1980,
Nairobi 1985, Beijing 1995)
Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) (in force
1981)
“Washington Consensus”
Dissolution of Soviet Union
1999–2010 Declaration on Social Justice




Global financial crisis (2008)
Source International Labour Organization (2009, 03.02.2021); own representa-
tion
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This applies to both de jure and de facto implementation and transfer
into national practice—such as court decisions, arbitration awards, or
collective agreements alongside national laws.
The membership duration of the countries considered was calculated
on the basis of data provided by the International Labour Organization
(2020). It measures the duration of a country’s membership in the ILO at
time t and is consequently a relative measure of the maturity of member-
ship. I follow the results of Boockmann (2001) and assume that older,
more “experienced” members are more susceptible to rapid self-induced
ratification, while “younger” members become infected later after several
contacts with those already infected.
I also control for the legal origin of a member country. La Porta et al.
(2008, 287) classified countries’ legal systems based on the assumption
that law and legal systems became transmitted as “bits of information”
through channels such as trade, conquest, colonization, missionary work,
migration, etc., from one country to another. Typically, legal transplanta-
tion took place between a few mother countries and the rest of the world.
Drawing on the ongoing discussion in the legal scholarship, they distin-
guish between two main legal traditions (common law and civil law)
and fine-tune their analysis to also cover subtraditions within civil law
(French, German, socialist, and Scandinavian). According to Ahlering
and Deakin (2005, 881–882), the influence of legal origin on the labor
market is indirect:
[…] it is mediated through the practice of regulation, or ‘regulatory style.’
If a system has adopted a particular regulatory approach in one area, it is
more likely to do so in another. In addition, the marginal cost of adopting
the laws of the parent system are lower than attempting to begin anew
with new methods and procedures. Thus ‘path dependence in the legal
and regulatory styles emerges as an efficient adaptation to the previously
transplanted legal infrastructure’ (Botero et al. 2004: 1346). Although no
reference is made here to the concept of institutional complementarities,
the same basic idea seems to be at work.
Chau et al. (2001, 129–130) subsume that the legal origin of a country
can have an influence on the natural labor standard “(i) directly via the
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ideological bias it imposes on the relative importance of the state vis-à-
vis the individual, and (ii) indirectly via its influence on the performance
of government to protect the rights of individuals and government effi-
ciency.” Therefore, institutional factors, which in turn are determined by
the legal tradition of a country, could delay ratifications, even though one
could have expected it based on the economic constitution of a country.
It is not possible to address the full range of criticisms of the transfer-
ability of legal origin to labor rights within the scope of this chapter. As a
representative example, Ahlering and Deakin’s (2005, 900–901) critique
weighs particularly heavily, pointing to the sometimes large historical
overlaps of regulatory logics in labor law and criticizing allegedly clear
ideational path dependencies. It is largely on the basis of this critique
that I have chosen to examine the relevance of legal origins for equality
regulation.
Finally, the national equality index maps the annually averaged de
jure strength value of national antidiscrimination law equivalent to
the different dimensions of the ILO’s international antidiscrimination
convention C111. It is calculated from six indicators of the WoL dataset5
(Dingeldey et al. 2021), which quantify the dimensions of antidiscrim-
ination considered in the C111. The values vary between 1 (“legally
guaranteed”) and 0 (“no such guarantee exist”), with downward grada-
tions indicating limited guarantees, weaker recommendations, or the
non-inclusion and non-regulation of subareas of the antidiscrimination
idea according to C111.
To sum up, the lack of available global diffusion data so far has
severely limited the empirical and theoretical development of diffusion
network effects as well as the development of a more profound under-
standing of contagion mechanisms in the field of transnational norm
5 The indicators used are: e01 (“The law provides for equal opportunities for men and women
in terms of access to employment”), e02 (“The law provides for regulation of positive discrim-
ination [affirmative action/special measures] in order to overcome labour discrimination of
women”), e03 (“The law provides for equal opportunities concerning ethnicity/race in terms
of access to employment”), e04 (“The law provides for regulation of positive discrimination
[affirmative action/special measures] in order to overcome labour discrimination of groups
disadvantaged in terms of ethnic/racial backgrounds”), e06 (“The law provides for equal oppor-
tunities for men and women in terms of working conditions”), and e07 (“The law provides for
equal opportunities in terms of working conditions concerning ethnicity/race”).
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diffusion. Despite all its limitations, the analysis presented here is the
most comprehensive to date with regard to the influence of networks on
the ratification of an ILO convention (here: C111).
Results
Figure 8.3 shows the development of the share of ratifiers per year and
the cumulative ratifiers. Overall, a continuous and balanced increase can
be seen. It is also clear that half of the ratifiers had already ratified by
1973. Visible increases occur once again in the early 1990s and from
1998 onwards. The critical mass of one-third of all ratifiers, i.e., the
critical tipping point for the start of the norm cascade phase according
to Finnemore and Sikkink (see section “Theorizing Transnational Diffu-
sion Processes of International Labor Standards”), was reached within
the first six years after the adoption of the convention. Since the number
of ratifiers subsequently increases at an almost constant rate, no special
effect can be observed here—at least descriptively—of the norm cascade
Fig. 8.3 Ratifier and cumulative ratifier proportion of C111, 1959–2010 (N =
150)
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phase which then theoretically follows and which rewards compliance
and sanctions deviation. Attention should be drawn to the huge increase
around 1960, lifting the share of ratifiers to 0.2. Since there was a large
increase in membership in 1960, especially from former African colonies,
this can be interpreted as an indicator that the underlying regulatory
agenda of the convention was in the interest of both the new and the
old members. I have pointed out before that through blaming, shaming,
and condemnation, the process of drafting and adopting C111 was also
used by hitherto still existing colonies to draw attention to the fact that,
to their detriment, there existed a “colonial labor code” in parallel to
the regular canon of ILO standards, the latter of which applied to other
workers but excluded them.
The leaps around 1990 and 1998 then point to the two remaining
phases. The second phase, the norm cascade phase, got a push in the
early 1990s after a long period of continuous growth. As Table 8.1 shows
several key elements such as declarations, world conferences on women,
and the establishment of UN human rights conventions communicated
the contents and ideas of the C111 to the world as a global social
consensus and thus strengthened and promoted them.
Ratification was no longer only possible in principle nor solely the idea
of a norm entrepreneur elite; instead, it became socially desirable in the
structure of the international organization and increasingly binding by
means of soft law. The internalization stage was reached at the latest by
1998, when the C111 was elevated to the status of a core labor conven-
tion and thus considered fundamentally binding in its regulatory idea
for all ILO members, even without individual ratification. Antidiscrim-
ination can now be regarded as something that is “taken for granted.”
Moreover, what Gilardi called the reversal of the burden of justifica-
tion has occurred: states must now officially justify why they do not
adequately implement antidiscrimination rights.
A look at the share of ratifications of members classified according
to the World Bank income categories in Table 8.2 also provides inter-
esting insights. Boockmann’s (2001) econometric analysis of the dura-
tion between non-ratification and ratification of conventions hinged
primarily on the implied costs of implementation for nonindustrialized
countries. In industrialized countries, on the other hand, the preferences
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Table 8.2 Ratifier categories (according to adopter categorization of Rogers

















9 16 8 10 4 47
19.15 34.04 17.02 21.28 8.51 100.00




10 14 12 5 3 44
22.73 31.82 27.27 11.36 6.82 100.00




10 10 14 6 5 45
22.22 22.22 31.11 13.33 11.11 100.00
27.78 19.23 37.84 24.00 35.71 27.44
Low
income
7 12 3 4 2 28
25.00 42.86 10.71 14.29 7.14 100.00
19.44 23.08 8.11 16.00 14.29 17.07
Total 36 52 37 25 14 164
21.95 31.71 22.56 15.24 8.54 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note First row has frequencies, second row has row percentages, and third row
has column percentages
Source Own calculations
of central governmental actors were more decisive for the duration of
ratification. But the cost argument cannot be easily accepted for C111.
The majority of low-income countries belong to the early ratifiers or
the early majority. Surprisingly, almost half of the ILO’s high-income
members (46.81%) are Laggards, Late Majority, or Non-Adopters. Vosko
(2010) has comprehensively reviewed the long road that has been taken
in the departure from the standard Western-oriented male-breadwinner
employment relationship. It can only be assumed at this point that
these effects are also reflected in the ratification behavior of the mainly
Western-dominated high-income countries. Further research on this is
needed elsewhere.
Table 8.3 shows the result of the discrete-time logistic hazard esti-
mations in hazard ratios. Ratios larger than 1 can be interpreted as
a positive relationship, while estimations between 0 and 1 indicate a
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Table 8.3 Global network diffusion of antidiscrimination legislation in employ-
ment and occupation. Discrete-time logistic hazard model of ratifications of ILO
C111 (N = 161/112)
Ratification of C111
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rate t(0–10) 0.076+ 0.079+ 0.062+ 0.088
Rate t(11–20) 0.050* 0.053* 0.035* 0.061+
Rate t(21–40) 0.038* 0.041* 0.025* 0.052+
Rate t(41–52) 0.134 0.159 0.066 0.259
Trade existed (=1, else =
0)
0.954 1.097 1.061 0.669
GDP per capita/10,000
USD
0.997 1.008 1.011 1.007
Democratization 1.029 1.044 1.028 1.029
Cultural spheres netw.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
0.160 0.179 0.165 0.187
Colonies netw.: exposure 1.770* 1.744* 1.929* 1.172
Trade netw: w. exposure
(lag 1 year)
0.207 0.240 0.149 0.444
Spatial proximity netw.:
w. exposure











Legal origin (FR) 2.073*
Legal origin (UK) 0.653
Legal origin (GER) Ref
Observations 2506 2506 1795 1795
Log Likelihood −530.235 −527.417 −361.698 −345.784
Akaike Inf. Crit 1082.471 1078.834 745.397 725.568
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
negative relationship. The hazard ratios for the networks represent the
odds of a member country ratifying C111 given the exposure through
the network in question to countries that had already ratified C111.
All models were calculated twice: Model 1 and Model 2 cover all 161
countries in the network sample for which data on legal origin and the
national equality index were available. Models 3 and 4 refer to the smaller
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risk set of ILO members for which the same data were available. Thus,
pure network effects could be examined (Models 1 and 2) and their
significance compared with the results of the pure ILO sample (Models
3 and 4).
The assumptions from the descriptive observation with regard to the
temporal development of ratifications are basically confirmed. Consid-
ering all baseline hazard rates together, there is an overall indication of a
decreasing rate over time because these rates become smaller across time
periods. But as interpreting time effects in these models is unusual, we
will not go further into this. It is interesting, however, that a look at
the other control variables shows that neither GDP per capita nor the
democratization index is significant in any of the models. They do not
play a relevant role in the diffusion process of the ratifications of C111.
The fact that the cultural spheres network is not significant either fits
the assumption that the convention was universally ratified by the most
diverse member states. Overall, none of the networks examined have
a significant influence across all models. Even the positively significant
influence by the colonial legacies network on exposure becomes insignif-
icant as soon as national covariates such as legal origin or the national
equality index are included.6 Only the spatial proximity network has a
very high positive effect, which unexpectedly becomes insignificant when
we restrict the network to only include ILO members for which data on
national implementation of equality rights were also available. This is
another strong piece of evidence that mainly national characteristics of
the member countries explain the ratification behavior. Further, Mossig
et al. (2021, in this volume) have already pointed out that geography
should not be considered directly as a stand-alone effect but always in
combination with other linked indicators. Only when either duration
membership in the ILO, legal origin, the national equality index, or
all national covariates together are taken into account (Models 2 and
4) does the exposure through the proximity network acquire its signifi-
cant positive and strong influence. At the same time, the analysis of the
6 In addition, all calculations were also checked with a non-normalized colony network. Here,
the value for the proximity network becomes slightly larger, but overall no significant differences
can be found based on the different modeling of the colony network. The non-normalized
regression results are in the Appendix.
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national covariates is very insightful. For example, the country-specific
national equality index is not significantly positive in the models when
accounting for legal origin. The surprising result is that the national de
jure status of national equality laws is not relevant for the exposure for
ratification of C111. In principle, this speaks for the universal character
of the convention, which should motivate countries to support the ideas
of C111 through ratification, regardless of the level of development and
implementation of equivalent standards at the national level. However,
it contradicts the common narrative that countries ratify conventions
primarily when the implementation costs for them are particularly low
because they would not have to make major changes or adaptations to
national laws, for example.
The strong effect of legal origins is unexpected. The reference category
for the values shown were countries with German legal origins. Only
a few countries in total belong to the Socialist legal origin and all of
them in the sample have not ratified the convention, which explains the
massive significant negative value for them. It is thus a methodological
effect. The significant negative value for countries with UK/Common
Law legal origin stands out in particular but is not significant. In
contrast, the positively significant values for French and Scandinavian
legal origin, both renowned homelands of early equality efforts and insti-
tutionalization, are unsurprising. It should also be remembered at this
point that de jure data formed the basis of the analysis. These are and
were not always congruent with the de facto situation. The probability
of C111 compared to the probability of members with German legal
origin is thus particularly high in countries with French legal origin and
Scandinavian legal origin.
The duration membership in ILO shows a relatively small negative
effect (close to 1). This indicates that if members do not adopt shortly
after entry into ILO the chances of ratifying the convention later are
reduced. Another explanation could be that older members are slower in
ratifying—which was shown already in Table 8.2. This could therefore
be a consequence of the norm cascade phase or even the internalization
stage according to Finnemore and Sikkink: newer members need to prove
themselves and since it has become part of the global norm to ratify
C111, newer members never have a chance to NOT ratify.
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The results update and confirm previous research. Chau et al. (2001)
did not find any significant peer effects on the probability of ratifica-
tion for C111. Nevertheless, they also identified the legal system as a
relevant factor in the likelihood of ratification. While they considered
this to be the only factor, the present analysis now shows that regional
proximity and the duration of ILO membership are also relevant for the
probability of ratification. Schmitt et al. (2015) reported strong empir-
ical support for the existence of regional diffusion processes in relation
to social protection and the introduction of social security programs.
The probability that a country introduced a social security program
increased if another country in the same geographical region had already
adopted such a scheme. At the same time, they found a clear influence of
ILO membership on adoption. Third, colonial dummies indicated clear
effects that colonial heritage was important for consolidation. These last
two effects cannot be confirmed for the probability of adopting the C111
antidiscrimination convention. Membership even has delaying effects on
the ratification. And effects of colonial legacy network are not robust and
significant across models to exert consolidating effects.
While for Chau the probability of ratification increases with time,
this observation cannot be confirmed by the different networks. On the
contrary, the controlled time periods showed a negative effect. The low
impact of network effects further confirms Sheppard’s (2015) legal anal-
ysis and assessment that C111 was open enough for countries at different
stages of their membership to ratify national levels of antidiscrimination
standards.
Conclusion
This paper tested the influence of four networks on the diffusion of rati-
fications of C111 of the ILO. It was found that, with the exception of
the geographical proximity network, the networks examined here do not
play a significant role as a pipeline for diffusion. At the same time, the
significance of the geographical proximity network can only be meaning-
fully interpreted in conjunction with other, in this case national, factors.
The already weak influence of the colonial network also vanishes as soon
as the national legal origin of the countries is included in the model.
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Despite legal origin, however, there is a proximity effect of the networks
for which diffusion processes could be demonstrated, though the mech-
anism of this cannot be shown here. Further in-depth research is needed
at this point.
The influence of ILO membership slows down the effect of ratifica-
tion more than it supports it. Surprisingly, the influence of the national
de jure status of antidiscrimination rights is completely irrelevant. This
supports a decoupling of transnational and national regulation in the
field of antidiscrimination rights and should be further investigated in
terms of the de-territorialization of labor law. Referring to the question
posed in the title of my contribution, this could indicate an initial but
cautious “Yes, possibly from Geneva to the world.” To this end, it will
also be relevant to quantitatively analyze the interaction of C111 and
the UN human rights conventions ICERD and CEDAW—although the
descriptive analysis for the two relevant periods after adoption indicates
little remarkable increase in ILO C111 ratifications. Further analysis
should also take into account spillover effects of the EU key directives
in gender equality and nondiscrimination. This concerns questions of
learning processes, for example between institutions with overlapping
membership.
Overall, it must also be noted that domestic factors are mainly relevant
for the likelihood of ratifying C111. However, diffusion mechanisms
other than these are also conceivable, which could be revealed by, for
example, further inclusion of states with populations below 500,000
inhabitants and expansion through historically deep data across all
different networks.
Further work on the topic should for example consider the interaction
effects of colonial legacy and legal origin in transnational antidiscrimi-
nation law. The strong negative effect of common law legal origin on
the likelihood of ratification needs to be addressed in more depth. Simi-
larly, it would be worthwhile to theorize the additional pipeline of IO
membership alluded to in the article and then methodologically incor-
porate it into the model, for example, in the form of the UN, the ILO
and the EU as networks in their own right. This would also come closest
to the claim of examining diffusion not only in the form of convergence
but also as a process of interaction.
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Appendix
See Tables 8.4 and 8.5.
Table 8.4 Ratifier categories (according to adopter categorization of Rogers
2003) by legal origin
Legal origin










Socialist 0 0 0 0 1 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.14 0.61
Scandinavian 3 1 0 0 0 4
75.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
8.33 1.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.44
French 13 28 9 10 0 60
21.67 46.67 15.00 16.67 0.00 100.00
36.11 53.85 24.32 40.00 0.00 36.59
UK/Common
law
4 6 13 2 4 29
13.79 20.69 44.83 6.90 13.79 100.00
11.11 11.54 35.14 8.00 28.57 17.68
German 6 2 3 6 1 18
33.33 11.11 16.67 33.33 5.56 100.00
16.67 3.85 8.11 24.00 7.14 10.98
10 15 12 7 8 52
19.23 28.85 23.08 13.46 15.38 100.00
27.78 28.85 32.43 28.00 57.14 31.71
Total 36 52 37 25 14 164
21.95 31.71 22.56 15.24 8.54 100.00
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note First row has frequencies; second row has row percentages, and third row
has column percentages
Source Own calculations
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Table 8.5 Global network diffusion of antidiscrimination legislation in employ-
ment and occupation. Discrete-time logistic hazard model of ratifications of ILO
C111 (N = 161/112), non-normalized colonial network
Ratification of C111
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rate t(0–10) 0.073+ 0.076+ 0.061+ 0.094
Rate t(11–20) 0.046* 0.050* 0.032* 0.072
Rate t(21–40) 0.035* 0.039* 0.022* 0.066
Rate t(41–52) 0.132 0.163 0.067 0.354
Trade existed (=1, else =
0)
0.953 1.091 1.036 0.683
GDP per capita/10000 USD 0.986 0.996 1.010 0.995
Democratization 1.033 1.042 1.030 1.023
Cultural spheres netw.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
0.210 0.197 0.237 0.126
Non-normalized, colonies
netw.: exposure
1.921* 1.680+ 1.944 0.691
Trade net: w. exposure
(lag 1 year)
0.253 0.290 0.187 0.553
Spatial proximity netw.:
w. exposure







Legal origin (Socialist) 0.00000***
Legal origin (Scandinavic) 7.412**
Legal origin (FR) 2.089*
Legal origin (UK) 0.597
Legal origin (GER) Ref
Observations 2506 2506 1795 1795
Log Likelihood −530.947 −528.913 −362.996 −345.617
Akaike Inf. Crit 1083.894 1081.826 747.992 725.235
Note +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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The Diffusion of Workplace
Antidiscrimination Regulations
for the LGBTQ+ Community
Helen Seitzer
Introduction1
Today’s media are flooded with news: Millennials (born 1980–1990)
are the “gayest generation” in human history (Allen 2017). In 2020, it
was estimated that 4.5% of the US population identifies as LGBTQ+
(Lesbian, Gay, Bi-, Transsexual, Queer, and other) (The Williams Insti-
tute 2020). The public confusion over acronyms and pronouns goes
so far that people ironically label the LGBTQ+ community “alphabet
mafia” on social media platforms (Alphabet Mafia 2020). Gender-neutral
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language was implemented by the US government (Aldridge 2021),
while at the same time, 54 countries were still criminalizing same-sex
relationships in 2019.2 Despite the rising global visibility and acceptance
of people breaking with binary gender stereotypes, sexual preferences,
and the traditional ‘nuclear family’ constellations, there is still a large gap
when it comes to integration of people from the LGBTQ+ community
into everyday society.3 The community is not only facing difficulties in
their private lives, but also unfair treatment and discrimination in the
workplace. In 2017, over 20% of Americans who identify as part of
the LGBTQ+ community, reported to have been discriminated against
in the workplace during the job application process. Other common
issues include missing out on promotions, not receiving equal pay, verbal
abuse, and mistreatment through the courts. These discriminatory prac-
tices nearly double if multiple disadvantages intersect, such as ethnicity
or socioeconomic background (Casey et al. 2019). To ensure that all
people, regardless of their sexual preferences, can participate equally
and discrimination-free in the labor market, some states have resorted
to including the LGBTQ+ community in workplace antidiscrimination
policies. However, this movement is a newer topic on states’ agendas
and is progressing rather slowly, in addition, it is rarely discussed on
the international stage. While some states such as France, have intro-
duced antidiscrimination policies on the basis of gender already in 1985,
others are still hesitant. This chapter asks if transnational networks
are contributing to the diffusion of antidiscrimination policies for the
LGBTQ+ community by adding transnational pressure to inspire policy
adoption, or if this policy type is more dependent on local conditions.
For supporters of the LGBTQ+ community the need for political
action is undisputable. Adversaries, however, question, why the state
should get involved in such a private matter. This question leads to the
discussion of a welfare states’ responsibilities. According to the Universal
2 Own coding.
3 In this chapter, the term “community” refers to people of the LGBTQ+ community, not only
non-conforming regarding their own gender identity but also regarding their sexual orientation.
Due to lack of data, the included legal regulations do not include relationships breaking with
the status of a nuclear (2-parent) family or include multiple consenting adults (polyamory). In
addition, these regulations do not specifically mention transgender or transsexual people, but
the theoretical framing does include this group as well.
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Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN General Assembly 1948),
the state has the responsibility to ensure, among other things, every
persons’ security, safety, and freedom, regardless of origin, race, sex or
religion. This includes, as many activists of the gay rights movement
claim (Velasco 2018), the freedom to choose one’s partner regardless of
gender. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) (UN General Assembly 1966), signed by 171 coun-
tries, goes even further by declaring, that a state’s responsibility includes
ensuring the right to be recognized “without discrimination of any kind
as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (Article 2.2).
Given the global acceptance of these sets of definitions and responsibil-
ities, regulations ensuring the safety, well-being, and non-discrimination
of the LGBTQ+ community should therefore be seen as a constitu-
tive part of states’ welfare responsibilities, along with ensuring equal
opportunities and economic security. Ensuring a safe, discrimination-free
workplace is important for the livelihood of individuals and the commu-
nity. Multiple institutions such as the International Labor Organization
(ILO) are concerned with fostering the implementation of such policies
across the globe.
However, the reality of rights and protections for the LGBTQ+
community looks very different. While the acceptance of LGBTQ+
persons is slowly rising, the implementation of equal rights for couples
of the same gender as well as other family constellations aside from the
nuclear 2-parent-1-child household is still very low. The implementation
of protection laws is equally low in prevalence and similarly new, just as
marriage or civil union laws, as Fig. 9.1 shows. This chapter therefore
explores how global and local conditions such as countries’ interdepen-
dencies and national cultural values influence the diffusion of workplace
antidiscrimination regulations for the LGBTQ+ community.
Setting up a Timeline
To put the adoption of antidiscrimination regulations as analyzed in
this chapter into perspective, it is helpful to set up a timeline of how
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Fig. 9.1 Cumulative adoption rates for LGBTQ+ rights and important dates
LGBTQ+ issues progressed internationally over the years from local gay
rights organizations to internationally celebrated pride. This exploration
already contains clues about the results of this chapters’ analyzes. This
timeline not only includes important events leading up to the implemen-
tation of antidiscrimination policies, but also discusses the progression
from criminalizing same-sex relationships to their acceptance in society
as a prerequisite to the implementation of antidiscrimination regulations
for the community. Even though most societies today are open towards
the LGBTQ+ community, discrimination against the community is still
an issue, as discussed previously.
Throughout early human history, having relations with the same sex
or not conforming to popular gender norms was very common (LGBT
History 2021). But, with the rise of Christianity these relations began
to lose acceptance and were deemed “deviant” and criminal behavior.
Especially with the rise of modern sciences, medical procedures, and
psychology, this oppression strengthened (Edsall 2003). The struggle
for the community to be allowed to openly express their personality
and sexuality in public developed different forms around the globe.
The Scientific Humanitarian Committee was a Berlin-based organiza-
tion, founded as early as 1897, which is generally accepted as the first
gay rights organization. Figure 9.1 shows that at this point in time,
same-sex relationships were decriminalized in some countries, but it took
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considerably longer to include regulations for protection or even the
implementation of equal rights in marriage. Of course, this organiza-
tion was shut down during the Nazi rule in 1933 and its members
suffered greatly under the Nazi regime (Encarnación 2014). These topics
then resurfaced in Europe again already in 1948 with the signing of
the UDHR. This document, especially Article 2, granting the “rights
of freedom … without distinction of any kind, including sex”, has since
then been used by activist groups to frame their arguments, declaring the
choice of partners and personal expression a human right (Encarnación
2014). Interestingly, a study by Velasco (2018) showed, that increased
activism for equality and human rights often coincides with increased
activism for LGBTQ+ rights as well. The combining of forces for these
causes can be controversial but, in some cases, also be beneficial for both
parties (Velasco 2018). While the acceptance of same-sex partnerships is
a prerequisite for the implementation of any policy to protect LGBTQ+
community members from discrimination, it is also important to note
when antidiscrimination laws for the general population, regardless of
sexual preference, became important on the international stage.
Therefore, another historical event to consider in this chapter is the
ratification of the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention C111 (1958). This convention, which is ratified by 175
countries worldwide, states in the Preamble, that.
…all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue
both their material well-being and their spiritual development in condi-
tions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity,
and Considering further that discrimination constitutes a violation of rights
enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights….
Article (1a) states that “any distinction, exclusion or preference made
on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national
extraction or social origin” is to be considered as discrimination. Unfor-
tunately, as statistics show, discrimination, in the workplace or elsewhere,
on basis of sexual orientation is still a common occurrence in many
states. Even though there were many public transgressions to the general
norm throughout history and a secret subculture existed in America and
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Europe, it took until 1969 for the LGBTQ+ community in the US to
open the fight for their rights to a public, discrimination-free life as well
(Edsall 2003). The Stonewall riots, a violent clash between police and
patrons of Stonewall Inn, a transvestite and gay bar in Manhattan, is
now considered the beginning of the open fight for LGBTQ+ rights, as
this clash was followed by the first gay pride parade in the world. The
open fight for equal rights eventually led to the realization, that antidis-
crimination regulations protecting the LGBTQ+ community, not only
in the workplace, are a necessity to ensure the equal participation of this
group in the labor market and everyday life. Today, the fight for equal
rights of the community often lies in the hands of local and interna-
tional organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
like the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Associa-
tion (ILGA), which is considered the largest transnational IO advocating
for LGBTQ+ rights today. Figure 9.1 shows the adoption rates for the
decriminalization of same-sex relationships, the adoption of antidiscrim-
ination laws in the workplace, and the adoption rates for marriage or
civil union laws for same-sex couples. This timeline clearly demonstrates
how the acceptance of private relationships long preceded the acceptance
and support of antidiscrimination regulations and family units poten-
tially involving children. It also establishes that in the past, local events
seem to have been more prevalent in inspiring societal change, rather
than international pressure influencing policies. Nevertheless, the effect
of transnational influence cannot be dismissed.
Due to the combination of these events, the political definition of
human rights in the UDHR, which was then followed by other public
events and a global, political debate, the year 1948 will serve as a starting
point for this analysis.
Until 2010, 104 countries of the 164-country sample used in this
chapter had actively removed laws previously criminalizing relationships
among people of the same gender, effectively making same-sex relation-
ships legal. The societal acceptance thereof is a different story, but this
discussion would exceed the scope of this chapter. Only 5 countries in
the sample did not have any criminalization or decriminalization laws in
place, however, several countries such as Iraq did not have a specific crim-
inalization law in place but are known to find other ways of enforcing
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norm digressions, or had laws limiting the freedom of expression of
persons (Egypt) (Mendos et al. 2020). Others simply had never criminal-
ized LGBTQ+ relationships, or there was no clear data found. In 2020,
54 Countries still had active laws criminalizing LGBTQ+ relationships
or limiting their freedom of expression. 66 countries had implemented
regulations preventing discrimination at the workplace on basis of sexual
orientation.
The acceptance of relationships contrary to the common norm differs
significantly from the inclusion of the community in all aspects of
public life. The legalization or decriminalization of same-sex relationships
started much earlier than the adoption of laws giving the community
the same rights as everyone else, as Fig. 9.1 shows (Encarnación 2014).
In addition, there are considerable differences in local and national
regulations. For example, Wisconsin was the first US state to ban
discrimination based on sexual orientation in both public and private
sector employment in 1982, but the regulation was only implemented
in 2020 on the national level (Johnson 2016). France, on the other
hand, banned discrimination based on sexual orientation already in
1985 for the entire country. While antidiscrimination regulations are
making strong progress, equal marriage rights are only slowly being intro-
duced. Adoption rights are lagging still further behind. This shows that
participation in the workplace might be considered a more important
aspect to ensure than those allowing the socialization of children by
same-sex couples, as this goes along with the impression of fostering
non-traditional families and decay in Christian morals.
This global divergence in adoption of rights for the LGBTQ+
community begs the question of why some countries try to ensure a
discrimination-free workplace and “fulfillment of citizen duties” (e.g.,
contributing to the economy) regardless of sexual orientation while
others do not. Previous research has found various reasons, local condi-
tions such as activism, urbanization, religiosity but also international
problem pressure (e.g., Ayoub and Page 2020; Ayoub 2015; Colvin
2004). This problem pressure can be administered through IOs and
other advocacy groups, but also other policymakers, which then ulti-
mately leads to policy diffusion. While policy diffusion, local culture,
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and religion have been a part of previous research on the topic, the inclu-
sion of additional networks such as trade, has not been considered yet.
This chapter therefore intends to fill this gap.
When looking at the statistics but also the declarations and regula-
tions presented above, one immediately wonders what other global or
local factors might drive the introduction of rights and policies for the
LGBTQ+ community, and what players or factors are preventing it. This
chapter therefore sets out to explore different networks of policy diffu-
sion. Do transnational trade networks, spatial proximity, colonial ties and
cultural similarities have an impact on the diffusion of workplace antidis-
crimination regulations for the LGBTQ+ community? Or do domestic
factors have a stronger impact on the implementation of these policies,
indicating no norm diffusion regarding this policy? The policies include
all regulations prohibiting discrimination in the workplace due to sexual
preference and expression.
In the following section, I will clarify my theoretical approach and
contextualize the chapter with previous research. I will then discuss the
methodology and data used and then discuss the results, conclusion, and
limitations of this analysis.
Theory
Policy diffusion has multiple explanatory mechanisms through which
policies travel from one country to another, namely learning, compe-
tition, imitation, or coercion (Dobbin et al. 2007). All the mechanisms
share the commonality that policies are traveling from one country to
another through a connection between them. This could be a colonial
relationship, resulting in a coercive diffusion; a trade network resulting
in competition; or simply communication through either unneighborly
relations or general interactions between policymakers and advocates, or
IO membership, fostering policy learning. The mechanism at work here
is “contagion”: if a country has adopted a norm, all countries tied to this
country are exposed to this fact and their risk of adoption increases if
the policy is contagious. The more countries are embedded into different
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networks, the more likely they are to adopt policies similar to network
partners’ (Boli and Thomas 1999).
A common theoretical approach to this is Meyer and colleagues’
world society theory (Meyer et al. 1997). According to this theoret-
ical approach, countries and policymakers draw from a common set of
accepted norms and ideas about social policies and rights, such as the
construct of democracy or human rights, for policy inspiration. Through
networks of interaction, such as trade, simple spatial proximity, shared
IO membership, or colonialism, the members of world society exchange
information which ultimately allows for policy diffusion. The members
of world society also hold each other accountable for adhering to these
commonly accepted standards. Consequently, the adoption of these stan-
dards can allow countries to legitimize themselves and “put themselves on
the map.” To conclude, countries care about their image and reputation
on the world stage and new adopters are implementing policies when
under pressure to do so. In addition, if these norms are not adopted,
punitive action can occur. Thus, through this framework, the interna-
tional community is said to enforce the diffusion of these standards to
the point where this development seems inevitable. The increase in expo-
sure through different networks and IOs results in a deeper embedding
in world society and increases the risk of adoption (Velasco 2020b; Boli
and Thomas 1999).
While the networks of world society lead to the diffusion of norms,
which norms are diffusing can be explained by neoinstitutionalist theory.
According to this theoretical strand, international organizations as ratio-
nalized others develop and implement norms and values in world society,
resulting in an increasing isomorphism of different institutions around
the globe. Most of these norms are based on rational arguments based
on increasing efficiency. Antidiscrimination policies increase the partic-
ipation and therefore also productivity of the LGBTQ+ community,
effectively improving citizens’ labor market participation and a coun-
tries’ economic productivity (Dobbin et al. 2007). Therefore, especially
countries based on neoliberal values could be expected to implement
antidiscrimination policies for the LGBTQ+ community so as not
to prevent a large portion of society from contributing to economic
productivity.
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However, this is not always the case. In fact, with issues such as
LGBTQ+ rights the increased pressure through world society might
even invoke an adverse reaction (Rahman 2014). Studies have found
that while there is a positive change in attitudes toward homosexu-
ality in general due to the work of IOs and world society, the gap
between liberal, more religious societies has widened (Roberts 2019;
Ayoub and Page 2020; Ayoub 2015). In fact, the framing of LGBTQ+
rights as “foreign values” from the West is not uncommon. Ironically,
some African countries criminalizing LGBTQ+ relationships do so in
direct reference to their British colonial heritage—a Western influence
(Encarnación 2014). Interestingly, shaming through world society due
to non-compliance might even support the resistance to these norms, if
the local societal situation does not agree with the international norm—
as it is often the case in religious communities or countries. In fact, if
countries do not have an internal motivation to implement these norms,
resistance to shaming might even legitimize legislators in the eyes of
their local population (Terman 2019). Nevertheless, it seems as if world
society has some effect on the introduction of LGBTQ+ policies, as does
culture, just maybe not exclusively in a positive direction. Therefore, I
consider different networks of possible policy diffusion, as mentioned
before, along with several local conditions as control variables to test if
workplace antidiscrimination laws diffuse through the “usual” channels
or if there are other mechanisms at play.
Previous Research
There is a surprisingly large body of literature on LGBTQ+ policies avail-
able—considering the novelty of the issue. But many of these studies
focus on the implementation of different regulations or bans in indi-
vidual countries, or societal acceptance or rejection of LGBTQ+ issues,
instead of policy development and diffusion. Interestingly, a large body
of these studies is focused on the United States; fewer studies provide a
global perspective. Nevertheless, there are several studies relevant to this
chapter. Many studies identify local cultural characteristics as defining
factors.
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Johnson (2016) found that the lack of national pressure, combined
with an active LGBTQ+ community, results in a federal instead of
national implementation of policies for the community. In addition, the
presence of an active group advocating for gender and racial equality
positively contributes to the introduction of LGBTQ+ policies. In a
similar perspective, more women in parliament tends to increase the
number of social welfare policies and therefore positively influence the
introduction of LGBTQ+ policies as well (Velasco 2018). Based on these
results, a gender equality index was integrated into the analysis of this
chapter to control for the local culture and perspective on women.
Another study on the implementation of LGBTQ+ rights, especially
in the workplace, states as well that internal activism, even though
not necessarily visible to the outside world, is the driving force behind
antidiscrimination regulations in Fortune 1000 companies. However, the
author also states that without the cultural capacity to allow such a
“transgression” against traditional norms, activism would not be possible
in the first place (Raeburn 2004).
Although a lot of evidence points to the influence of local culture and
conditions on the introduction of these policies, it has to be mentioned
that the internal pressure to implement these policies is often higher in
industrialized, urban regions due to the higher chances of a more diverse
community (Colvin 2004).
According to Taylor and colleagues (2012) the risk of adoption of
LGBTQ+ as well as transgender rights also depends highly on the specific
subject of the policy: While regulations providing antidiscrimination
protections on the basis of sexual orientation are highly dependent on
internal political factors such as the capacity and use of local initia-
tives, education rate, and a divided government; for gender identity
issues, this is not the case. The authors add that even though there are
no clear diffusion pathways discernible, the isomorphism they found
between countries is suspicious and does hint toward a world society
model of policy diffusion. Another indicator supporting the influence of
world society has been found by Fernández and Lutter (2013) as well.
This study finds that political, secular-rational values as well as socioe-
conomic factors drive the implementation of these policies, aside from
world society ties. World society ties are here defined as membership
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in different IOs and ratified human rights treaties. Interesting in this
study is the positive effect of domestic cultural, rational values. These
results indicate that not only are local cultural conditions such as female
empowerment, activism , and economic factors influencing the imple-
mentation of these policies, but also ties through shared IO membership
and shared perspectives on human rights.
Despite these studies showing the increase of LGBTQ+ protection
regulations, several studies have found that with growing advocacy
groups and international visibility, the resistance to implement these
norms is also growing. Outside the West, resistance of local LGBTQ+
groups is rising, which becomes visible through disagreements with the
international norm, as well as activism groups, especially human rights
organizations, not wanting their arguments to be “hijacked” (“gay rights
are human rights”). This can put pressure on local lawmakers to prevent
the implementation of LGBTQ+ rights (Velasco 2018). Rahman (2014)
also points out, that in many countries not classified as “the West,” the
international pressure to implement legal regulations which were previ-
ously implemented in the West can lead to what the author calls a
“homocolonialist” perspective. The resistance to these laws has less to
do with the subject itself, but rather with the opposition to the West,
especially if the invoked Western exceptionalism fosters a confronta-
tional, hierarchical relationship between countries, where not adopting
these norms is not only seen as “trailing behind” but even as “infe-
rior.” Thus, when the international pressure to implement LGBTQ+ laws
does not respect individual societal backgrounds and instead antagonizes
society and lawmakers alike, even shaming the country internationally,
this pressure can lead to an oppositional action (Terman 2019).
As these studies show, there are many local but also transnational
conditions fostering the implementation of LGBTQ+ policies. A new
factor in this chapter is the use of exposure to countries with shared
cultural characteristics as a transnational network of influence. Are
lawmakers only responding to local cultural conditions or are they also
reacting to actions of lawmakers in countries with a similar cultural
profile? Based on these results, the following aspects are considered in
this analysis: aside from a network of cultural similarity, colonial ties,
spatial proximity, and trade, several societal conditions were included:
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a gender equality index as well as the ratification of the ILO conven-
tion C111 against discrimination, GDP per capita and a democratization
index. Furthermore, as a proxy for embeddedness in world culture, the
indegree of the trade network is used. Trade openness (Busemeyer 2009)
was tested for, but not included.
Data andMethods
The chapter analyzes predictors influencing the introduction and diffu-
sion of workplace antidiscrimination laws for the LGBTQ+ community
from 1949 until 2010 for N = 164 countries. The data was collected
from the ILGA reports on State-Sponsored Homophobia (e.g., Mendos
et al. 2020). These regulations include all acts or laws that prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation, even if this stipulation is one
of several mentioned in the act. For example, New Zealand included
sexual orientation for the first time in 1993: Section 21(1)(m) of the
Human Rights Act names sexual orientation among the prohibited
grounds of discrimination. Article 22 of this act prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment, thereby covering discrimination in employment
based on sexual orientation. This regulation was then revised and in
2000, Article 105(1)(m) of the Employment Relations Act specifically
prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. In
many cases, acts were vague at first, only covering sexual orientation
and gender identity was added later on. France for example, named
sexual orientation in 1985 as grounds protected against discrimination
under the Labour Code and in 2008, gender identity was included. All
first mentions of protection against discrimination or equal treatment in
occupation, workplace, trade, or profession with regards to sexual pref-
erence or orientation were included. If sexual orientation was included
as an amendment, the date of amendment was set as the introduction.
Introductions were only coded if the regulation was introduced for the
entire state. In cases like the United States, for example, some local
states introduced antidiscrimination laws much earlier than the federal
level: The District of Columbia covered sexual orientation already in
240 H. Seitzer
1973 (D.C. Code § 2–1402.11),4 but it was only included in federal
legislation in 2020. In this case, the federal regulation was coded.
The networks on shared cultural characteristics (or cultural spheres),
which are considered of special interest in this chapter, include indica-
tors of political liberties, rule of law, gender roles, dominant religion,
language group, government ideology, classification of civilization, and
colonial past (Besche-Truthe et al. 2020). In addition, a network of
trade (Barbieri and Keshk 2016), colonial relationships (Becker, 2019
enriched with Head and Mayer, 2014; and our own data collection
using Wikipedia), and spatial proximity (Eiser et al. 2020) is considered
to potentially influence the diffusion process (see Mossig et al. 2021,
in this volume, for a detailed description of the data and procedure).
Aside from the network exposure, several indicators were included: The
degree of trade, describing the number of trade ties a country has in
any given year as indicator for a countries’ embeddedness into a glob-
alized world. More ties in trade could indicate a deeper embeddedness
in world society and therefore a stronger pressure to implement antidis-
crimination regulations. This indicator is not to be confused with a trade
openness measure (Busemeyer 2009), which was tested but not signifi-
cant. Additionally, GDP per capita (Inklaar et al. 2018) was controlled
for, missing data on this indicator was interpolated with a logistic func-
tion to account for the nonlinear rise of GDP. Further, the democracy
index from the V-Dem Project (Lührmann et al. 2018) was included.
Missing data points were interpolated linearly. These indicators allow
testing for the influence of economic situation as well as political regime.
Also, a historical gender equality index was included, to account for
local awareness of equality and potential activism (Dilli et al. 2019). The
missing time points were interpolated linearly as well. Finally, the ratifi-
cation of the ILO Discrimination (Labour and Occupation) Convention
C111 regarding antidiscrimination was controlled to identify if the ratifi-
cation of a general agreement regarding antidiscrimination irrespective of
sexual orientation, had an influence on the adoption of this more specific
4 https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council/code/sections/2-1402.11.html.
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antidiscrimination regulation (data collected by Hahs, Chapter 8 in this
volume). This influence has not been tested in other studies before. The
diffusion of the ratification of this ILO convention is analyzed in this
volume as well, further information can be found in Chapter 8 by Hahs.
For the analysis the R package netdiffuseR (Vega Yon and Valente
2020) was used. Exposure is defined as the share of j adopters in the
ego-centered network of node i (i = j ) at time t. Exposure is set to
influence the adoption rate between t and t + 1 (Valente 1995). If all
countries, one specific country (ego) is connected to have implemented
the policy before ego, exposure is 1. If none have adopted, exposure is 0
(see Mossig et al. 2021, in this volume, for details of these concepts). The
weighted exposure term is then used in a discrete-time logistic-hazard
model to predict its influence on the introduction probability of the
dependent variable. Once a country has introduced the policy, it leaves
the risk set. Introductions after 2010 are right-censored. The standard
errors were corrected with a clustering indicator for historically depen-
dent units, such as the former Yugoslavia, which could introduce a policy
for multiple modern political entities at once. The logistic hazard model
is only estimated for the years 1949 until 2010, as antidiscrimination
only came onto the international agenda in 1948 with the signing of the
UHDR. As mentioned previously, this is because this convention is often
used to argue for the introduction of antidiscrimination regulations and
is therefore seen as the starting date for the public and political debate
about antidiscrimination laws. The effects are displayed in hazard ratios,
coefficients greater than 1 denote a positive effect, coefficients smaller
than 1 denote a negative effect.
Results
Figure 9.2 shows a world map of the diffusion of antidiscrimination
policies for the LGBTQ+ community. The figure demonstrates that this
policy is a new topic and has made significant changes in the last few
years, especially after 2010. Most policy fields included in this volume
have an “epicenter” of policy origin, in this case, it is European and other
English-speaking countries.
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Fig. 9.2 The global diffusion of antidiscrimination regulations in the workplace
for the LGBTQ+ community
Table 9.1 shows the hazard ratios of the discrete-time hazard model
of introduction of antidiscrimination regulations in the workplace for
the LGBTQ+ community. The logistic-hazard model includes N = 126
countries.5 The original dataset in this volume includes political enti-
ties which are important for the exposure through the networks but are
no longer existent, and not all datasets of the independent variables can
provide information on these entities—resulting in a reduced sample.
5 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo—Brazzaville, Congo—Kinshasa,
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
> 1995 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
1995–2003 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
2004–2010 0.000*** 0.00000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
GDP per capita/10000
USD
1.170 1.123 1.194 1.209
democratization 1.699*** 1.685*** 1.864*** 1.849***
ratification of ILO
convention C-111
3.507 2.964 2.456 2.406
gender equality index 1.139*** 1.132*** 1.143*** 1.144***
degree trade network 1.025* 1.020+ 1.028* 1.030*
cultural spheres net.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
0.011* 0.011* 0.001** 0.001**
colonies net.: w. exposure 0.371* 0.359* 0.321*
trade net.: w. exposure
(lag 1 year)
98.960 204.648
spatial proximity net.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
0.339
Observations 7448 7448 7448 7448
Log Likelihood −150.315 −148.107 −146.619 −146.545
Akaike Inf. Crit 318.631 316.214 315.239 317.09
Note + p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
The time sections were chosen depending on the cumulative adoption
function of the policies (see Fig. 9.1).
The model shows that GDP per capita has no significant positive
effect on the introduction of workplace antidiscrimination regulations.
In contrast, the effect of the democratization index is positive and signif-
icant in all models. Interestingly, the signing of the ILO convention
C111 regarding antidiscrimination does not have a significant effect on
the introduction of antidiscrimination laws for the protection of the
LGBTQ+ community. The gender equality index is significant and posi-
tive as well, denoting that countries with more women in power, in the
workplace, and involved in public life, are more likely to also introduce
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antidiscrimination laws to protect LGBTQ+ people in the labor force
This is in line with findings from Velasco (2018) and others, showing
that in general, a higher prevalence of women’s rights activism and public
participation in a country has positive effects on LGBTQ+ rights and
representations.
Another interesting result is the degree effect of the trade network,
showing the effect of a larger number of trade partners on the risk of
adopting policies regardless of exposure to already “infected” countries.
Countries with more ties in trade have a higher risk of implementing
these regulations. In terms of exposure through the networks, we can see
that the exposure effect through the cultural spheres network converges
toward 0—in hazard ratios, this is a large negative effect. The effect
is statistically significant. The negative sign is an initially counterintu-
itive result. Similarly, ties based on colonial relationships have a negative,
significant effect on a normalized model. The exposure through these
particular networks slows the diffusion process down or even prevents
it. The exposure through the trade network is insignificant and posi-
tive, but also incredibly large. To test if the trade embeddedness effect
could be representative for trade openness (total trade/GDP; Busemeyer
2009), this effect was tested as well, but was not significant.6 The pseudo-
R-square measure by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) however indicates
that the trade embeddedness effect contributes significantly to the model
fit, as it improves from 0.74 to 0.83 with the inclusion of the trade
degree effect. Spatial proximity has no significant effect. To take different
methods of calculating exposure into account, the exposure calculation
for the colonial ties network was changed to represent a non-normalized
coefficient (the exposure effect reduces over time instead of remaining
stable after decolonization). This model can be found in the appendix.
Although the colonial ties network loses its significance, the effect direc-
tions and sizes of all other coefficients remain relatively stable, supporting
the findings.
6 Model not shown.
9 The Diffusion of Workplace Antidiscrimination Regulations … 245
As a result, I therefore conclude that (1) the cultural spheres network
does not aid in the diffusion of antidiscrimination laws. While the influ-
ence of exposure through the cultural spheres network is significant, the
effect is negative. It therefore seems to hinder diffusion instead. However,
while cultural similarity seems to halt the diffusion. (2) Being embedded
in a trade network has a positive effect, regardless of previous adoptions
through other countries. And (3) domestic factors are the main drivers
of this policy type. As gender equality and democratization index have
such strong positive effects, the influence of local culture is undeniable.
However, this instance seems to depend on the local problem pressure
and situation and much less on transnational pressure. The international
community of world society does not seem to influence the diffusion
of this type of policy, rather, it seems to slow the diffusion down. This
finding might hint towards a similar mechanism as discussed by Terman
(2019), according to whom global pressure and a mismatch to local
conditions can hinder the implementation of these policies. The frequent
interaction with other countries through trade does have some effect, but
it does not justify a diffusion model in the classical sense.
Conclusion & Discussion
In this chapter, I have examined the diffusion of antidiscrimination
regulations in the workplace for the LGBTQ+ community. I have
tested the influence of exposure through networks of cultural simi-
larity, colonial past, trade, and spatial proximity. In addition, I tested
the influence of domestic conditions, such as GDP per capita, gender
equality, democracy, and the ratification of the ILO’s C111 convention
for antidiscrimination (ILO 1958).
The results are somewhat expected and in line with previous research,
but also interesting, especially regarding the influence of culture.
Domestic factors, mainly the democratization index and the gender
equality index have a very strong positive impact on the introduc-
tion of antidiscrimination regulations. Countries with women in power
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and active in public life are more likely to implement antidiscrimina-
tion regulations for the community. This is not surprising, as previous
research has found this association as well (Johnson 2016; Velasco 2018).
Interestingly, the ratification of the ILO’s C111 convention did not have
any significant effect, a result counterintuitive to the common line of
argumentation in previous research that international organizations drive
the diffusion of this policy type. On the other hand, the ratification
of this policy might as well be “myth and ceremony” to appease world
society, while being not implemented on a local level (Meyer and Rowan
1977). In addition, the organizations credited with success for the imple-
mentation of policies supporting the LGBTQ+ community are usually
topic-specific and very active on a local level, in contrast to the transna-
tional scope of the ILO (Velasco 2018). A country’s embeddedness in the
globalized world through the trade network also has a positive impact.
Trade with many different countries might go along with a certain level
of openness. This effect is not to be confused with the classical measures
for trade openness, the proportion of trade on GDP, which was not
significant in this analysis. The important aspect for this measurement is
then the number of ties, rather than the percentage of trade on national
GDP. This effect might be spurious, as Western, industrialized, English-
speaking countries, who tend to trade more than most other countries,
have already adopted the policy, as Fig. 9.2 suggests. This supports the
suspicion that this policy does not diffuse via the expected pathway—if at
all—and relies more on domestic factors. The most interesting result of
the analysis is the negative effect of the cultural spheres network. Coun-
tries sharing cultural characteristics do not cause contagion, in contrast,
it slows the diffusion down. However, this might be the case for only
some countries: Fig. 9.2 indicates, in contrast to the analysis results, that
language, and therefore one aspect of cultural similarity as measured in
the network, seems to be an influence on the adoption of antidiscrim-
ination policies. My suspicion therefore is that culture does matter in
the implementation of this policy, however, it might only be a positive
influence for some cultural spheres, while hindering diffusion in others.
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Aside from the effect of trade, none of the exposure terms were posi-
tive. This leads to the conclusion that this type of policy does not diffuse
through networks of shared cultural characteristics or similarity, at least
not for all cultural spheres. The negative exposure term of culture can
also be explained by adverse effects through shaming (Terman 2019)
and a polarization to the Western “homocolonialist” agenda, as Rahman
described it (2014). The results are in line with previous studies high-
lighting the importance of local activism and local problem pressure to
implement LGBTQ+ protection policies. It seems that this specific policy
does not follow the “usual” social policy diffusion pathways, but depends
on local conditions, such as societal values instead of global influence.
Limitations
As with any other study, this analysis has limitations. The missing data
for GDP per capita had to be interpolated. Additionally, the oil crisis in
1973 led to a very sharp increase in GDP per capita for Kuwait, Qatar,
Norway, and the United Arab Emirates, resulting in outliers potentially
influencing the analysis—even though this data is not a measurement
error. Additionally, the gender equality index had to be interpolated as
well, as this indicator ends in 2003. Second, the starting point of the
logistic hazard model is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, as countries were
at ‘risk’ of implementing these policies far before 1949. The changes to
this policy in the last 10 years were drastic and an expansion of the data
is planned. The use of discrete-time points is another limitation here;
however, the model fit did not significantly change with the use of time as
a linear predictor.7 Furthermore, the particularities of modelling longitu-
dinal analyses with a changing country sample for the same geographical
area have to be kept in mind. It would be beneficial to include IO
or NGO networks into this analysis, as they are potentially stronger
drivers for this policy than the included networks, as research shows
7 Model not shown.
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(e.g., Velasco 2020a), but the interaction between the present networks
and IO membership is left for future research to discover. In addition,
measures for local activism and interest groups could also shed more light
on the implementation of these policies. Culture as a predictor of this
policy is irrefutable, but there might be conflicting aspects of culture not
clearly distinguishable with the cultural spheres network. As mentioned
before, certain religious orientations are a counterproductive character-
istic (Rahman 2014), but have been combined into the network with
other characteristics such as government ideology, resulting in the above
effects. In addition, it has to be mentioned that world society models
can only provide limited explanations in some cases, as they do not fully
account for prolonged adverse effects of exposure. Previous studies could
show that controversial issues such as LGBTQ+ rights might not be fully
captured through this theoretical framing, as norms in society have to be
shared, but the pressure through this model mainly rests on policymakers
(Velasco 2020b). Roberts (2019) suggests the use of multiple moderni-
ties theory instead to take a closer look at culture-specific attitudes and
reactions to international pressure. Despite these limitations, I feel that
the model presented here still shows interesting results, as they reveal
the strong influence of local conditions over the networks, and the nega-
tive effect of cultural similarity, pointing toward different mechanisms of
policy diffusion in contrast to other studies in this volume, depending
on the specific policy.
Appendix
See Table (9.2)
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Table 9.2 The introduction of workplace antidiscrimination regulations, N =
126 countries, 1949–2010 non-normalized colonial network
Introduction of workplace
antidiscrimination laws
(1) (2) (3) (4)
> 1995 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
1995–2003 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
2004–2010 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
GDP per capita/10000
USD
1.170 1.183 1.260 1.226
democratization 1.699*** 1.678*** 1.870*** 1.898**
ratification of ILO
convention C-111
3.507 3.596 3.063 3.063
gender equality index 1.139*** 1.134*** 1.144*** 1.143***
degree trade network 1.025* 1.022+ 1.030* 1.027+
cultural spheres net.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
0.011* 0.011* 0.0004** 0.0003**
colonies net.: w. exposure
non-normalized
0.233 0.166 0.199
trade net.: w. exposure
(lag 1 year)
123.221 45.839
spatial proximity net.: w.
exposure (lag 1 year)
4.486
Observations 7448 7448 7448 7448
Log Likelihood −150.315 −149.912 −148.423 −148.229
Akaike Inf. Crit 318.631 319.824 318.846 320.459
Note + p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Carina Schmitt and Herbert Obinger
Introduction1
This volume examines the spread of different social policies around the
world. It analyzes at the macro-level the importance of cultural, colo-
nial, and trade networks for the global diffusion of health care systems,
education, work injury, antidiscrimination, and family policies as well
1This chapter is a product of the research conducted in the Collaborative Research Center
“Global Dynamics of Social Policy” at the University of Bremen. The center is funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation)—project
number 374666841—SFB 1342.
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as labor regulations. All chapters have applied a uniform methodolog-
ical approach that enables a comparison of social policy dynamics and
an evaluation of the importance of different networks over time as well
as across different social policy fields.
The Diffusion of Social Policies Around
theWorld
Figure 10.1 illustrates the spread of the ten social policies analyzed in the
previous chapters. While the x-axis shows the year of program adoption,
the y-axis depicts the cumulative number of countries on a global scale
that has introduced the respective social policy. For many programs, the
spread of social policies follows an S-curve which is indicative of policy
diffusion. It is striking, however, that the diffusion processes differ greatly
Fig. 10.1 The introduction of ten social policies around the world
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between the individual programs in terms of timing, adoption rate, and
speed. For example, while the introduction of compulsory education
and work injury schemes started relatively early, the diffusion of family
policies began at a much later stage. Moreover, there is a remarkable
variation in the number of countries that have adopted the respective
policy. Today, almost all countries worldwide have established health care
systems, compulsory education, work injury programs as well as paid
maternity leave, and antidiscrimination regulations regarding employ-
ment and occupation. By contrast, long-term care, child benefits, and
workplace childcare as well as adult basic education and LGBTQ+ poli-
cies are far less common. With regard to the speed of introduction, work
injury schemes, health care systems, and paid maternity leave spread
much more rapidly than compulsory education. In the case of the more
recent social policies, the figure suggests that labor-related programs such
as the ratification of the ILO antidiscrimination convention or adult
basic education spread faster than family and long-term care policies.
Table 10.1 supports this pattern. For example, the average adoption
year for workers’ compensation schemes is 1932, compared to 1991
Table 10.1 The spread of social policies around the globe
Social policy field n Adoption rate Min Mean Median Sd
Work injury 159 0.97 1854 1932 1928 26.1
ILO Convention 156 0.95 1959 1979 1975 17.0
Health care
system
161 0.98 1883 1953 1958 31.9
Long-term care 48 0.29 1948 1991 1995 17.6
Compulsory
education
154 0.94 1739 1927 1925 56.5
Adult basic
education
130 0.79 1921 1986 1991 19.4
Antidiscrimation
LGBTQ+
66 0.40 1985 2005 2005 7.6
Paid maternity
leave
153 0.93 1884 1948 1952 26.7
Child benefits 90 0.55 1926 1956 1950 21.8
Workplace
Childcare
98 0.60 1902 1951 1952 25.5
Notes n = Number of countries with the respective program in place; adoption
rate = n/ 164; min= first year of introduction, sd = standard deviation
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for long-term care. The adoption rate, i.e., the proportion of countries
with the respective social policy in place in relation to all countries, also
reflects significant differences across various programs. While the adop-
tion rate for work injury, health care systems, the ratification of the ILO’s
antidiscrimination directive, and maternity protection is over 0.9, the
values for long-term care and child benefits are significantly lower. Inter-
estingly, the standard deviation of the year of introduction of compulsory
education is high compared to all other policies, indicating that here the
diffusion process lasted much longer than with all other programs.
Figure 10.2 shows the timing of the inaugural legislation of four
major social security programs, namely, work injury schemes, health care
systems, compulsory education, and paid maternity leave.
Figure 10.2 illustrates marked cross-regional and program-related
differences. While European countries, Russia (Soviet Union), and Latin
American countries introduced all four policies relatively early, the vast
majority of African states adopted social policy programs comparably late
or not at all yet. The countries in North America, notably the United
States, clearly deviate from the overall pattern in the Global north.
The Influence of Networks on the Diffusion
of Social Policies
All chapters in this volume have analyzed the influence of the same set of
networks for explaining the diffusion of different social policies. Specif-
ically, the importance of cultural, colonial, and trade relations is tested
and contrasted with the effects of a network capturing geographical prox-
imity. The overall findings reveal that the importance of international
linkages captured by different network types is not homogeneous across
the social policies examined. For example, Chapter 2 has shown that the
network of spatial proximity is significant for understanding the intro-
duction of work injury schemes. In the case of compulsory education
(see Chapter 3), cultural linkages seem to have some effect on policy
diffusion (at least when spatial proximity is not controlled for).
Interestingly, neither colonial ties nor trade relations have been iden-
tified in these chapters as important explanatory factors. By contrast,
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(a) Work Injury Systems  
(b) Health Care Systems
Fig. 10.2 The introduction of four basic social policies by regions. a Work Injury
Systems. b Health Care Systems. c Paid Maternity Leave. d Compulsory Education
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c) Paid Maternity Leave   
d) Compulsory Education 
Fig. 10.2 (continued)
Chapter 4 on adult basic education, regulating access to training in basic
reading, writing, and numeracy skills for those who did not have the
chance to learn it in formal education, does find some evidence that
colonial ties matter. It is argued in that chapter that the importance of
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colonial linkages can be attributed to coercive diffusion, as the USSR
imposed this policy on its satellite states. In the case of health care
systems (see Chapter 5), the authors conclude that health care systems
are more likely to have been introduced in earlier periods in affluent
countries connected by close trade relations. Later on, other factors like
nation-building processes in former colonies gained importance. While
also geographical proximity was important, colonial ties did not seem to
play a role for legislative activities in this field. With regard to long-term
care (see Chapter 6), geographical proximity turned out to be the most
relevant network driving the international proliferation of this program.
In the case of paid maternity leave (see Chapter 7), program adop-
tion is influenced by continuous advocacy as well as technical assistance
provided by the ILO.
By contrast, workplace childcare facilities are shaped by colonial
ties. More specifically, workplace childcare regulations were particularly
widespread in former French colonies. Chapter 8, which analyzes the
ratification of ILO’s antidiscrimination convention from 1958, only
finds evidence for the relevance of geographical proximity. All other
networks play a minor role in the diffusion process. With regard to
LGBTQ+ policies, diffusion seems to be driven to some extent by trade
relations with other countries. Interestingly, the effect of cultural spheres
has even been identified as negative (see Chapter 9).
Apart from the various international linkages that swayed the spread
of social policies, domestic factors also have to be examined. Democ-
ratization processes have been identified as a key driving factor for the
introduction of work injury programs, long-term care, and the adop-
tion of LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination policies. In the case of the latter
the state of gender equality at the domestic level increased the proba-
bility of a country enacting antidiscrimination policies. In addition, state
formation is crucial for the adoption of work injury programs, while
family allowances are spurred by low fertility levels. The introduction
of long-term care has mostly been a reaction to population aging and
strong political and social participation of women in the respective coun-
tries, while economic prosperity was important for the early introduction
of health care systems. Lastly, the ratification of the ILO’s discrimina-
tion convention is highly influenced by the legal origin of a country,
particularly the French legal tradition.
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To summarize, this book contributes to the literature in the following
respects. Firstly, several social policies and different types of networks
were considered simultaneously. This allows us to study and compare
program-related policy diffusion and to evaluate the importance of
different types of international and transnational relations for social
protection legislation. The findings suggest that spatial proximity is the
most relevant network in this regard. Geographical proximity implies
strong international linkages in many respects such as cross-border
migration, cultural ties, and trade relations. Moreover, all these linkages
are indicative of intensive cross-border communication, which is widely
seen as a main prerequisite for policy diffusion.
Secondly, all individual chapters show that it is the interplay between
international interdependencies and national factors that explains the
adoption and spread of social policies. In terms of domestic determi-
nants, the results presented in the book chapters suggest that democ-
ratization processes are of central importance. Interestingly, the results
for economic variables such as economic prosperity are very heteroge-
neous, indicating that the diffusion of social policies does not follow
the linear logic emphasized by modernization theory (Wilensky 1975).
Rather, in line with the findings by Collier and Messick (1975), it seems
that economic development is only relevant in the early stages of program
adoption, while at later stages international factors such as international
organizations or horizontal diffusion between states become increasingly
important.
Lastly, the book analyzes the diffusion of social policies for a global
sample and thus overcomes the bias towards OECD countries that is
typical for the vast majority of the pertinent literature. Existing research
not only focuses on the spread of policies within the OECD world, but
often also restricts the analysis of international interdependencies to rela-
tionships between Western countries. However, policymaking in OECD
countries as well as elsewhere is shaped by global economic relations,
cultural and colonial ties linking countries across regions and conti-
nents (Schmitt et al. 2015; Schmitt 2020). It is necessary to take all
interdependencies into account that have relevance to a specific national
policymaking process.
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Critical Outlook
While some key challenges in the diffusion literature have been addressed
in this volume, the approach suggested here also has its limits. Addressing
them opens up promising avenues for further research.
To begin with, several chapters have shown that geographical prox-
imity is the most relevant network for understanding welfare legislation.
However, the advantage, mentioned above, that spatial proximity is a
strong indication for the relevance of international relationships, is also
its disadvantage, as it subsumes many different types of interdependen-
cies. Spatial proximity is a catch-all indicator comprising cultural ties,
close communication or important trade relations between neighboring
countries. Disentangling these overlapping linkages that are altogether
reflected by spatial proximity is a major challenge for further studies.
Moreover, actors have not been considered in this volume. This
is problematic as neither communication nor the transmission and
processing of information is possible without agency. A promising next
step towards a more comprehensive understanding of diffusion processes
would be to directly measure cross-border communication or informa-
tion exchange between actors, rather than extrapolating the intensity
of cross-border communication from cultural, spatial, and economic
relationships between states.
In this volume, the relevance of four different networks, i.e., cultural,
colonial, economic relations as well as geographical proximity between
countries was tested. However, countries are connected with each other
via more than these four networks. Important networks not considered
here are, for example, constituted by migration or communication flows.
However, as the chapters cover a long time span stretching from the late
nineteenth century to the present, the possibility of integrating these
networks is limited, because bilateral and dyadic information for the
formative period of the welfare state is scarce. Collecting further network
information from earlier periods would be a promising avenue to come
towards a more comprehensive understanding of long-term social policy
diffusion.
A further problem refers to data quality, which is likely to vary greatly
across the long time periods considered in this book. It is plausible that
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the quality of data for the formative period of social policy in the late
nineteenth century is much lower compared to that of contemporary
data.
In the diffusion literature, several mechanisms underlying diffusion
processes such as learning, imitation, coercion, and competition are
discussed (Simmons et al. 2008; Simmons and Elkins 2004). However,
it is very difficult—if not impossible, especially for macro-quantitative
studies—to identify which diffusion mechanism ultimately gave rise
to policy diffusion, as many of these mechanisms clearly overlap. For
example, learning and emulation are closely connected and hard to sepa-
rate from each other. Do governments really get a better understanding
of the causal mechanisms between policies and outcomes from expe-
riences made by other countries, or do they simply comply with the
policies adopted in a particular peer group for symbolic reasons? To
answer this question we need theoretical clarifications as well as alter-
native methodological tools that allow us to distinguish between the
different mechanisms underlying policy diffusion (Obinger et al. 2013).
Moreover, the analysis of the impact of international interdependen-
cies and networks on domestic social policy dynamics is restricted to the
adoption of similar policies. However, it is also possible that governments
deliberately refrain from adopting a policy because they have learned
from the failure of similar policies implemented abroad (Marsh and
Sharman 2009; Shipan and Volden 2012). This type of learning cannot
be captured by contemporary statistical techniques. In a similar vein,
governments might implement alternative policies because they cannot
or do not want to pursue the same policy strategy as competing coun-
tries. One way of dealing with this problem is to study policy diffusion
not only by analyzing policies that have already been implemented, but
also by examining the policy formulation process, or what Gilardi et al.
(2021) call the issue definition stage.
Diffusion processes are also dependent on the characteristics of a
particular policy. Diffusion should vary with the complexity and observ-
ability of specific reforms. Complexity is “the degree to which an
innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and use”
(Rogers 2004, p. 242). Technically complex policies are not easy to
translate into legislation. The policy effects are not clearly observable or
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ambiguous, whereas the necessity of technical and scientific expertise to
link solutions to policy problems is typically high (Makse and Volden
2011, p. 111; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley 2016).
Furthermore, the fit between policies adopted abroad and national
circumstances might be a crucial factor when examining why some coun-
tries adopt specific policies and not others. A policy is more likely to
spread among those countries in which it is compatible with the existing
national institutional setting (Pacheco 2012). Compatibility is “the
degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with existing
values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters” (Rogers 2004,
p. 224). If a policy of a foreign state can easily be combined with another
country’s existing policies, it is more likely to be adopted (Boushey 2010;
Shipan and Volden 2012). To test whether the institutional fit or policy
compatibility between countries influences the diffusion process, indi-
cators that describe the institutional structure and the existing (social)
policy portfolio of each country could be used to generate time-varying
similarity matrices, e.g., by using two-mode networks.
Overall, the methodological approach applied in this volume has its
strengths and provides interesting insights. However, it also has weak-
nesses. Many aspects, such as the direct transfer of a particular policy
from one country to another, can only be addressed with qualitative, in-
depth studies. Recent scholarly work in the social sciences has shown
promising ways as to how this can be done (Kuhlmann et al. 2020;
Starke 2013). Diffusion research must also consider the approaches and
methods of transnational historical research and global history (Kettunen
and Petersen 2011; Rodgers 2014). In short, interdisciplinary collabora-
tion and the consistent application of mixed methods designs are needed
more than ever in order to better understand both the contextuality and
the patterns of global social policy diffusion.
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